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Samenvatting 149xC O N T E N T SChapter 1
Introduction and overview of the
thesis
1.1 Introduction
Natural resources such as stocks of ﬁsh, stands of trees, fresh water, oil, and other
naturally occurring resources are used for a variety of consumptive and productive
purposes. Moreover, natural resources as a whole support life, and serve in partic-
ular, as receptors of waste products stemming from the process of production and
consumption. We can think of a natural resource as a unique factor input, but
most natural resources have characteristics that make them very similar to capital
(Hartwick and Olewiler, 1998).
In the absence of exclusive property rights and markets, conﬂicts over competing
uses are unavoidable. For example, the lack of ﬁshing rights and the migratory
behavior of ﬁsh in the ocean have led to a series of conﬂicts between France and
Spain over tuna ﬁshing in the Bay of Biscay in 1994, and between the European
Community and Canada over ﬁshing oﬀ the coast of Greenland in 1995. Depending
on the property rights of the resource, and environmental factors aﬀecting net growth
rates and resulting biomass levels, a natural resource may tend to ﬂourish or to
fade. The collapse of the Peruvian anchovy ﬁshery in 1972-1973 (10.5 MMT in 1971
to 4.7 MMT, according to Royce, 1987) and the Northern Cod stock complex oﬀ
Newfoundland in 1995 (OECD, 1997) are evident examples.
Economists view natural resources as a composite asset that provides a variety
of services. Moreover, it is a very special asset, and undue depreciation of the value
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of this asset must be prevented so that it may continue to provide aesthetic and
life-sustaining services. Today, newspapers and public aﬀairs television programs
remind us regularly of the exhaustion of ﬁsh stocks, the increase of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere, the destruction of forests, reductions of oil reserves, land con-
straints on world food production and the rapidly growing population and cities in
the world. Natural resources must all be managed through preservation programs.
Management should be understood broadly, including joint cooperation exploita-
tion and conservation of the resources, and the related natural environment. The
detailed management plans will be determined by the management organizations in
order to control the exploitation and achieve desired results of using resources.
While the details of each resource management problem are diﬀerent, they all
have one particular feature in common: they involve strategic interactions and in-
terdependencies among parties. For instance, a ﬁshery situation depends upon the
harvest levels of all ﬁshing nations. The threat of conﬂicts in the major ﬁsheries of
the world have forced the ﬁshing nations to negotiate in the United Nations. Since
sovereign countries have diﬀerent preferences, they view the management of ﬁsheries
from their own perspectives. This makes it diﬃcult to coordinate resource manage-
ment eﬀectively. Hence, a major challenge in theory (as well as in practice) is how
to achieve eﬃcient, stable binding international agreements on high seas ﬁsheries.
M e a s u r e sl i k et h ee x c l u s i v ee c o n o m i cz o n e( E E Z )h a v ee ﬀectively nationalized most
of the world’s commercial ﬁsheries, which has impacted all countries that used to
harvest the resource or that intended to do so. Reaching a regional ﬁshery agree-
ment for reducing ﬁshing eﬀort or a harvest level has proved to be a diﬃcult task.
These strategic interdependencies involve interactive decision making; they can thus
be easily modelled as a game, and analyzed, at least theoretically.
Game theory is a set of analytical tools designed to help us understand the
situations in which a decision maker’s behavior aﬀects not only his or her own
gains and losses, but also those of other decision makers. Recently, game theory
has become an indispensable tool in environmental and resource economics (for
discussions, see, for example, Vrieze, 1995; Hanley and Folmer, 1998) because many
of the typical features of environmental problems can be most adequately handled
by means of game theoretic notions and models. Game theory provides powerful
new tools to analyze externalities that occur in the context of the management of
natural resource assets. The main theme of this thesis is to focus on some classes of
games with their applications to the management of such assets.1.2. Game theory 3
The thesis is a collection of essays in game theory and applications of game
theory to analyze environmental resource problems and their management. In the
thesis, a resource problem refers to situations characterized by ineﬃcient use of a
resource, while resource management is deﬁned as the design of resource allocation
mechanisms, which leads to the eﬃcient use of the resource. A major focus of the
essays in game theory (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) is related to coalitional games, whereas
the main issue of the applications (Chapters 6 and 7 ) is related to international
ﬁsheries management in the context of the 1995 United Nations Agreement on the
Implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The ﬁve essays are
connected by the notion of “fair” solution applied to achieve eﬃcient use of the
resource.
In what follows, section 1.2 will motivate what and how diﬀerent approaches
of game theory would be relevant in the context of this thesis. Section 1.3 will
then provide a brief description of the nature of natural resource problems and in
particular, the problem of high seas ﬁsheries management. Section 1.4 provides
a brief review of game theoretic approaches to ﬁsheries management. Finally, an
overview of the thesis is given.
1.2 Game theory
Game theory studies the behavior of decision makers (“players”) whose decisions af-
fect each other. Game theoretical approaches usually are classiﬁed into two branches:
noncooperative and cooperative game theory. “Noocooperative” refers to the fact
that players cannot make binding agreements, whereas in “cooperative” it is as-
sumed that players can.
Noncooperative game theory deals largely with how intelligent individuals in-
teract with one another in an eﬀort to achieve their own goals. Cooperative game
theory, on the other hand, deals with the options available to the group: what coali-
tions form, how the available payoﬀ is divided. A rough analogy, as remarked by
Aumann (1997), is the distinction between micro and macroeconomics. Noncooper-
ative game theory is a kind of micro theory; it involves descriptions of behaviours.
Cooperative game theory studies games from a macro viewpoint; it is concerned
with how things look “on the whole” by focusing on the feasible outcomes that can
be obtained by enforceable commitments.
In noncooperative game theory, the emphasis is on the strategies of players and4 1. Introduction and overview of the thesis
the consequences of the interaction of strategies on payoﬀs. The purpose of nonco-
operative approach is to make predictions on the “internal” stable outcome. That
is, a situation in which no player should have an incentive to deviate, the so-called
Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950).
In cooperative game theory, one abstracts from the speciﬁcs of the strategies
interaction, and the emphasis is on the possibilities of cooperation among players.
It is often assumed that utility is transferable. The question that this approach
deals with is how the value that the grand coalition (all players together as a whole)
can achieve should be divided over all players. The main issue is thus to ﬁnd ways
of dividing a certain surplus (or cost) among a group of players. The core and the
Shapley value are two important solution concepts in this context.
Since both approaches can be considered as two ways of looking at the same
problem (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1997), there is a close relation between the two
approaches. Nash (1951) proposed that cooperation between players can be studied
by using a similar concept to the Nash equilibrium. He argued that cooperative
actions are the result of some process of bargaining among the “cooperating” players;
in this bargaining process, each player should be expected to behave according
to some bargaining strategy that satisﬁes the same personal utility maximization
criterion as in any other game situation (Nash, 1950). That is, in any real situation,
if we look at what people can do to reach an agreement on a joint cooperative
strategy, in general we should be able to model it as a game in noncooperative form
and then predict the outcome by analyzing the set of equilibria (Myerson, 1991).
Therefore, if we are interested in feasible outcomes that the players may achieve, we
can think of the noncooperative part of game theory as an instrument with which
to obtain the cooperative result1.
Noncooperative and cooperative approaches complement and strengthen one an-
other. One can ﬁnd cooperative models without binding agreements (e.g. Chwe,
1994), and noncooperative models with the possibility of binding agreements (for an
overview, see, Montero, 2000). A standard technical approach between the nonco-
operative and the cooperative is to convert the normal form game into characteristic
function form game (see, Aumann, 1959), and analyze the core of the cooperative
game so induced.
In the next chapter, a brief review of game theoretic notions and models will be
1For further details on bargaining games, see, for example, Mas-Colell (1997), and the references
therein.1.3. Natural resource problems 5
presented.
1.3 Natural resource problems
Natural resources are often categorized as being renewable or nonrenewable.R e -
newable resources are those capable of regenerating (or self-reproduction), such as
ﬁsh populations. A renewable resource can remain productive indeﬁnitely, although
it may be driven to extinction if it is overexploited2.
In the case of nonrenewable resources, such as oil, coal and peat, consuming a
unit of the resource implies that the stock for future consumption is reduced for
ever. The central problem of natural resources is intertemporal allocation.I no t h e r
words, natural resource economics, are mainly concerned with the question of how
much of a stock should be designed for consumption today and how much should
be left in place for the future.
1.3.1 Characteristics
The resource economics literature shows that natural resources are widely seen as
luxuries (c.f. Dasgupta, 2002). Moreover, it is argued that for many natural re-
sources markets and hence, prices simply do not exist.
Eﬃcient resource use is complicated by jurisdictional externalities, public goods
nature, non-use values and beneﬁciaries spatially separated from the location of
resources. From the economic viewpoint, natural resources are usually viewed as
forms of assets within a society’s capital stock3.
When would breaches of eﬃciency occur? One useful way to examine how people
use the resources making up the natural asset is based on a concept known as a
property right4. Property rights are sets of ordered relationships among people that
deﬁne their opportunities, their exposure to the acts of others, their privileges, and
their responsibilities for use of the resource (Schmid, 1995, pp. 46). These property
2Biological regenerating resources are often characterized by emphasizing that they are “ re-
newable but exhaustible”. This refers to the minimum viable population size (further details, see,
for example, Clark, 1990; Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen, 2000).
3Capital is the stock of society’s resources (human, man-made and natural) that generate a ﬂow
of goods and services (Swanson and Johnston, 1999).
4Rights deﬁne the mode of individual participation in resource use decisions, and thus are part
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rights can be vested either with individuals, as in a decentralized economy, or with
the nation, as in a centrally planned economy. By examining property rights5 to see
how people aﬀect human behaviour, we will better understand how natural resource
problems arise from ineﬃcient resource allocations6.
There are many diﬀerent characteristics a property right can possess. An eﬃ-
cient structure of property right, however, has three main characteristics: exclusivity,
transferability,a n denforceability (Tietenberg, 2000). That is, the beneﬁts of the use
of a resource should accrue to the owner, and only to the owner, either directly or
inderectly by sale to others (exclusivity); all property rights should be transferable
from one owner to another in a voluntary exchange (transferability); and property
rights should be secure from involuntary seizure or encroachment by others (enforce-
ability). The exclusivity of a right is an important distinguishing characteristic. A
private property right gives the owner the power to the exclusive use of a natural
resource. A common property right is held by a group of individuals and excludes
those not in the group. Open access is completely nonexclusive - no one can be
prevented from using or exploiting the natural resource.
Economists traced the main problem of a natural resource to its unique: open
access or common property characteristics.
Open access occurs when a resource is available to all who care to harvest it.
In such a resource, there are few or no restrictions, and harvesting will occur until
resource rents7 are dissipated. Because marginal private cost can be signiﬁcantly
lower than marginal social costs, Ricardian scarcity rents are not realized. Ineﬃ-
ciencies are manifested by overexploitation of the resource and overcapitalization by
the harvesting sector. Commercial ﬁshing is often used as a classical example of an
open access resource; its regulation has been problematic because of the diﬃculty in
assigning property rights. In an open access ﬁshery, the ﬁshing grounds are exploited
on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis because no individual has the property rights to
5It should be emphasized that rights are a relationship among individual with respect to a
resource rather than the relationship between an individual with a resource.
6Note that property rights regimes may have other important characteristics, but it is the degree
of exclusivity that we emphasize (further details, Hartwick and Olewiler, 1998, pp 8). For example,
Tietenberg (2000) presents three types of property rights regimes : state property regimes (i.e. the
government owns and controls the property), common property regimes, and open access regimes.
7Rent is the diﬀerence between the price of a good using a natural resource and the unit costs of
turning that natural resource into the good. The unit costs include the value of the labor, capital,
material and energy inputs used to convert the natural resource into a product.1.3. Natural resource problems 7
the ﬁshery, and, thus no individual has the right to legally exclude others from its
use. Open access ﬁsheries can occur in the absence of eﬀective collectively managed
ﬁsheries, designated as common property. Although open access ﬁsheries are now
scarce in the pure sense, many are categorized as regulated open access ﬁsheries.
The expected outcome of an open access ﬁs h e r yi sr e f e r r e dt oa st h e“ tragedy of the
commons” (Hardin, 1968): a potential extinction of ﬁsh stocks.
Common property resource has arrangements for sharing the natural resource
with others in the designated group resource and distribution of the process (Hartwick
and Olewiler, 1998). The group may be small or large, and makes joint decisions
about the use of the resource and distribution of the proceeds. Common property
is deﬁned in such a way that it encompasses a wide range of participant structures.
It is often in the best interest of the participants to form an association in order to
prolong the life of the resource. The resource may be sustainable into perpetuity,
depending on the agreements and their enforceability. The resource manager may
be an individual, a government, or a small group that acts as one manager. In this
case, a benevolent manager can manage the ﬁshery in such a way that economic
rents are fully realized.
While common property resources have the potential to optimize eﬃciency if all
the individuals potentially aﬀected by the resource use are members of the man-
agement group, open access leads to the most serious problems in natural resource
use8. There is a distinction between domestic and international (or transbound-
ary) resource problems. At the international level, there is no single institution
or ‘government’ with the jurisdiction to initiate and enforce environmental policy.
This typical feature is critical in the context of the development and enforcement
of international resource policy. In particular, international environmental and re-
source policy requires the development of mechanisms to induce countries to adopt
and implement voluntarily a given policy. Therefore, international policy has the
same characteristics as domestic policy, but is also based on voluntary agreements
(multilateral contract) to achieve jointly a common management goal.9
8Open access works well only when there is little need to manage a resource at all (i.e. when
demand is too low to make the eﬀort worthwhile).
9These features have led to the development of international environmental and resource man-
agement as a sub-discipline of environmental economics (for further details, see, for example,
Hanley and Folmer, 1998).8 1. Introduction and overview of the thesis
1.3.2 The problem of high seas ﬁsheries
Every year, approximately 90 million tons of ﬁsh are captured globally, supplying
by far the largest source of wild protein for human consumption. According to the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), most of the world’s ﬁshing areas have
already reached their maximum potential for ﬁsh captures. About 50 percent of
stocks are already being ﬁshed at sustainable levels, and 25 percent are being over
ﬁshed, making it very unlikely that there will be substantial increases in ﬁsh captures
(UN, 2002).
To prevent the further global decline in ﬁsh stocks, a concrete international eﬀort
is required to improve the overall governance of marine ﬁsheries. Countries must
adopt new and more eﬀective ﬁshing policies and ensure the full implementation of
existing regulations. In 1992, the United Nations convened an international confer-
ence on the management of high seas ﬁsheries, reﬂecting a deep concern with the
long term sustainability of ﬁsh stocks in the areas adjacent to the 200 nautical mile
economic zones (EEZ). This conference was concluded in 1995 with an agreement,
referred to as the 1995 U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement10, which authorizes regional
organizations to manage ﬁsheries outside 200-mile limit. All who ﬁsh in a given
area will have to abide by the rules agreed upon by the relevant organization, the
Regional Fishery Management Organization (RFMO)11.I ti su n c l e a r ,h o w e v e r ,w h a t
(if any) limits the membership of such organizations. Hence, international conﬂicts
over ﬁshing rights are a common occurrence.
A limit to eﬀectiveness of exclusive zones for ﬁsheries management is the problem
of transboundary impacts of harvesting. Fish resources are not readily visible; ﬁsh
move from the territorial waters of one country to those of another or inhabit the
territorial waters of more than one country at a time. When such ﬁsh resources are
subject to exploitation by ﬁsheries of many countries, problems of overexploitation,
overcapitalization, and rent dissipation may arise. The amount of ﬁsh harvested by
each country determines the size of the unharvested resource, as well as the stock
that remains for breeding and for future harvest by all countries involved. Although
one country’s harvest depends on the harvesting decisions of other countries, each
country needs to make such decisions without necessarily knowing the harvesting
decisions of others. Since each country knows that the unharvested portion of trans-
10This Agreement came into force in December, 2001 (UN, 2002). For a review of the history
and origins of the 1995 UN Agreement, see Bjorndal and Munro (2003).
11A RFMO consists of several coastal states and some distant water ﬁshing nations.1.4. Applications of game theory to ﬁshery management 9
boundary stock may not be available in the future, there is no incentive to reduce
ﬁshing eﬀort to the level required to sustain the stock. The strategy choice be-
tween countries to exploit a transboundary ﬁsh stock is an example of a prisoners’
dilemma.
The imprecise deﬁnition of property rights in the high seas adjacent to the EEZ
or the management power within a RFMO (which led to the “ﬁsh war” of the 90’s)
is the main unresolved problem in the high seas ﬁsheries (Bjorndal and Munro,
2003). For example, article 8 of the UN Convention states that any country having
a real interest in high seas ﬁshery must be allowed entrance to the existing RFMO.
However, if a country refuses to abide by the management regime, then membership
may be denied. From this perspective, one of the relevant issues pertaining to the
U.N. Agreement in the long term economic viability of RFMOs is the new entrant
problem (Kaitala and Munro, 1993) which is related to the creation of the facto
property rights for the “charter” members of the RFMO. If there exists a RFMO
with original charter members, cooperation of the existing organization may be
endangered by a new possible entrant (c.f. Kaitala and Munro, 1995, 1997 and
Pintassilgo and Duarte, 2000).
1.4 Applications of game theory to ﬁshery man-
agement
1.4.1 Why use game theory?
The basic assumptions of game theory emphasize that rational players, pursuing
well-deﬁned objectives, take into account their knowledge of the rationality of oth-
ers and accordingly form expectations of other decision makers’ behaviour (further
details, see Chapter 2). Since the problems of natural resource use are situations
in which externalities cross frontiers - so that the impacts of the externality are
not conﬁned to the agent of origin - one agent’s choice depends on the choice of
the others. From this perspective, it is almost impossible not to think in terms
of game theory to model natural resource conﬂicts, even if one avoids the phrase
itself. For example, Dasgupta’s (1982, p.15) observation that “in the absence of co-
operation, actions not directly controlled by an agent aﬀect the outcomes that the
agent can attain by the use of actions that the agent does in fact control”, involves10 1. Introduction and overview of the thesis
game-theoretic notions.
Game theory has become an indispensable tool in environmental and resource
economics, especially in the study of transboundary environmental problems such as
international ﬁsheries stocks. Roughly speaking, in the context of natural resource
problems, the noncooperative outcome implies that each agent maximizes its eco-
nomic rents taking own harvesting (extraction) costs into account. Moreover, each
agent ignores the eﬀects of its damage on the other agents and takes the policies and
damages of the other agents as given. Hence, a given agent will continue increasing
its eﬀorts as long as the beneﬁts of each additional unit of common resource exceed
the eﬀort costs to the agent. In terms of resource use problems, the noncooperative
outcome implies a situation in which each agent determines its optimal reduction
strategy, given the strategies of the others (i.e. Nash equilibrium)12.
The cooperative outcome13 in the resource problem is the outcome that maxi-
mizes the sum of individual agents’ net beneﬁts. In this outcome each agent max-
imizes its net beneﬁts, internalizing the adverse eﬀects of its action (strategy) on
its own welfare and on the welfare of all other agents in the system. In terms of
resource management, this outcome implies an achieving agreement (i.e. agents
negotiate and sign an agreement). This agreement may take many forms, but the
natural assumption is that they select an outcome that is Pareto eﬃciency14.I t
should be observed that agents may very well form coalitions and act together, such
that the set of Pareto eﬃcient outcomes comprises several allocations, including the
cooperative outcome and the Nash bargaining solution.
The diﬀerence between the net beneﬁts from the cooperative and noncoopera-
tive outcomes deﬁnes the potential gains to reach an agreement. The key issue is
the division of the gains among the participating agents (individuals or nations).
Usually, the core and the Shapley value are used as sharing rules in this context. In
addition, when some countries are interested in coordinating and forming coalitions,
while outsiders continue to behave noncooperatively, then many situations with joint
as well as opposing interests in environmental problems can be described and ad-
dressed with the theory of partition function form games. For recent works on the
12This non-cooperative equilibrium coincides with the so-called voluntary provision equilibrium
for public good problems (see Moulin, 1995).
13Under the assumption of transferable utility (TU) games.
14Further details, for example, see Barrett (1992, 1994, 1997), Carraro and Siniscalco (1998),
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applications of game theory to the analysis of environmental and resource problems,
see Pethig (1992), Carraro and Filas (1995), and Hanley and Folmer (1998).
1.4.2 A review of game theory approaches to ﬁshery man-
agement
The economic rationale for resource management was established in early work by
Scott and Gordon in the 1950’s. Gordon (1954) focused on the institutional causes of
overﬁshing, hypothesizing that, without an entrepreneur to direct the application of
inputs, excess eﬀort would enter until average rather than marginal product equaled
opportunity costs. His work was mostly predictive, oﬀering a simple model of the
rent dissipation process under open access. Scott (1955) outlined the ﬁrst dynamic
theory of the sole owned (optimized) ﬁshery and discussed how the true dynami-
cally optimal steady state would balance marginal current proﬁt against marginal
use costs. His work was primarily normative, asking: how should society manage
renewable resources? Both papers speciﬁcally deal with ﬁsheries, but their central
lessons applied to renewable resources more generally (Deacon et al., 1998).
Since strategic interaction among agents exploiting the common resource is vir-
tually inevitable, the application of game theory is obvious. In the literature, game
theoretic ﬁsheries models are made up of a combination of a biological model of
ﬁsheries and a game theoretic model. Models are usually developed to study what
happens both to the ecology and economics of a ﬁshery under noncooperation (i.e.
open access) and cooperation (sole-owner or common property right), with the aim
of isolating the negative eﬀects of noncooperation. Two approaches of game theory
and their solution concepts are thus applied to analyze such a situation of ﬁsheries
resources.
Economic analysis of ﬁsheries management has been concerned with two con-
trasting systems of property rights: the full rights and no rights system. Each
system has a unique equilibrium: the social planners’ outcome for the former, and
the open access outcome for the latter (for a survey, see Sumaila, 1999). The open
access outcome is easy to implement but most wasteful. The social planner’s out-
come, relating to a sole owner (i.e. private), is almost impossible to realize in practice
because of the threat of new entrants into the ﬁshery. For theoretical discussion of
these outcomes, see Clark (1990) and Mesterton-Gibbons (1993).
The ﬁrst applications of game theory to ﬁsheries management can be attributed12 1. Introduction and overview of the thesis
to Levhari and Mirman (1980), and Clark (1980). In the case of two countries, they
show that if each country tries to maximize its own welfare, taking into account
the actions of the other, a long term equilibrium can be achieved. Assuming the
countries are symmetric, and in which neither players has introduced eﬀective man-
agement (the resource thus is at the common bionomic equilibrium), this equilibrium
will occur at a lower stock than would be optimal if the two countries formed a co-
operative venture.15 Levhari and Mirman (1980) showed that the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium leads to greater consumption as a function of the size of the ﬁsh popu-
lation and to smaller steady state consumption.
In his diﬀerential game model, Clark (1980) shows that the noncooperative feed-
back equilibrium is discontinuous in the control variable and only the most eﬃcient
country harvests in the equilibrium. Dockner et al. (1989) extend Clark’s model
to the case of duopoly where price depends on the quantity harvested. They show
that the player with smaller unit costs is able to choose a higher catch rate and the
disadvantage of being a Stackelberg follower can be eliminated by a more eﬃcient
technology. Fischer and Mirman (1996) extend Levhari and Mirman’s model to a
case where both dynamic and biological externalities are present16.
An early application of cooperative game theory is given by White and Mace
(1988). They present a static cooperative game model in which prices are constant
and costs are divided into ﬁxed and variable costs. White and Mace argue that
cooperation would be expected to produce more eﬃcient behaviour than ﬁshermen
acting on their own. Munro (1991) takes the problem one step further, and studies
the possibility of agreements on long term mutual harvesting strategies. The issues
at stake are the share of ﬁsh given to each country and the weight given to social
discount rate, eﬀort cost, and consumer preferences. The basis for the negotiations
is a status quo distribution which, implicitly, is similar to the one that would follow
from Levhari and Mirman analysis. Agreement is based on the principle that no
country will be worse oﬀ than it would be with no agreement. Hannesson (1997)
extends the analysis by considering more than two countries in the high seas. In
his supergame model (inﬁnite time), Hannesson ﬁnds that the possibility of achiev-
ing a cooperative solution is good if nations perceive the ’game’ as being repeated
indeﬁnitely and adopt retaliatory measures for those who deviate from the agree-
15Cooperative here means Pareto optimal with equal weights.
16The analysis of noncooperative management usually is to devise a set of “credible threats”
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ment, although the conclusion is sensitive to the number of nations involved and
the diﬀerences in costs among nations. In addition, he ﬁnds that the likelihood of
cooperation is increased in the case of migratory ﬁsh stocks, and studies one special
case where there exists one dominant player in a straddling stock ﬁshery. His results
show how even a minor straddling to the high seas may cause substantial losses of
eﬃciency.
Kaitala and Munro (1993) addressed the new member problem that concerns the
inherent diﬃculties of negotiating multilaterally acceptable terms of a regional ﬁsh-
ery management organization on the high seas ﬁsheries stocks. Kaitala and Munro
(1995) show that if the new member problem is assumed to be non existent, then
the game characterizing the exploitation of high seas ﬁsheries (straddling stocks)
will be very similar to the case of shared stocks. The consequence of noncooperative
behaviour will be overexploitation; the need for a cooperative management regime
is evident. In their model, the excess economic return or cooperative beneﬁts will
be divided according to the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) that gives each
player its threat point (noncooperative) payoﬀ and an equal share of cooperative
beneﬁts. Considering a three-player game, they show that the consequences of non-
cooperation will be almost identical to those of an unregulated open access ﬁshery.
In the cooperative approach, they discuss four diﬀerent cases. These contain the
combinations of whether or not to allow for coalitions, and transfer of membership.
For the case in which transferable membership is allowed, they suggest that it may
possible for some original members to gain from a threat of a possible new entrant
by transfer of membership rights.
McKelvey et al. (2002) examine another model in the high seas. Their model
deals with a “ﬁsh war” between independently managed ﬂeets that harvest a com-
mon resource. The competitors are a distantwater ﬂeet, operating the world’s ocean
and a regional-based coastal countries’ national ﬂeet, operating out of its extended
economic zones. The distantwater ﬂeet’s ﬁxed-cost disadvantage is oﬀset by its ﬁrst
move’s advantage in each season’s harvest. Under stable conditions, the competi-
tors will return periodically to ﬁshdown a recovering stock. The period between
returns will be extended, and stock levels will be depressed more often than when
only a single ﬂeet is involved (as manifestations of the well known “tragedy of the
commons”).
Li (1998) and Kaitala and Lindroos (1998) take another application of coop-
erative game theory solution concepts. They calculate the Shapley value and the14 1. Introduction and overview of the thesis
nucleolus as sharing rules for the surplus beneﬁts from cooperation. Kaitala and
Lindroos (1998) demonstrate that the nucleolus and the Shapley value give more of
the beneﬁts to the coalition with substantial bargaining power than does the Nash
bargaining scheme. In addition, the outcomes from these solutions depend on the
relative eﬃciency of the most eﬃcient coalition. Their games are assumed to be
convex. For another review of game theoretic approach to ﬁshery management, see
Kaitala (1987), Sumaila (1999) and Lindroos (2000).
1.5 Overview of the thesis
This thesis deals with a game theoretic analysis of natural resource problems and
management. It is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of some notions and solution concepts of game
theory. We ﬁrst of all present an informal description of game theory. Next, we
present the most important concepts of game theory which are frequently used in
the thesis.
The next three chapters, chapters 3, 4 and 5, deal with several classes of games
and their solutions. Chapter 3, based on the paper “Oligopoly games with and
without transferable technologies” (Norde, Pham Do and Tijs, 2002), considers a
cooperative approach in oligopoly situations. In this chapter, standard oligopolies
are interpreted in two ways: oligopolies with transferable technologies and oligopolies
without transferable technologies. The ﬁrst type is characterized by the fact that a
group of cooperating ﬁrms is allowed to produce according to the cheapest technol-
ogy present in this group, whereas such a transfer of technologies is not possible for
the second type of oligopolies. From a cooperative point of view, this leads to two
diﬀerent classes of cooperative oligopoly games. We show that cooperative oligopoly
games without transferable technologies are convex games and those with transfer-
able technologies are totally balanced, but not necessarily convex. These properties
are applied to analyze the rules in regional ﬁshery organizations in Chapter 6.
In cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is one of the most important solu-
tion concepts. Diﬀerent axiomatic approaches to the Shapley value can be found in
the literature. Chapter 4, based on the paper “The Shapley value for games in par-
tition function form” (Pham Do and Norde, 2002), discusses a generalization of the
Shapley value to the class of partition function form games . This chapter extends
concepts and axioms related to the Shapley value, and studies a characterization1.5. Overview of the thesis 15
for this value to games in partition function form. Finally, an application of the
Shapley value is given for a class of oligopoly games in partition function form.
Chapter 5, based on the paper “Connection problems in mountains and mono-
tonic allocation schemes” (Moretti et al., 2002), deals with several problems of co-
operative cost sharing games for a mountain situation. Consider a group of persons
whose houses are built on mountains, which surround a valley or a part of the coast.
Their houses are not yet connected to sewage systems. Obviously sewage has to
be collected downhill in a water puriﬁer in the valley or along the coast, where it
has to be puriﬁed before introduction into the environment. This chapter studies
the problem of connecting houses in mountains with a puriﬁer as a special kind of
directed minimum cost spanning tree problems. We describe a simple method to
ﬁnd a spanning tree with minimum costs. Furthermore, we show how to construct
schemes for allocating the cost of every set of nodes among its members, which are
population monotonic.
Chapters 6 and 7 apply game theory to ﬁshery management problems. Chapter
6, based on the paper “Transboundary ﬁshery management: a game theoretic ap-
proach” (Pham Do, Folmer and Norde, 2001), deals with the problem of allocating
the proﬁts in a ﬁshery between the charter members and the entrants, once the
nations concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement. We show
that the outcome of noncooperative solution is virtually identical to that of the un-
regulated open access ﬁshery. When the combined harvesting eﬀorts in the Nash
equilibrium are very larger than the carrying capacity the stock will be depleted. We
argue that in the case of independent countries adjustment from the Nash equilib-
rium can be used as a rule to achieve the maximal sustainable yield. Furthermore,
we propose population monotonic allocation schemes as a management rule for di-
vision of proﬁts within a coalition. We demonstrate that the equal division of the
n e tg a i nv a l u ec a na l s ob eu s e dt oe x p a n dac o a l i t i o n .
Chapter 7, based on the paper “Regional ﬁshery agreements: the feasibility and
impacts of partial cooperation” (Pham Do and Folmer, 2003), deals with partial
cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly
migratory ﬁsh stocks. We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their
impacts on ﬁshing eﬀorts by means of games in partition function form. Further-
more, we demonstrate that the modiﬁed Shapley value is an appropriate device for
the division of the gains from cooperation.16 1. Introduction and overview of the thesisChapter 2
Some game theoretic concepts
2.1 Introduction
Game theory is a mathematical theory that analyzes interactive situations (decision
situations) in which there are two or more decision makers (players or actors) and
formulates hypotheses about their behaviour, as well as the ﬁnal outcomes of the
game. The players can be either individuals or groups of individuals1. Their interac-
tions may consist of attraction, combat, mating, communication, trade, partnership,
or rivalry. The theory of games puts the conﬂict (i.e. noncooperative) and coop-
erative situations into mathematical models for analysis. Rather than observing
how players actually behave in such situations, game theory attempts to tell what
rational decision makers will do in a well-structured model that is meant to capture
the essential elements of a particular segment of reality. The trick is to specify how
the players interact, and what the outcome will be. Particularly, with given char-
acteristics of players and their interactions, what kind patterns of behaviour will
develop?
The foundation of game theory, as part and parcel of economic theory, is laid
down in the classic book ‘Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour’b yJ o h n
von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern in 19442. The purpose of this chapter is to
present an overview of concepts that will be used in the sequel of the thesis. A
distinction3 is made between noncooperative and cooperative game theory. A game
1For example, the players may be birds, ﬁsh species, people, organizations, or nations.
2Note that the history of game theory can be traced back earlier. For a history of game theory,
see Walker (2001).
3However, this should not be viewed as an exclusive division; these are two ways of looking at
1718 2. Some game theoretic concepts
is noncooperative if commitments are not enforceable, while it is cooperative if
commitments are fully binding and enforceable.
In the remainder of this chapter, some game theoretic notions and basic con-
cepts that can be applied to analyze environmental resource problems and their
management are introduced. The next section presents an informal game theoretic
description of a typical natural resource management problem. Then, section 2.3
presents the formal representation of games and several solution concepts, both in
the general setup as well as in particular models of game theory that are frequently
used in the thesis. For further details of game theory, see Myerson (1991), Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994) and Osborne (2003). Some other background reading on
game theory with applications to speciﬁc environmental and resource problems can
be found in Hanley and Folmer (1998), Helm (2000), and Finus (2001).
2.2 Games and modeling interactive behaviour
In all game theoretic models the basic entity is a player. A game is played whenever
players interact with each other. Each player in the game must choose from a list
of alternative courses of actions resulting in outcomes over which the players may
have diﬀerent preferences. To clarify what game theory intends to capture, consider
the following example of an idealized model of resource exploitation.
The “tragedy of the commons”
Suppose three symmetric countries, A, B and C, exploit a common ﬁsh stock. Each
country can choose simultaneously and independently one of just two strategies,
“conserve” (i.e. restricted harvesting or reduced eﬀorts) or “exploit” (i.e. unre-
stricted harvesting) to get its maximum beneﬁts (payoﬀs).
If all countries adopt the conservation strategy, the total beneﬁti s1 2u n i t sa n d
each country gets 4 units. However, if one country (A) adopts “exploit”, while the
others adopt “conserve”, then A’s beneﬁt increases to 5 units, while B’s and C’s are
reduced to 2 units. Total beneﬁts decline to 9 units. Moreover, if only one country
(B) adopts “conserve”, while the other two adopt “exploit”, then B’s beneﬁti s
reduced to 0 units, while the beneﬁts of A and C increase to 3 units. Total beneﬁts
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decline to 6 units. These declines are a result of depletion and free-riding. Finally,
if all countries act to exploit the resource, they share reduced beneﬁto f3u n i t sa s
a result of overexploitation of the resource.








Table 2.1 The beneﬁts of three countries.
In Table 2.1, country A chooses the row, B chooses the column and C chooses
the matrix. The numbers in the corresponding cells give the net beneﬁts (payoﬀs)
of the game; the ﬁrst element represents country A’s beneﬁts, the second is country
B’s beneﬁts and the third is country C’s beneﬁts. For example, the second cell of the
ﬁrst row in the ﬁrst matrix is (3,0,3) indicating the net beneﬁt of 3 for country A, 0
for country B, and 3 for country C. This results from the choices (exploit, conserve,
exploit) in which countries A and C choose to increase their ﬁshing eﬀorts, while
country B reduces its eﬀort.
What strategy will countries choose? If country A acts to conserve the resource,
it will worry that either one or two others will opt to exploit the resource, thereby
reducing A’s gain to 2 or 0 units. Indeed, no matter which strategy B and C use,
A’s beneﬁts are maximized by the exploitation strategy. Acting rationally in their
own best interests, all countries will inevitably decide to exploit the resource, unless
they can reach a binding agreement (contract) of exploitation designed to conserve
the resource. And even if there is such an agreement, it will still pay one country to
cheat and exploit the resource, as long as the other country adheres to the agreement.
An informal description of games
There are several diﬀerent ways of describing a game, generally not equivalent to
one another. However, most games are described by means of the rules, the strategic
possibilities of players, the payoﬀs to the players and the preferences of the players
over the set of potential payoﬀs. According to the rules, it is assumed (cooperative20 2. Some game theoretic concepts
behaviour ) or not assumed (noncooperative behaviour) that the players commu-
nicate with each other, and make binding agreements with respect to how they
correlate their actions.
An important distinction is made between noncooperative and cooperative be-
haviour4. In the above example, “noncooperative” behaviour means that the three
countries do not coordinate their strategies and do not maximize total beneﬁts of
all countries as a whole. In that case, each country takes the strategy chosen by
the other country as being given, and tries to adopt the best strategy in the given
circumstances. If all succeed in this, we have a ”best response” or Nash equilibrium.
In this case, each country, (e.g. A) can reason as follows: ”either B or C will use
the exploitation or conservation strategy. (i) If both B and C adopt “exploit”, and
A does not, A gets nothing, while if A also adopts “exploit”, A can get 1 unit of
beneﬁts. (ii) If either B or C adopt “conserve”, and A adopts “exploit”, then A gets
at least 3 units, while if A adopts “conserve”, A gets only 2 units of the beneﬁts.
(iii) If both B and C adopt “conserve”, and A adopts “exploit”, A gets 5 units,
while it is only 4 units if A chooses ”conserve”. Similarly for B and C. Thus, the
best response strategy for each country is to adopt “exploit”. And, indeed, the only
best response in this game for each country is to adopt “exploit”.
“Cooperative” behaviour means that all countries can coordinate their strategies.
In this simple example, it is enough if they just choose the same strategy. Suppose
that B and C could commit themselves to follow A’s lead, letting A choose ﬁrst
and then choosing the same strategy A does, regardless of whether that is A’s best
response strategy or not. The commitment could take the simple form of a bond:
B and C could place with a third party a bond equal to 12 units of beneﬁts, to be
forfeit if they should fail to follow A’s lead in choosing strategies. Since B and C can
gain no more than 6 units by choosing a diﬀerent strategy than A, they will never
do so. Then A may reason that if it chooses to adopt “exploit”, B and C will do so
and they will each get a payoﬀ of 1; if A chooses conserve, however, B and C will
do the same, and they will each get a payoﬀ of 4. Since the choice of both B and C
depends upon A’s choice, A will choose conservation. This leads to the cooperative
outcome (conserve, conserve, conserve) for this game. It is a Pareto optimal.
The example we have given here is a highly simpliﬁed illustration of the coop-
erative and noncooperative outcomes. Real environmental and social problems are
4The notion of cooperative behaviour plays an important role in both cooperative and nonco-
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typically much more complex, involving many choices of strategies, uncertainty, in-
formation of sequence of choices and timing of commitment. In some cases we may
have to use more than one solution concept of the cooperative games and more than
one reﬁnement of competitive equilibrium because in human life, people often either
cannot or do not coordinate their strategies, so that they fall into ineﬃcient out-
comes (like the case of the two countries committing in the example). The following
situation illuminates another approach to games that plays an important role for
analysis of cooperative situations in which externalities exist.
Suppose that only two countries can coordinate their strategies. If all countries
have pessimistic expectations, with respect to outsiders behave non-cooperatively,
the two countries in the coalition will each get at least 2 units of beneﬁts (as choosing
their conservation strategy and accepting free rider behaviour by the other), while
the single country gets at least 1 unit (c.f. the competitive equilibrium). However,
if all have optimistic expectations, the two countries will each expect to get 4 units,
whereas the free rider wants a payoﬀ of 5 units. Since the outcome of this case is
feasible but not Pareto optima; it may be considered a partial equilibrium.
This example illustrates how game theory can capture some environmental and
resource problems, and serves as an example of a fundamental dichotomy of game
theory, which is central in this chapter.
2.3 Games and solution concepts
This section presents the formal descriptions of noncooperative and cooperative
game theory. Whereas noncooperative game theory concentrates on the strategic
choices of the individual, and focuses on how each player plays the game and what
strategies she chooses to achieve her goals, cooperative game theory deals with the
options available to the group: what coalitions do form and how are the available
payoﬀs divided. It follows that noncooperative theory is intimately concerned with
the details of the processes and rules deﬁning a game; cooperative theory usually
abstracts away from such rules, and looks only at more general descriptions that
s p e c i f yo n l yw h a te a c hc o a l i t i o nc a ng e t .
A systematic description of the outcomes that may emerge in a family of games
is called a solution. In noncooperative game theory, solution concepts are developed
to predict the outcomes that might arise when the game is played by “rational”
individuals, or after learning processes have converged. Most of these solution con-22 2. Some game theoretic concepts
cepts are variations of the equilibrium concept that was proposed by John Nash in
the 1950s (van Damme, 2000). In cooperative games, there is no single solution
concept dominating the ﬁeld as much as the Nash equilibrium, although the core is
frequently used as a solution concept. Solution concepts in cooperative game the-
ory formulate requirements regarding payoﬀs. In general, the cooperative solutions
suggest how the total value of the grand coalition can be split among all the players
in a satisfactory way.5
In this section, we conﬁne our attention to the normal (or strategic) form games
with the Nash equilibrium solution, and coalitional form games with the core and
the Shapley value as solution concepts. These concepts are the most used in the
thesis.
2.3.1 Noncooperative games
To describe a noncooperative game, we need to know the players, the available
actions of each player, the possible outcomes, and the payoﬀs of the game.
The normal (or strategic) form
The formal mathematical deﬁnition of an n-player normal form game is as follows.
Let Xk be the (ﬁnite) set of possible decisions (also called actions or strategies) that
player k might take, and X = Πn
k=1Xk be the set of strategy proﬁles. Assume that
each player’s preferences over the set of outcomes of the game can be described by
a (von Neumann and Morgenstern) utility function; hence, each player wants to
maximize his utility6. Each strategy proﬁle x ∈ X can be identiﬁed with a certain
outcome.We write πk(x) for the utility of player k associated with this outcome.
Then, an n-player normal (or strategic) form game is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A normal form game is a tuple Γ = <N , (Xk)k∈N,(πk)k∈N >,
where
5An outcome in cooperative game theory speciﬁes a payoﬀ for every player and cannot be
formulated in terms of strategies (like in noncooperative game theory) because the only ingredients
are players and payoﬀs.
6Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) give conditions under which such a utility function can
be found; some theory has been developed also without this assumption, but it is convenient to
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• N = {1,2,...,n} is a nonempty, ﬁnite set of players,
• each player k ∈ N has a nonempty set Xk of pure strategies,
• each player k ∈ N has a payoﬀ function πk : Πn
k=1Xk → R specifying for each
strategy proﬁle x =( xk)k∈N ∈ Πn
k=1Xk player k’s payoﬀ πk(x) ∈ R.
We assume the player set of the game is ﬁnite, and use conventional game theo-
retic notations. For example, X = Πn
k=1Xk denotes the set of strategy proﬁles. For
k ∈ N, let X−k = Πj∈N\{k}Xj denote the set of strategy proﬁles of k’s opponents.
For S ⊆ N, let XS = Πj∈SXj denote the set of strategy proﬁles of players in S.A
strategy proﬁles x =( xk)k∈N ∈ X will be denoted by x =( xk,x −k)o r( xS,x −S), if
the strategy choice of player k or the set of players S needs to be stressed.
Example 2.1 Consider the tragedy of the commons in Section 2.2. The strategic
form game, Γ = <N ,(Xk)k∈N,(πk)k∈N >, of this situation can be deﬁned as follows.
Let N = {1,2,3} be the set of players. For each country k ∈ N,l e tXk = {I,R}
denote the strategy set of k, where I (increasing eﬀorts) and R (reducing eﬀorts)
denote the decisions to be chosen by each country. The payoﬀ function πk for each
k is the number in the corresponding cells of Table 2.1. For instance, for a strategy
proﬁle x =( I,I,I), πi(x)=1 , for all i ∈ N; for x =( R,I,I), π1(x)=0 , π2(x)=
π3(x) = 3; and for x =( R,R,R), πi(x) = 4, for all i ∈ N, and so on.
Solution concepts
In noncooperative game theory, individuals cannot make binding agreements and
the unit of analysis is the individual who is concerned with doing as well as possible
for himself, subject to clearly deﬁned rules and possibilities. The most important
solution concepts commonly used are dominant strategy equilibrium and Nash equi-
librium7.
Dominant equilibrium
In some games, a player can choose a strategy that “dominates” all other strategies
7Later reﬁnements, such as subgame perfection, trembling-hand equilibrium and sequential
equilibrium, extend this idea to games of imperfect information. Extensions to repeated games
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in her strategy set: regardless of what she expects her opponents to do, this strat-
egy always yields a better payoﬀ than any other of her strategies. In Example 2.1,
the “exploit” strategy can be considered as a dominant strategy for each country,
although it is not the best outcome for players jointly. Another example of a game
in which each player has a dominant strategy is a second-price auction with inde-
pendent valuations of the bidders: here bidding one’s true valuation is always a best
response, regardless of the bids one’s opponents.
A dominant strategy equilibrium is a strategy combination consisting of domi-
nant strategies for all players. Formally,
Deﬁnition 2.3 A strategy proﬁle x∗ ∈ X is a dominant strategy equilibrium if
for every player k ∈ N we have
πk(x
∗
k,x −k) ≥ πk(xk,x −k)f o ra l lx ∈ X. (2.1)
A dominant strategy equilibrium is the best response to all possible strategy
combinations by other players.
Nash equilibrium
The fundamental idea behind the equilibrium concept introduced by Nash (1951),
the so-called Nash equilibrium, is that each player chooses a strategy that maximizes
her own payoﬀ given the strategies of the others. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy
combination from which no player has unilateral incentive to depart (i.e. a Nash
equilibrium emphasizes the requirement that equilibria be self-enforcing)8. Formally,
Deﬁnition 2.4 A strategy proﬁle x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if and only if







−k) for all xk ∈ Xk. (2.2)
In a Nash equilibrium, each player is doing the best she can do given the strategies
of the other players. In Example 2.1, the Nash equilibrium is x =( I,I,I).
A Nash equilibrium is played if each player has correct conjectures about strate-
gies the other players are going to choose and chooses (one of) her best strategy
8Hence, the NE is supported by self-consistent beliefs and might therefore be viewed as a rational
expectation outcome (for further details of the implications, for example, see Finus, 2001).2.3. Games and solution concepts 25
(strategies) given these conjectures9. The saddle point equilibrium of von Neumann
(1959) is a special instance of it, as is the Cournot equilibrium in oligopoly theory
(Friedman, 1990).
Unfortunately, a Nash equilibrium (NE) does not always exist in a game. In the
game ‘matching pennies’ below there exists no NE in pure strategies.
Example 2.2 (Matching Pennies) Two people choose, simultaneously, whether to
show the Head (H) or the Tail (T) of a coin. If they show the same side, people 2
pays person 1 a dollar; if they show diﬀerent sides, person 1 pays person 2 a dollar.
Each person cares only about the amount of money that she receives and prefers to






Table 2.2 The payoﬀs for Matching Pennies.
This game has no Nash equilibrium10.
However, in some games there are multiple equilibria and none of them dominates
the others, as in the following example.
Example 2.3 (Hawk-Dove)T w oa n i m a l sa r eﬁghting over some prey. Assume each
of them can behave like a dove (D) or like a hawk (H). The best outcome for each
animal is the situation in which it acts like a hawk while the other acts like a dove.
The worst outcome is the situation where both act like hawks. The Hawk-Dove
game is shown in Table 2.3. One can see that this game has two Nash equilibria
(D,H)a n d( H,D).
9Other reﬁnements of the Nash equilibrium such as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (see the textbook by Friedman, 1990) are not discussed here.
Three other solution concepts, such as a max-min strategy, a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and
Stackelberg equilibrium, are often used for analyzing environmental games (Finus, 2001).






Table 2.3 The payoﬀs for Hawk-Dove.
Existence of Nash equilibrium
The ﬁrst existence proof for NE in n-person noncooperative games is due to Nash
(1951). Nash shows that any noncooperative game has at least one equilibrium in
mixed (random play) strategies.
A mixed strategy for a player is a probability distribution over the set of pure
strategies of this player. Formally,
Deﬁnition 2.5 Given player k’s (ﬁnite) pure strategy set Xk, a mixed strategy
σk : Xk → [0,1] assigns to each pure strategy xk ∈ Xk a probability σk(xk) ≥ 0t h a t
player k will play, where
P
xk∈Xk σk(xk)=1 .
Theorem 2.1 (Nash, 1951) Given any ﬁnite game Γ in strategic form, there exists
at least one (Nash) equilibrium in mixed (random play) strategies.
2.3.2 Cooperative games
Cooperative game theory deals with situations in which binding agreements are
allowed and the unit of analysis is the group or coalition. A coalition is a subset
of players that has the right to make binding agreements with each other, and it
is usually assumed that any subset of players can do this. A possible division of
joint proﬁts among “cooperating” players is called a payoﬀ vector. An allocation
rule speciﬁes how to divide joint proﬁts for a collection of cooperative games. In
cooperative game theory much attention is paid to allocation rules with appealing
characteristics.
The classical solution concepts that arise can be grouped into “core-like”n o t i o n s
and “value-like” notions (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1997). The former include the core11,
the stable set of von Neumann and Morgenstern, the bargaining set, the kernel and
11The core is analogous to the economists’ notion of the contract curve.2.3. Games and solution concepts 27
the nucleolus; the latter include the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950), the
Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), their many extensions and generalizations, and the
τ−value (Tijs, 1987). This section focuses on the most popular concepts: the core
and the Shapley value. The core consists of those payoﬀ vectors which are, in a
speciﬁc sense, acceptable to all players, whereas the value approach is directed at
ﬁnding a vector of payoﬀsw h i c hg i v eap a y o ﬀ to each player (who takes proper
account of the threat capacities of all players). For further details of the other
solution concepts, see Myerson (1991) and Curiel (1997).
The characteristic function form
The formal mathematical deﬁnition of an n-player cooperative game in characteris-
tic function form or a cooperative game with transferable utility (used to be called
“game with side payments”) is as follows. Let N be a (ﬁnite) set of players. A
nonempty subset S of N is called a coalition. We assume that the value or the
worth of a coalition S ⊂ N, v(S), is transferable a n dt h e r e b yc a nb es h a r e da m o n g
the members12. The coalition consisting of all players outside S,i sc a l l e dt h ecom-
plementary coalition of S, denoted by N\S. The quantity v(S) is interpreted as
the maximum utility (payoﬀ) S can obtain whatever the remaining players may do.
Accordingly, v(N) is the maximum utility achievable by the grand coalition N of all
players13. Then, a cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) is deﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.6 A characteristic function form game (TU) is described by an or-
dered pair (N,v), where
• N = {1,2,...,n} denotes the (ﬁnite) set of players, and
• the characteristic function v :2 N → R which associates to every subset S of
N ar e a ln u m b e rw i t hv(∅)=0 .
12Hence, for each coalition S, v(S) is interpreted as a certain amount of a perfectly divisible
commodity that is available for division among the members of S if S forms.
13Note that the utility is transferable if any distribution of the total payoﬀ v(S)a m o n gt h ep l a y e r s
in S results in increments and decrements of individual utilities which sum to zero according to
some speciﬁc set of utility scales for players. If payoﬀs cannot be freely redistributed inside a
coalition, or if the redistribution of payoﬀs does not lead to increments and decrements of utility
that sum up to zero, the situation can be modeled as a game without transferable utility or NTU
game (for details, see chapter 9, Myerson, 1991).28 2. Some game theoretic concepts
Usually we identify the game (N,v) with its characteristic function v.T h e
number of players in a coalition S is denoted by |S|.
For every cooperative game (N,v)a n da l lT ⊆ N, the subgame (T,v|T)i sd e ﬁned
by v|T(R)=v(R)f o ra l lR ⊆ T.
Example 2.4 Consider the example of the stragedy of the commons in Section 2.2.
The characterstic function form game (N,v)c a nb ed e ﬁned as follows.
Let N = {1,2,3} be the set of players. For all i ∈ N, v({i}) = 1; for all S ⊆ N,
if |S| =2t h e nv(S)=4 , and v(N) = 12.
Example 2.5 (Unanimity game)L e tN be a set of players, and let T ∈ 2N\{∅}.
The unanimity game (N,uT) is the game described by uT(S)=1i fT ⊆ S, and
uT(S) = 0 otherwise (see Shapley, 1953).
In the unanimity game (N,uT), the value of coalition S equals 1 if S contains
all players in T, whereas the value of coalition S equals 0 if there exists a player in
T that does not belong to S.
The following properties play an important role in cooperative game theory.
• Ag a m e( N,v)i sc a l l e dsuperadditive if for any disjoint coalitions S, T ⊆ N,
v(S)+v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T). (2.3)
Condition (2.3) states that joining two coalitions may only increase their possi-
bilities.
• Ag a m e( N,v) is called convex if for any coalition S, T ⊂ N, and any player
j ∈ N such that S ⊂ T ⊂ N\{j}, it follows that
v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {j}) − v(T)( 2 . 4 )
The term v(S ∪{j})−v(S) is interpreted as the marginal contribution of player
j to coalition S. Convexity implies that the larger a coalition becomes, the greater
is the marginal contribution of new members.
In example 2.4, the game (N,v)i sc o n v e x .2.3. Games and solution concepts 29
• Ac o o p e r a t i v eg a m e( N,v)i sbalanced if for every non-negative vector of
weights (λS)S⊂N,S6=N,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes
P




The balancedness condition states that there is no feasible pattern of coalition
formation that yields a higher aggregate payoﬀ than the grand coalition can achieve.
• A game (N,v) is called totally balanced if game (N,v) and all its subgame are
balanced.
Solution concepts
In general, a payoﬀ to the players is represented by a real valued vector x =( xi)i∈N ∈
RN,w h e r et h ei-th coordinate of the vector x denotes the payoﬀ given to player i.
We denote
P
i∈S xi by x(S).
The vector x ∈ RN is called eﬃcient if x(N)=v(N) and the set of all eﬃcient
v e c t o r si sc a l l e dt h epreimputation set, denoted by IP(v).
A solution concept ϕ on a set of cooperative games is a mapping that associates
with every game v as e tϕ(v) ⊆ IP(v).
Imputation set and the core
An imputation of the game is a division of the payoﬀ that can be achieved by
all players cooperating. The formal mathematical deﬁnition is as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.7 The imputation set I(v) of a game (N,v)i sd e ﬁned as the set





xi = v(N),∀ i ∈ S : xi ≥ v({i})}. (2.5)
For simplicity we assume that the set of imputations is always nonempty. Thus, in
t h eT Uc a s ew ec o n s i d e ro n l yg a m e st h a ts a t i s f yv(N) ≥
P
i∈N v({i}).
Intuitively, the core is the set of imputations against which no coalition can propose
an alternative which they prefer and could achieve if they acted independently. For-
mally,30 2. Some game theoretic concepts









xi = v(N). (2.7)
So the payoﬀ vectors in the core are not only individually rational but also
coalitionally rational (i.e. each core element represents a stable allocation in the
sense that no coalition has an incentive to split oﬀ).
T h ec o r eo fag a m e( N,v) is denoted by Core(v),
Core(v)={x ∈ R
N| x(N)=v(N), and x(S) ≥ v(S),∀S ⊆ N}.
Once an allocation from the core has been selected, no coalition on its own can
improve the payoﬀ of all its members. However, the core of a cooperative game may
be empty.
Example 2.6 Consider the following simple game (N,v). For each S ⊆ N =
{1,2,3},v (S)=0i f|S| =1 ,a n dv(S)=1i f|S| ≥ 2. Then it is easy to see
that in this game, the core Core(v)=∅.14 In other words, for a simple game v,t h e
core is nonempty if and only if there is at least one veto player.
E x i s t e n c eo fc o r ee l e m e n t s
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for a game has nonempty core in terms of balanced conditions. The Bondareva-
Shapley theorem is as follows.
Theorem 2.2 (Bondareva, 1963 and Shapley, 1967) A TU game has a nonempty
core if and only if it is balanced.
Another well-known relation between convexity of games and the existence of
core elements is the following:
14If Core(v) 6= ∅ then x ∈ Core(v) implies that
P
j∈N xj = v(N)=1a n d
P
j6=i xj ≥ v(N\{i})=
1. Thus, xi =0 , ∀i ∈ N.2.3. Games and solution concepts 31
Theorem 2.3 (Shapley, 1971) If a game (N,v) is convex, then Core(v) is a nonempty
set.
Note that convexity implies the balancedness, but the reverse does not hold.
The Shapley value15
A value16 is a solution concept ϕ that assigns to each game v av e c t o rp a y o ﬀ
ϕ(v)=( ϕ1(v),ϕ2(v),...,ϕn(v)) in RN. Hereby ϕi(v)s t a n d sf o ri’s payoﬀ in the game,
or alternatively for the measure of i’s power in the game.
Shapley (1953) presented a value (i.e., Shapley value) that assigns an expected
marginal contribution to each player in the game with respect to a uniform distri-
bution over the set of all permutations17 on the set of players. The Shapley value
can be described as the following.
Let σ be a permutation (or an order) on the set of players; it is one-to-one
function (bijection) σ : N → N such that for any j ∈ N there exists exactly one
player i ∈ N such that σ(i)=j. Let Π(N)b et h es e to fa l lp e r m u t a t i o n so nN.
For σ ∈ Π(N), and player i ∈ N, denote the set of players preceding player i in the
order σ by PR σ
i = {j ∈ N | σ(j) ≤ σ(i)}. The marginal contribution of player i





i ) − v(PR
σ
i \{i}).
If permutations are randomly chosen from the set of all permutations ΠN with
equal probability for each one of the |N|! permutations, then the average marginal









which is the deﬁnition of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953).
Shapley (1953) provided the following interpretation of his value. Suppose that
the player in N enter a room randomly so that each of the |N|!p o s s i b l eo r d e r si s
15Further details of the Shapley value, its generalizations and the applications can be found in
the collection of papers in Roth (1988) and chapters 52-57 in Aumann and Hart (2002).
16The value approach to cooperative games provides a strong contrast with the core concerning
the multiplicity of solutions.
17Ap e r m u t a t i o nσ : N → N is an order on the players, where σ(i)=j means that player i is at
position j.32 2. Some game theoretic concepts
equally likely. On entering the room, player i ﬁnds a (possible empty) coalition S
already there. Player i gets his marginal contribution to coalition S, v(S∪{i})−v(S).
The probability that player i ﬁnds exactly coalition S in the room is
|S|!(|N|−|S|−1)
|N| ,
since all possible orders in which players in S and players in N\S enter the room
are equivalent, provided that players in S enter before i and players in N\S after i.





S2. (Symmetry)I ft w op l a y e r si,j ∈ N, v(S ∪ {i})=v(S ∪ {j}) for all coalitions
S ⊂ N with i,j / ∈ S (usually, i and j are called substitutes in (N,v)), then
ϕi(v)=ϕj(v).
S3. (Dummy) If, for some i ∈ N, v(S)=v(S\{i})+v({i})f o ra l lS ⊂ N, i ∈ S,
then ϕi(v)=v({i}), and i is called a dummy (or null) player
S4. (Additivity)I f( N,v1)a n d( N,v2) are two games having the same player set
N, and (N,z)i sd e ﬁned by z(S)=v1(S)+v2(S) for all S ⊆ N, then ϕ(z)=
ϕ(v1)+ϕ(v2).
The ﬁrst axiom requires that players precisely distribute among themselves the
resource available to the grand coalition. The second axiom requires symmetric
players to be paid equal shares. The third axiom requires that zero payoﬀsb e
assigned to players whose marginal contribition is null with respect to every coalition.
The last axiom requires that if a game is formed by adding two games together, then
the Shapley value of the new game is the sum of the values of the original games.
Theorem 2.4 (Shapley, 1953) There is a unique value satisfying the eﬃciency,
symmetry, dummy, and additivity axioms: it is the Shapley value given in equation
(2.8).
The Shapley value can be calculated for any game (N,v)w i t haﬁnite number of
players. It has the further advantage of giving a unique outcome that satisﬁes both
individual rationality and eﬃciency. The payoﬀ for any player is a weighted average
of the contributions that the player makes to each of the coalition to which she
belongs.2.3. Games and solution concepts 33
Theorem 2.5 (Shapley, 1971) Let (N,v) be a TU game. Then the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) t h eg a m ei sc o n v e x
(ii) for any S,T ⊂ N,
v(S)+v(T) ≤ v(S ∩ T)+v(S ∪ T). (2.9)
(iii) for each σ ∈ ΠN, the marginal contribution vector is in the core.
Example 2.7 Consider the following situation. Three ﬁrms, indexed by i =1 ,2,3,
decide to start their own network business. Each of them has some skills and some
capital to add to the venture. For example, such a situation may be one ﬁshery
ﬁrm (1) and two other food producers (2,3). After careful analysis of the situation,
they conclude that they can achieve an annual proﬁt of 10, and this amount has to
be divided among them. However, after some additional analysis ﬁrm 1 ﬁgures out
that if it works together with ﬁrm 3 without ﬁrm 2 it may make the same proﬁt
of 10, whereas if it works with ﬁrm 2 solely it gets a proﬁto f8 .N o t et h a tﬁrm 1
gets nothing if it can not sell its products to another. In addition, if either ﬁrm 2
and 3 work or do not work together they get nothing, since they have no material.
This situation can be modeled as a cooperative game (N,v)w h e r eN = {1,2,3},
v({i})=0i fi ∈ N, v({2,3})=0 ,v({1,2})=8 ,v ({1,3}) = 10 and v(N)=1 0 .
T h ec o r eo ft h i sg a m ei sCore(v)={(t,0,10 − t)| 8 ≤ t ≤ 10}. The Shapley
v a l u eo ft h i sg a m ei s( 6 1
3,11
3,21
3) / ∈ Core(v).
Population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS)
An allocation scheme for the game (N,v)i sap a y o ﬀ scheme that provides not
only a payoﬀ vector for a speciﬁc game, but also for all its subgames. Sprumont
(1990) introduced a concept that exhibits this monotonicity property. It guarantees
that once a coalition is formed, no player in this coalition has an incentive to form a
smaller coalition, since the payoﬀ of any player increases, as the coalition he belongs
to grows larger. An allocation scheme that satisﬁes this property as well as the
property of eﬃciency for all subgames is called a population monotonic allocation
scheme. Formally,34 2. Some game theoretic concepts
Deﬁnition 2.9 A vector (yi,S)S⊆N,i∈S is a population monotonic allocation scheme
(PMAS) for the cooperative game (N,v) if it satisﬁes the following conditions:
(i)
P
i∈S yi,S = v(S)f o r a l l S ⊆ N
(ii) yi,S 6 yi,T for all S,T ⊆ N with S ⊆ T and all i ∈ S.
If a game (N,v)h a saP M A S( yi,S)S⊆N,i∈S then the payoﬀ vector (yi,N)i∈N is a
core element for the game (N,v). Moreover, for all T ⊆ N it holds that (yi,T)i∈T
is a core element for the subgame (T,v|T). Hence, every subgame of (N,v)h a sa
nonempty core. This implies that if a game has a PMAS then it is total balanced.
Sprumont (1990) also showed that convex games have a PMAS. In fact, he proved
that the Shapley value for the game that includes all players and each subgame
provides a PMAS.
Partition function form games
The theory of coalition formation has been developed as a natural extension of tra-
ditional cooperative game theory. In addition to being a generalization of the von
Neumann-Morgenstern theory, the theory of games in partition function form has
been developed to avoid some of the restrictive assumptions made in the classical
theory. Whereas the classical characteristic function is constructed such that the
outcome for each coalition does not depend on the complement, the partition func-
tion allows for externalities between coalitions (i.e. when a coalition formed, its
outcome depends on what the complement forms as well). The theory attempts to
oﬀer answers to two questions. First, if some coalitions can be more eﬀective than
others, how should the outcome of any given coalition game depend on the coalition
structure? Second, if the cooperation structure can be inﬂuenced by exclusive nego-
tiations among the players, what kinds of cooperation structures should we expect
to observe, in any given coalition game?
A partition of N is called a coalition structure (of N). Let P(N)b et h es e to fa l l
coalition structures of N. Hence, κ ∈ P(N)m e a n st h a tκ = {S1,S 2,...,Sm}, where
Sj ∩ Si = ∅ for i 6= j and ∪m
j=1Sj = N. The coalition structure consists of singleton
coalition only is denoted as [N], while the grand coalition is denoted by {N}.
Let E(N) be the set of embedded coalitions which is deﬁned as
E(N)={(S,κ) ∈ 2
N × P(N)| S ∈ κ and κ ∈ P(N)}.
Deﬁnition 2.10 A game in partition function form is an ordered pair (N,w),2.4. Concluding remarks 35
where N = {1,2,...,n} denotes the (ﬁnite) set of players, and the partition function
w : E(N) → R assigns a real number to each embedded coalition (S,κ)i ne a c h
partition κ of the set of players.
The value w(S,κ) represents the outcome (payoﬀ)o fc o a l i t i o nS given that
coalition structure κ forms. Usually, we identify the game (N,w) with its partition
function w.
Example 2.8 Consider the tragedy of the commons in section 2.2. Assume that
countries behave cooperatively in their coalition and noncooperatively with respect
to the others. A game in partition function form can be derived as follows.
w(i,[N]) = 1, w(i,{i,jk})=5 ,w(jk,{i,jk})=3 ,w({N}) = 12.
Recent developments in partition function form games deal with both the for-
mulation of game models and solution concepts. The choice of forming a coalition
usually is modelled as a strategic variable of each player. Cooperation emerges as
the outcome of pure noncooperative behaviour. Most of the recent literature (e.g.,
Bloch, 1996, and Ray and Vohra, 1997 and 1999) assumes that a partition function
reﬂects the Nash equilibrium of a game played among coalitions acting as single
players. The value w(S,κ) is thus the equilibrium payoﬀ of S in the game against
the remaining coalitions in κ. One can further distinguish between static models
(e.g., Hart and Kurz, 1983) and dynamic models of coalition formation (e.g., Bloch,
1996). The collection of works related to recent applications of coalition formation
for economic analysis can be found in Carraro (2003).
The value and core concepts have been developed but are also under further
development. For the value, see Myerson (1977) and Bolger (1989); for the core
concepts, see Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997), and Funaki and Yamato (1999).
2.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter reviews brieﬂy some notions and solutions of game theory. It is clear
that game theory provides a comprehensive framework for the analysis of the fun-
damental causes of natural resource problems: multi-actor decision making in situa-
tions characterized by the lack of property rights and the existence of externalities.
However, the assumption that all individuals are perfectly rational and intelligent36 2. Some game theoretic concepts
may not be satisﬁed in any real-life situation of environmental and resource prob-
lems18. Game theorists should, therefore bring their models close enough to practice
and expose the decision makers to the interpretations.
The present features of environmental and resource concerns give rise to new
types of games, like fuzzy games and dynamic cooperative games. While game theory
has become an indispensable part of the environmental and resource economist’s
toolbox, environmental and resource games can serve as a resource for game theorists
to analyse undiscovered ﬁelds and thereby to enhance the beautiful ﬁeld of game
theory and contribute to its full blossoming. The next chapters attempt to make
contributions to these goals.
18Just as game theory may mean diﬀerent things to diﬀerent people, diﬀerent people understand
completely diﬀerent things by “applications”.Chapter 3
Oligopoly games with and without
transferable technologies
3.1 Introduction
One of the major economic applications of game theory lies in the ﬁeld of oligopoly
theory. Oligopoly exists where there are markets in which the fate of each partici-
pant depends on the actions taken by the other participant or participants. Usually,
the theory of oligopoly refers to the partial equilibrium study of markets in which
demand side is competitive, while the supply side is neither monopolized nor com-
petitive (Friedman, 1991). There are two basic approaches to oligopoly theory: the
cooperative and the noncooperative. Typically, the cooperative approach utilizes a
bargaining model under which the several ﬁrms (players) in the oligopoly are sup-
posed to bargain among themselves in order to agree on some joint decision that
yields to the industry one of the outcomes that is Pareto optimal for them. However,
the most pervasive concept underlying the writing on oligopoly is the noncooperative
equilibrium1 (Shubik, 1968).
This chapter2 considers a cooperative approach to oligopoly situations. Two fun-
damentally diﬀerent types of cooperative oligopoly games are distinguished: oligopoly
games with transferable technologies and oligopoly games without transferable tech-
nologies. Oligopoly games with transferable technologies are characterized by the
1With respect to oligopoly, the readers can ﬁnd some discussions of the relative merits of
cooperative and noncooperative theories in the works of Friedman (1971) and Shubik (1968).
2This chapter is based on Norde, Pham Do and Tijs (2002).
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fact that a group of cooperating ﬁrms is allowed to produce according to the cheap-
est technology present in this group. Such a transfer of cheapest technologies would
not be possible for oligopoly games without transferable technologies. An example
of the ﬁrst type is a collection of crop-producing farmers. Every farmer faces its spe-
ciﬁc costs for cultivation of speciﬁc varieties (such as potato, tomato, etc.), which
strongly depend upon the sowing and irrigation techniques used by the farmer.
Cooperating farmers are able to exchange their production techniques (i.e. their
knowledge) which is a costless operation. An example of the second type is a group
of oil producing countries, each having their own costs for production of one barrel of
oil. For geographical reasons, a country like Norway cannot produce oil at the same
cost as, for example, Saudi Arabia or Indonesia not even in the case of cooperation.
An oligopoly situation is usually modeled as a noncooperative game, since the
making of joint agreements is diﬃcult. The more ﬁrms there are in the market,
the more interests there are to be reconciled, and hence the harder to come to
agreements. Making an agreement means giving up some freedom of action. This
would only be done when others are also restricting their choices, and the prospects
in the market for each of ﬁrms are improved as a result of all restrictions taken
together (Friedman, 1971). Aumann (1959) introduced two ways of converting a
non-cooperative game into a cooperative one. In the ﬁrst approach, every coalition
computes the amount of money that they can guarantee themselves, regardless of
what the players outside the coalition do. The second approach computes, for every
coalition, the minimal amount of money such that the players outside the coalition
can prevent the players in the coalition from getting more. Zhao (1999) showed
that, for the case of transferable technologies, these two approaches lead to the same
cooperative game. For the special case of oligopolies without capacity restrictions, he
provided necessary and suﬃcient conditions for convexity of these games (Theorem
3, Zhao 1999).
This chapter focuses on the case of oligopolies without transferable technologies.
We show that the resulting cooperative game is a convex game in general3.M o r e -
over, using the same techniques as in the case of oligopoly games without transferable
technologies, we are able to show that oligopoly games with transferable technolo-
gies are totally balanced. The next section presents some preliminaries. Section 3.3
introduces the cooperative oligopoly games, both with and without transferable tech-
3For a special case, all ﬁrms are symmetric, this result is also obtained in Meinhardt (1999) and
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nologies, and provides a formula for the computation of the coalitional values of these
games. Section 3.4 deals with the properties of cooperative oligopoly games. We
show that cooperative oligopoly games have a nonempty core. Moreover, oligopoly
games without transferable technologies are convex games, while oligopoly games
with transferable technologies are totally balanced. We discuss some generalizations
in section 3.5, and demonstrate that the main results remain valid if the players have
convex cost functions instead of linear cost functions. Concluding remarks follow in
the last section.
3.2 Preliminaries
This section introduces some deﬁnitions and notations that will be used frequently
in this chapter.
For a ∈ R,w ed e ﬁne a+ =m a x {a,0}. If N is a ﬁnite (player) set and (Xi)i∈N
is a collection of non-empty (strategy) spaces, then, for every S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, the
Cartesian product Πi∈SXi is denoted by XS. Moreover, if Xi ⊂ R for every i ∈ N,
and x =( xi)i∈S ∈ XS for some S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, then the sum
P
i∈T xi is denoted by
x(T) for every T ⊆ S. If (ci)i∈S ∈ RS for some S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, then cS =m i n i∈S ci.
Consider a monopolistic producer of some good, whose maximum production
capacity is y>0. Suppose that this monopolist faces the linear inverse demand
function p(t)=x − t,t ∈ [0,y], with x ≥ 0. So, if the monopolist produces t units
of output, he can sell these at a price of x − t per unit of output. Note that the
monetary scale is chosen in such a way that an increase in output of one unit causes a
decrease in price of one unit. Moreover, we assume that the monopolist can produce
at zero cost. So, the monopolist faces the following simple maximization problem
maximize (x − t)t such that t ∈ [0,y]. (3.1)
We will refer to (3.1) as monopolistic optimization problem (x,y). One easily veriﬁes
that the maximum of this problem is fy(x), where the function fy is provided in the
deﬁnition below.




4x2, if 0 ≤ x ≤ 2y
y(x − y), if x>2y.40 3. Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
In this chapter the following properties of the functions {fy}y>0 play an impor-
tant role.
Proposition 3.1 The functions {fy}y>0 have the following properties:
(i) fy is non-decreasing and convex on [0,+∞) for every y>0;
(ii) for every y>0, x ∈ R, a>0,a n dc ≥ 0 we have
fy(x+) − fy((x − a)+) ≥ fy((x − c)+) − fy((x − c − a)+);
(iii) for every y1 > 0, y2 > 0 and x ∈ R we have
fy1(x+) − fy1((x − y2)+) ≥ fy2((x − y1)+) − fy2((x − 2y1)+).
Proof (i) Follows directly from the fact that f0
y is non-negative and nondecreas-






2x, if 0 ≤ x ≤ 2y
y, if x>2y.
(ii) Let y>0. Deﬁne the function gy : R → R by gy(x)=fy(x+), i.e gy(x)=fy(x)i f





y(x)i fx ≥ 0a n dg
0
y(x)=0i fx<0. So, g
0
y is non-decreasing on
R.T h e r e f o r e ,gy is convex on R, and hence the statement follows.
(iii) First note that fy1(x+)+fy2((x−2y1)+)=fy1+y2(x+)f o re v e r yx ∈ R.D e ﬁne
the C1-function u : R → R by
u(x)=fy1+y2(x+) − fy1((x − y2)+) − fy2((x − y1)+).








2(2x − y1 − y2), 1
2(x − y2), 1
2(x − y1),0}
> 0,
and for every x ∈ (y1 + y2,2y1 +2 y2)w eh a v e
u0(x)=1
2x − min{1
2(x − y2),y 1} − min{1
2(x − y1),y 2}
= 1
2x − min{1
2(2x − y1 − y2), 1
2(x + y2), 1
2(x + y1),y 1 + y2}
< 0.3.3. Oligopoly games 41
So, u is increasing on [0,y 1 + y2] and decreasing on [y1 + y2,2(y1 + y2)]. Therefore,
u(x) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ [0,2(y1 + y2)].
Proposition 3.2 Let X and Z be compact topological spaces, and let K : X ×Z →
R be a continuous function. Moreover, suppose that there exists a z∗ ∈ Z such that
































which ﬁnishes the proof.
3.3 Oligopoly games
This section introduces the two types of cooperative oligopoly games and provides
a formula to calculate the coalitional values of these games.
An oligopoly with linear inverse demand function is completely described by the
tuple (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b). Here N = {1,...,n} is the collection of ﬁrms, yi > 0i s
the maximal production (capacity) of ﬁrm i,a n dci > 0 is the marginal cost of ﬁrm
i (i.e. the cost for the production of one unit of output). The constant b ≥ 0i st h e
intercept of the inverse demand function: if total production is x, then the price per
unit of output is max{b − x,0} =( b − x)+. Without loss of generality we assume
that the ﬁrms are ranked according to their marginal costs, i.e. c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ···≤ cn.
Corresponding to the oligopoly above, the strategic oligopoly game
Γ =( N,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈N)
is deﬁned by
Xi =[ 0 ,y i]( 3 . 2 )42 3. Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
for every i ∈ N,a n d
ui(x)=( b − x(N))+ · xi − cixi (3.3)
for every i ∈ N and every x =( xi)i∈N ∈ XN.
Aumann (1959) introduced two ways of converting a non-cooperative game
(N,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈N) into a cooperative game. The ﬁrst approach leads to the co-
operative game (N,vα), which is obtained by computing for every coalition S the
amount of money that the players in S can guarantee themselves that regardless of
what the players outside S do. The second approach results in the game (N,vβ)b y
computing for every coalition S the minimum amount of money such that the play-
ers outside S can prevent the players in S from getting more. The next subsection
shows that for oligopoly games these two cooperative games coincide, leading to the
class of cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies. Subsection
3.3.2 follows the approach of Zhao (1999), where every member in a coalition can
produce according to the cheapest technology present in this coalition. Again, in
the spirit of Aumann (1959), two cooperative games are deﬁned which turn out to
coincide. This leads to the class of cooperative oligopoly games with transferable
technologies.
3.3.1 Cooperative oligopoly games without transferable tech-
nologies
Let (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b) be an oligopoly with linear inverse demand function, and
let Γ =( N,(Xi)i∈N,(ui)i∈N) be the corresponding oligopoly game as deﬁned by (3.2)
and (3.3). The cooperative game (N,vnt
α )i sd e ﬁned by
vnt
α (S)=m a x x∈XS minz∈XN\S
P
i∈S ui(x,z)




for every S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ and
vnt
α (N)=m a x x∈XN
P
i∈N ui(x)




whereas the cooperative game (N,vnt
β )i sd e ﬁned by
vnt
β (S)=m i n z∈XN\S maxx∈XS
P
i∈S ui(x,z)
=m i n z∈XN\S maxx∈XS[(b − z(N\S) − x(S))+ · x(S) −
P
i∈S cixi]
(3.6)3.3. Oligopoly games 43
for every S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ and
v
nt




ui(x)( 3 . 7 )
=m a x
x∈XN




The superscript nt in (N,vnt
α )a n d( N,vnt
β ) is an abbreviation for ‘not transfer-
able’. The following proposition shows that the games (N,vnt
α )a n d( N,vnt
β )c o i n c i d e .
Proposition 3.3 Let (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b) be an oligopoly with linear inverse de-
mand function, and let (N,vnt
α ) and (N,vnt





β (S)=m a x
x∈XS
[(b − y(N\S) − x(S)) · x(S) −
X
i∈S
cixi]( 3 . 8 )
for every S ⊆ N.
Proof Let S ⊆ N, and deﬁne the continuous functions fS : XS → R and
gS : XS → R by









for every x ∈ XS. Clearly, we have fS(x) ≥ gS(x) for every x ∈ XS.I fˆ x ∈ XS
is such that fS(ˆ x) >g S(ˆ x)t h e nb − y(N\S) − ˆ x(S) < 0a n dˆ x(S) > 0. Hence,
fS(ˆ x)=−
P
i∈S ciˆ xi < 0=fS(x0), where x0 ∈ XS is given by x0
i =0f o re v e r y











β (S)=m a x
x∈XS
fS(x)





β (N)=m a x
x∈XN
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by deﬁnition. Therefore, let S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅.D e ﬁne the compact sets
X = XS = Πi∈S[0,y i], Z = XN\S = Πi∈N\S[0,y i], and








Deﬁne z∗ ∈ Z by z∗




∗)=fS(x) for every x ∈ X.
Application of Proposition 3.2 yields vnt
α (S)=vnt
β (S)=m a x x∈XS fS(x).
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b) be an oligopoly with linear inverse de-
mand function. The game (N,vnt
α ), deﬁned by (3.4) and (3.5) (and which is equal to
the game (N,vnt
β )d e ﬁned by (3.6) and (3.7)), is called the cooperative oligopoly game
without transferable technologies, corresponding to oligopoly (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b),
and denoted by (N,vnt).
The following proposition shows how to compute the values of coalitions in co-
operative oligopoly games without transferable technologies.
Proposition 3.4 Let (N,vnt) be the cooperative oligopoly game without transferable
technologies, corresponding to oligopoly (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b). Then, for every S ⊆











Proof Let S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅. Write S = {s1,...,s k} with s1 < ···<s k,a n dl e t





where the C∞-function gS : XS → R is given by
gS(x)=( b
0 − x(S)) · x(S) −
X
i∈S
cixi.3.3. Oligopoly games 45
Let x∗ =( x∗
i)i∈S ∈ XS be such that vnt(S)=gS(x∗). In order to maximize gS, one
should use the ﬁrms with lowest marginal costs, ﬁrst. For example, if i, j ∈ S with
i<jare such that x∗
i <y i and x∗
j > 0, then a decrease of x∗
j by some amount
ε > 0a n da ni n c r e a s eo fx∗
i by the same amount do not decrease the value of the
objective function gS.H e n c e ,w em a ya s s u m et h a tx∗ is such that x∗
j > 0f o rs o m e
j ∈ S implies x∗
i = yi for every i ∈ S with i<j . In order to prove (3.9), we will
distinguish between four cases.
Case 1: x∗
sl =0f o re v e r yl ∈ {1,...,k}.S i n c e x∗






0 − cs1 ≤ 0.
As a consequence, b0 − cj − 2yS,j ≤ b0 − cs1 ≤ 0f o re v e r yj ∈ S. Therefore,
vnt(S)=gS(x∗)=0=
P
j∈S fyj((b0 − cj − yS,j)+).
Case 2: There is an m ∈ {1,...,k − 1} with x∗
sl = ysl for every l ∈ {1,...,m} and
x∗
sl =0f o re v e r yl ∈ {m +1 ,...,k}. Since x∗
sm = ysm, x∗












0 − 2yS,sm+1 − csm+1 ≤ 0.
For every j ∈ S,j ≤ sm,
b
0 − cj − 2yS,j ≥ 2yS,sm+1 + csm − cj − 2yS,j ≥ 2yj,
and hence fyj((b0 − cj − 2yS,j)+)=yj(b0 − cj − 2yS,j − yj).
For every j ∈ S,j ≥ sm+1,
b
0 − cj − 2yS,j ≤ 2yS,sm+1 + csm+1 − cj − 2yS,j ≤ 0,46 3. Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies








= ys1(b0 − cs1 − ys1)+
ys2(b0 − cs2 − 2ys1 − ys2)+
ys3(b0 − cs3 − 2ys1 − 2ys2 − ys3)+
. . .
+ysm(b0 − csm − 2
Pm−1
l=1 ysl − ysm)
=
Pm
l=1 ysl(b0 − csl − 2yS,sl − ysl)
=
P
j∈S fyj((b0 − cj − 2yS,j)
+).
Case 3: There is an m ∈ {1,...,k} with 0 <x ∗
sm <y sm (and hence x∗
sl = ysl for
every l ∈ {1,...,m− 1} and x∗











sl − csm =0
or, equivalently, x∗
sm = 1
2(b0 − csm − 2yS,sm). Hence,
b
0 − csm − 2yS,sm =2 x
∗
sm ∈ (0,2ysm),
and, as a consequence,
fysm((b




0 − csm − 2yS,sm)
2.
Moreover, for every j ∈ S,j < sm,
b
0 − cj − 2yS,j ≥ 2yS,sm + csm − cj − 2yS,j ≥ 2yj,
and hence fyj((b0 − cj − 2yS,j)+)=yj(b0 − cj − 2yS,j − yj).
For every j ∈ S,j ≥ sm+1,
b
0 − cj − 2yS,j ≤ 2yS,sm+1 + csm − cj − 2yS,j ≤ 0,3.3. Oligopoly games 47













l=1 ysl − x∗
sm)(
Pm−1














sm(b0 − csm − 2yS,sm − x∗
sm)
= ys1(b0 − cs1 − ys1)+
ys2(b0 − cs2 − 2ys1 − ys2)+
ys3(b0 − cs3 − 2ys1 − 2ys2 − ys3)+
. . .
+ysm−1(b0 − csm−1 − 2
Pm−2
l=1 ysl − ysm−1)+
1
4(b0 − csm − 2yS,sm)2
=
P
j∈S fyj((b0 − cj − 2yS,j)
+).
Case 4: x∗
sl = ysl for every l ∈ {1,...,k}.S i n c ex∗





0 − 2y(S) − csk ≥ 0.
For every j ∈ S,
b
0 − cj − 2yS,j ≥ 2y(S)+csk − cj − 2yS,j ≥ 2yj









= ys1(b0 − cs1 − ys1)+
ys2(b0 − cs2 − 2ys1 − ys2)+
ys3(b0 − cs3 − 2ys1 − 2ys2 − ys3)+
. . .
+ysk(b0 − csk − 2
Pk−1
l=1 ysl − ysk)
=
Pk
l=1 ysl(b0 − csl − 2yS,sl − ysl)
=
P
j∈S fyj((b0 − cj − 2yS,j)
+).48 3. Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
Remark 3.1. Proposition 3.4 states that in order to compute the value vnt(S)
one has to solve a monopolistic optimization problem for every ﬁrm in S.I f
S = {s1,s 2,...,s k} with s1 <s 2 < ··· <s k,o n eﬁrst has to solve a monop-
olistic optimization problem for ﬁrm s1 (i.e. the ﬁrm in S with lowest marginal
cost). Which monopolistic optimization problem (v,y) should be solved for ﬁrm s1?
Clearly, y should be equal to ys1, the maximum capacity of ﬁrm s1.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
the number v should express approximately the proﬁt per unit of output, if ﬁrm
s1 produces a very small amount of output. Taking into account the fact that the
players in N\S produce at maximal capacity in order to decrease the proﬁts for
S as much as possible, and the fact that ﬁrm s1 produces at costs cs1 p e ru n i to f
output, we get v = b−y(N\S)−cs1 if b−y(N\S)−cs1 ≥ 0( i . e .i fm a r g i n a lr e v e n u e
on the ﬁrst amounts of output exceeds the marginal cost, and v =0o t h e r w i s e ) .
Which monopolistic optimization problem (v,y)s h o u l db es o l v e df o rﬁrm s2?O f
course y should be equal to ys2. If coalition S is going to use the capacity of ﬁrm
s2, it is clear that S uses ﬁrm s1 already at full capacity. So, it is tempting to
conclude that v = b − y(N\S) − cs2 − ys1. By doing this, however, one neglects
the fact that every unit produced by ﬁrm s2 decreases the selling price by one unit,
and, as a consequence, the proﬁts generated by ﬁrm s1 by ys1 units. In order to
take also this eﬀect into account, one should use v = b − y(N\S) − cs2 − 2ys1 if
b−y(N\S)−cs2 −2ys1 ≥ 0 (i.e. if marginal revenue on the ﬁrst amounts of output
of ﬁrm s2 exceeds the marginal cost, and v = 0 otherwise). Similar arguments can
be used for ﬁrms s3,...,s k.
Example 3.1 Consider the cooperative oligopoly game without transferable tech-
nologies (N,vnt), corresponding to oligopoly (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b)w i t hN = {1,2,3},
S ﬁrm 1 ﬁrm 2 ﬁrm 3 vnt(S)
{1} f14(38) = 336 − − 336
{2} − f8(30) = 176 − 176
{3} − − f12(22) = 121 121
{1,2} f14(46) = 448 f8(16) = 64 − 512
{1,3} f14(50) = 504 − f12(8) = 16 520
{2,3} − f8(42) = 272 f12(14) = 49 321
{1,2,3} f14(58) = 616 f8(28) = 160 f12(0) = 0 776
Table 3.1 The values of coalitions for the game (N,vnt).3.3. Oligopoly games 49
y1 = 14, y2 =8 ,y3 =1 2 ,c1 =2 ,c2 =4 ,c3 = 16, and b =6 0 . How to calculate, for
example, vnt({1,3})? Firm 1 faces the monopolistic optimization problem (v,y)w i t h
v = b−y2−c1 =5 0a n dy = y1 = 14; so its proﬁti st h u sfy(v)=f14(50) = 504. Firm
3 faces the monopolistic optimization problem (v,y)w i t hv = b − y2 − c3 − 2y1 =8
and y = y3 =1 2 ;s oi t sp r o ﬁti st h u sfy(v)=f12(8) = 16. Therefore, vnt({1,3})=
504 + 16 = 520. Proceeding in this way, we get Table 3.1. The last column of this
table provides the game (N,vnt).
3.3.2 Cooperative oligopoly games with transferable tech-
nologies
This subsection follows the approach of Zhao (1999), where cooperating ﬁrms can use
the cheapest technology available. Consider, once again, the oligopoly (N,(yi)i∈N,
(ci)i∈N,b). In the spirit of Aumann (1959), the cooperative game (N,vt








[(b − z(N\S) − x(S))+ · x(S) − cS · x(S)] (3.11)





[(b − x(N))+ · x(N) − cN · x(N)], (3.12)
whereas the cooperative game ((N,vt
β)i sd e ﬁned by
v
t




[(b − z(N\S) − x(S))+ · x(S) − cS · x(S)] (3.13)





[(b − x(N))+ · x(N) − cN · x(N)]. (3.14)
The superscript t in (N,vt
α)a n d( N,vt
β) is an abbreviation for ‘transferable’. Once
again, it can be shown that the games (N,vt
α)a n d( N,vt
β)c o i n c i d e( s e ea l s oZ h a o
(1999)).
Proposition 3.5 Let (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b) be an oligopoly with linear inverse de-
mand function, and let (N,vt
α) and (N,vt







[(b − y(N\S) − x(S)) · x(S) − cS · x(S)] (3.15)
for every S ⊆ N.50 3. Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
Proof The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.3 with functions
fS : XS → R and gS : XS → R deﬁned by
fS(x)=( b − y(N\S) − x(S))+ · x(S) − cS · x(S),
and
gS(x)=( b − y(N\S) − x(S)) · x(S) − cS · x(S)
for every x ∈ XS.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b) be an oligopoly with linear inverse de-
mand function. The game (N,vt
α), deﬁned by (3.11) and (3.12) (and which is equal
to the game (N,vt
β)d e ﬁned by (3.13) and (3.14)), is called the cooperative oligopoly
game with transferable technologies, corresponding to oligopoly (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b),
and denoted by (N,vt).
The following proposition shows how to compute the values of coalitions in co-
operative oligopoly games with transferable technologies.
Proposition 3.6 Let (N,vt) be the cooperative oligopoly game with transferable
technologies, corresponding to oligopoly (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b). Then, for every S ⊆





fyj((b − cS − y(N\S) − 2yS,j)+). (3.16)
Proof Let S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅ and let b0 = b − y(N\S). According to (3.15),
vt(S)=m a x x∈XS[(b0 − x(S))x(S) − cS · x(S)]
=m a x t∈[0,y(S)] gS(t),
where the C∞-function gS :[ 0 ,y(S)] → R is given by gS(u)=( b0 − cS − u)u for
every u ∈ [0,y(S)]. Let u∗ ∈ [0,y(S)] be such that vt(S)=gS(u∗). In order to
prove (3.16), we distinguish three cases.
Case 1: u∗ =0 .S i n c egS is maximal at u∗ =0 ,g 0
S(0) = b0 − cS ≤ 0. Consequently,
b0 − cS − 2yS,j ≤ 0 for every j ∈ S and hence
v




0 − cS − 2yS,j)+).3.3. Oligopoly games 51
Case 2: u∗ ∈ (0,y(S)). Since gS is maximal at u∗,g 0
S(u∗)=b0 − cS − 2u∗ =0 ,a n d
hence u∗ = 1
2(b0 − cS). Let j∗ ∈ S be such that u∗ ∈ (yS,j∗,y S,j∗ + yj∗]. Then
b
0 = cS +2 u
∗ ∈ (cS +2 yS,j∗,c S +2 yS,j∗ +2 yj∗],
and hence fyj∗((b0 − cS − 2yS,j∗)+)=1
4(b0 − cS − 2yS,j∗)2.
Moreover, for every j ∈ S,j < j∗,
b
0 − cS − 2yS,j ≥ 2yS,j∗ − 2yS,j ≥ 2yj,
and hence, fyj((b0 − cS − 2yS,j)+)=yj(b0 − cS − 2yS,j − yj).
For every j ∈ S,j > j∗,
b
0 − cS − 2yS,j ≤ 2yS,j∗ +2 yj∗ − 2yS,j ≤ 0,
and hence fyj((b0 − cS − 2yS,j)+) = 0. Therefore,





j∈S,j<j∗ yj(b0 − cS − 2yS,j − yj)+1
4(b0 − cS − 2yS,j∗)2
=
P
j∈S fyj((b0 − cS − 2yS,j)
+).
Case 3: u∗ = y(S). Since gS is maximal at u∗ = y(S), g0
S(u∗)=b0 −cS −2y(S) ≥ 0.
For every j ∈ S,
b
0 − cS − 2yS,j ≥ 2y(S) − 2yS,j ≥ 2yj,
and hence fyj((b0 − cS − 2yS,j)+)=yj(b0 − cS − 2yS,j − yj). Therefore,
vt(S)=gS(u∗)=( b0 − cS − y(S))y(S)
=
P
j∈S yj(b0 − cS − 2yS,j − yj)
=
P
j∈S fyj((b0 − cS − 2yS,j)+).
Remark 3.2 Proposition 3.6 states that in order to compute the value vt(S)o n e
has to solve a monopolistic optimization problem for every ﬁrm in S. The description
of these problems is similar to the description in Remark 3.1. The only diﬀerence52 3. Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
is that the marginal cost for every ﬁrm has to be replaced with the lowest marginal
cost in the coalition.
Example 3.2 Consider the cooperative oligopoly game with transferable tech-
nologies (N,vt), corresponding to oligopoly (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b) in Example 3.1.
How to calculate e.g. vt({1,2})? Firm 1 faces the monopolistic optimization
problem (v,y), with v = b − y3 − c1 =4 6a n dy = y1 = 14, so its proﬁti s
fy(v)=f14(46) = 448. Firm 2 faces the monopolistic optimization problem (v,y),
with v = b − y3 − c1 − 2y1 =1 8a n dy = y2 =8 ,s oi t sp r o ﬁti sfy(v)=f8(18) = 80.
Therefore, vt({1,2}) = 448+80 = 528. Proceeding in this way leads us to Table 3.2.
S ﬁrm 1 ﬁrm 2 ﬁrm 3 vt(S)
{1} f14(38) = 336 − − 336
{2} − f8(30) = 176 − 176
{3} − − f12(22) = 121 121
{1,2} f14(46) = 448 f8(18) = 80 − 528
{1,3} f14(50) = 504 − f12(22) = 121 625
{2,3} − f8(42) = 272 f12(26) = 168 440
{1,2,3} f14(58) = 616 f8(30) = 176 f12(14) = 49 841
Table 3.2 The values of coalitions for the game (N,vt).
The last column of this table provides the game (N,vt).
3.4 Properties of oligopoly games
This section provides some properties of cooperative oligopoly games. Using the
results of the previous section, we will show that oligopoly games without trans-
ferable technologies are convex games, whereas oligopoly games with transferable
technologies are totally balanced.
3.4.1 Properties of oligopoly games without transferable tech-
nologies
In order to prove the main result of this section we ﬁrst need a lemma.3.4. Properties of oligopoly games 53
Lemma 3.1 Let (N,vnt) be the cooperative oligopoly game without transferable tech-
nologies corresponding to oligopoly (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b).L e tl,m ∈ N,l < m and
let S ⊆ N\{l,m} be such that S ∩ {l +1 ,...,m − 1} = ∅.T h e n ,
v
nt(S ∪ {l,m}) − v
nt(S ∪ {l}) − v
nt(S ∪ {m})+v
nt(S) ≥ 0.
Proof We write xT;i = fyi((b − ci − y(N\T) − 2yT,i)+) for every T ⊆ N, i ∈ T.
First note that
(xS∪{l,m};l − xS∪{l};l)+( xS∪{l,m};m − xS∪{m};m)
= fyl((b − cl − y(N\(S ∪ {l,m})) − 2yS∪{l,m},l)+)
−fyl((b − cl − y(N\(S ∪ {l})) − 2yS∪{l},l)+)
+fym((b − cm − y(N\(S ∪ {l,m})) − 2yS∪{l,m},m)+)
−fym((b − cm − y(N\(S ∪ {m})) − 2yS∪{m},m)+)
= fyl((b − cl − y(N\S)+yl + ym − 2yS,l)+)
−fyl((b − cl − y(N\S)+yl − 2yS,l)+)
+fym((b − cm − y(N\S) − yl + ym − 2yS,l)+)
−fym((b − cm − y(N\S)+ym − 2yS,l)+)
≥ fyl((b − cm − y(N\S)+yl + ym − 2yS,l)+)
−fyl((b − cm − y(N\S)+yl − 2yS,l)+)
+fym((b − cm − y(N\S) − yl + ym − 2yS,l)+)
−fym((b − cm − y(N\S)+ym − 2yS,l)+)
≥ 0,
where at the ﬁrst inequality we used Proposition 3.1 (ii) with
y = yl,x = b − cl − y(N\S)+yl + ym − 2yS,l,a = ym, and c = cm − cl,
and at the second inequality we used Proposition 3.1 (iii) with
x = b − cm − y(N\S)+yl + ym − 2yS,l,y 1 = yl, and y2 = ym.54 3. Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
Furthermore, for j ∈ S, j<l ,
xS∪{l,m};j − xS∪{l};j − xS∪{m};j + xS;j
= fyj((b − cj − y(N\(S ∪ {l,m})) − 2yS∪{l,m},j)+)
−fyj((b − cj − y(N\(S ∪ {l})) − 2yS∪{l},j)+)
−fyj((b − cj − y(N\(S ∪ {m})) − 2yS∪{m},j)+)
+fyj((b − cj − y(N\S) − 2yS,j)+)
= fyj((b − cj − y(N\S)+yl + ym − 2yS,j)+)
−fyj((b − cj − y(N\S)+yl − 2yS,j)+)
−fyj((b − cj − y(N\S)+ym − 2yS,j)+)
+fyj((b − cj − y(N\S) − 2yS,j)+)
≥ 0,
because of Proposition 3.1 (ii) with
y = yj,x = b − cj − y(N\S)+yl + ym − 2yS,j,a = ym, and c = yl.
Finally, for j ∈ S, j>m ,
xS∪{l,m};j − xS∪{l};j − xS∪{m};j + xS;j
= fyj((b − cj − y(N\(S ∪ {l,m})) − 2yS∪{l,m},j)+)
−fyj((b − cj − y(N\(S ∪ {l})) − 2yS∪{l},j)+)
−fyj((b − cj − y(N\(S ∪ {m})) − 2yS∪{m},j)+)
+fyj((b − cj − y(N\S) − 2yS,j)+)
= fyj((b − cj − y(N\S) − yl − ym − 2yS,j)+)
−fyj((b − cj − y(N\S) − yl − 2yS,j)+)
−fyj((b − cj − y(N\S) − ym − 2yS,j)+)
+fyj((b − cj − y(N\S) − 2yS,j)+)
≥ 0,
because of Proposition 3.1 (ii) with y = yj,x= b−cj −y(N\S)−2yS,j,a= yl, and
c = ym.
According to Proposition 3.4,3.4. Properties of oligopoly games 55












j∈S(xS∪{l,m};j − xS∪{l};j − xS∪{m};j + xS;j)
+( xS∪{l,m};l − xS∪{l};l)+( xS∪{l,m};m − xS∪{m};m)
≥ 0.
Theorem 3.1 Every cooperative oligopoly game without transferable technologies is
convex.
Proof In order to show that every cooperative oligopoly game without transfer-
able technologies is convex, it suﬃces to show that for every cooperative oligopoly
game without transferable technologies (N,vnt), every l,m ∈ N with l<m ,a n de v -
ery S ⊆ N\{l,m} we have vnt(S∪{l,m})−vnt(S∪{l})−vnt(S∪{m})+vnt(S) ≥ 0.
We will prove this with induction to k = |S∩{l+1,...,m−1}| (i.e. with induction
to the number of players in S between l and m).
Induction basis.L e t( N,vnt) be a cooperative oligopoly game without transferable
technologies, l,m ∈ N with l<m ,a n dS ⊆ N\{l,m} such that
|S ∩ {l +1 ,...,m− 1}| =0 .
According to Lemma 3.1,
vnt(S ∪ {l,m}) − vnt(S ∪ {l}) − vnt(S ∪ {m})+vnt(S) ≥ 0.
Induction step. Let k ∈ N, and suppose that for every cooperative oligopoly
game without transferable technologies (N,vnt), every l,m ∈ N with l<m ,e v -
ery S ⊆ N\{l,m} such that
|S ∩ {l +1 ,...,m− 1}| ≤ k − 1,56 3. Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
we have
vnt(S ∪ {l,m}) − vnt(S ∪ {l}) − vnt(S ∪ {m})+vnt(S) ≥ 0.
Let (N,vnt) be a cooperative oligopoly game without transferable technologies, cor-
responding to oligopoly (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b), let l,m ∈ N with l<m ,a n dl e t
S ⊆ N\{l,m} be such that
|S ∩ {l +1 ,...,m− 1}| = k.
Deﬁne l∗ =m i nS∩{l+1,...,m−1}.L e t( N,wnt) be the cooperative oligopoly game




i = yi for every i ∈ N, c0
i = cl∗ for every i ∈ {l,l +1 ,...,l ∗}, c0
i = ci for
all other i.T h e nw eﬁnd
(v
nt(S ∪ {l,m}) − v




nt(S ∪ {l,m}) − w
nt(S ∪ {l}) − w
nt(S ∪ {m})+w
nt(S))
= fyl((b − cl − y(N\S)+yl + ym − 2yS,l)+)
−fyl((b − cl − y(N\S)+yl − 2yS,l)+)
−fyl((b − cl∗ − y(N\S)+yl + ym − 2yS,l)+)
+fyl((b − cl∗ − y(N\S)+yl − 2yS,l)+)
≥ 0,
where the equality follows by using (3.9) and the fact that player l is the only player
in S ∪ {l,m} whose marginal cost has been changed. The inequality follows by
Proposition 3.1 (ii) with
y = yl,x = b − cl − y(N\S)+yl + ym − 2yS,l,a = ym, and c = cl∗ − cl.
Let (N,unt) be the cooperative oligopoly game without transferable technologies,
corresponding to oligopoly (N,(y00
i )i∈N,(c00







i for every i ∈ N\{l,l∗},a n dc00
i = c0
i for every i ∈ N.D e ﬁne S0 =( S ∪
{l})\{l∗}. One easily veriﬁes that unt(S0 ∪ {l∗,m})=wnt(S ∪ {l,m}), unt(S0 ∪
{l∗})=wnt(S ∪ {l}), unt(S0 ∪ {m})=wnt(S ∪ {m}), and unt(S0)=wnt(S). Since
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and hence
w
nt(S ∪ {l,m}) − w
nt(S ∪ {l}) − w
nt(S ∪ {m})+w
nt(S) ≥ 0.
By (3.17), we infer that
v
nt(S ∪ {l,m}) − v
nt(S ∪ {l}) − v
nt(S ∪ {m})+v
nt(S) ≥ 0,
which ﬁnishes the proof.
3.4.2 Properties of oligopoly games with transferable tech-
nologies
Subsection 3.4.1 showed that every cooperative oligopoly game without transfer-
able technologies is convex. Zhao (1999) noted that this is not true in general for
cooperative oligopoly games with transferable technologies. The following example
illustrates this once again.
Example 3.3 Consider the cooperative oligopoly game with transferable technolo-
gies (N,vt) of Example 3.2. One easily veriﬁes that vt(123)−vt(13) = 216 < 319 =
vt(23) − vt(3), which shows that (N,vt)i sn o tc o n v e x .
However, we can show that every cooperative oligopoly game with transferable
technologies is totally balanced. Moreover, we can show that the marginal vector,
corresponding to the order which ranks the ﬁrms in the order of increasing marginal
costs, provides a core element.
Proposition 3.7 Let (N,vt) be a cooperative oligopoly game with transferable tech-
nologies, corresponding to the oligopoly (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b).T h e n(N,vt) is totally
balanced. Moreover, for the vector x ∈ RN,d e ﬁned by
xi = v
t({j ∈ N : j ≤ i}) − v
t({j ∈ N : j ≤ i − 1})
for every i ∈ N, we have x ∈ Core(vt).
Proof First we note that every subgame (S,vt
S)o f( N,vt) (i.e. vt
S(T)=vt(T)
for every T ⊆ S) is a cooperative oligopoly game with transferable technologies58 3. Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
itself. In order to see this, let S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅. From (3.16) one easily derives
that (S,vt
S) is the cooperative oligopoly game with transferable technologies, corre-
sponding to oligopoly (S,(yi)i∈S,(ci)i∈S,b 0), where b0 =( b − y(N\S))+. Therefore,
in order to prove the proposition, it is suﬃc i e n tt os h o wt h a te v e r yc o o p e r a t i v e
oligopoly game with transferable technologies is balanced. Let (N,w)b et h ec o -
operative oligopoly game with transferable technologies, corresponding to oligopoly
(N,(yi)i∈N,(c0
i)i∈N,b), where c0
i = c1 for every i ∈ N.S i n c e a l l ﬁrms have equal
cost, the cooperative oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies,
corresponding to this oligopoly, coincide. Hence, according to Theorem 3.1, (N,w)
is convex. Deﬁne the marginal vector y ∈ RN by
yi = w({j ∈ N : j ≤ i}) − w({j ∈ N : j ≤ i − 1})
for every i ∈ N. By convexity of (N,w), we have y ∈ Core(w). Moreover, due to
(3.16), we have vt(S)=w(S) for every S ⊆ N with 1 ∈ S,a n dvt(S) ≤ w(S) for all
other S. As a consequence, we have x = y ∈ Core(w) ⊆ Core(vt).
3.5 Convex cost functions
The main results in this chapter are derived for oligopolies with linear cost functions.
A natural question is whether these results remain valid for oligopolies with con-
vex, continuous cost functions ci(xi). The corresponding cooperative game without
transferable technologies can be deﬁned by (3.4) or (3.6) with
P
i∈S ci(xi)i n s t e a d
of
P
i∈S cixi, whereas, in the case the cost functions are ordered c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn,
the corresponding cooperative game with transferable technologies can be deﬁned
by (3.11) or (3.13) with mini∈Sci(x(S)) instead of cSx(S). We will consider the fol-
lowing example.
Example 3.4 Consider the cooperative oligopoly game without transferable tech-
nologies (N,vnt), corresponding to the oligopoly (N,(yi)i∈N,(ci)i∈N,b)w i t hN =
{1,2,3,4,5}, y1 =2 ,y 2 =8 ,y 3 =4 ,y 4 =6 ,y 5 =7a n dci = i for every i ∈ N.
Consider also the oligopoly which arises if player 3,4, and 5 merger and act as one
player, say player 3∗. T h e nw eh a v ea no l i g o p o l yw i t ht h r e ep l a y e r s ,n a m e l y1 , 2,
and 3∗, y1 =2 ,y 2 =8 ,a n dy3∗ = y3 +y4 +y5 = 17, and cost functions, speciﬁed by3.5. Convex cost functions 59





3x3∗ if 0 ≤ x3∗ ≤ 4
12 + 4(x3∗ − 3) if 4 <x 3∗ ≤ 10
36 + 5(x3∗ − 10) if 10 <x 3∗ ≤ 17
Clearly, c3∗ is a continuous, piecewise linear, convex function. Let (N∗,wnt)b et h e
cooperative oligopoly game without transferable technologies, corresponding to this
new oligopoly. Then one easily veriﬁes for every S ⊆ {1,2} that wnt(S)=vnt(S)
and wnt(S ∪{3∗})=vnt(S ∪{3,4,5}), so wnt(1) = vnt(1) and wnt(23∗)=vnt(2345).
According to Theorem 3.1, vnt is convex, and it follows straightforwardly that wnt
is convex as well.
The idea presented in Example 3.4, can be generalized easily to show that every
cooperative oligopoly game without transferable technologies, corresponding to an
oligopoly in which every player has a piecewise linear, convex cost function, is a
convex game. Each ﬁrm should be split into a ﬁnite number of agents, each one
producing with ﬁnite capacity and constant marginal cost, in such a way that their
aggregate cost function is precisely the ﬁrm’s original cost function. The coopera-
tive oligopoly game, corresponding to the oligopoly with the agents as players, is,
according to Theorem 3.1, convex. It follows in a straightforward way that the
cooperative oligopoly game, with the ﬁr m sa sp l a y e r s ,i sc o n v e xa sw e l l .
The generalization can be carried even one step further. Every continuous, con-
vex function on a compact interval can be approximated in a uniformly continuous
way by piecewise linear, convex functions. Therefore, every cooperative oligopoly
game without transferable technologies, corresponding to an oligopoly in which play-
ers have continuous, convex cost functions, can be regarded as a limit of cooperative
oligopoly games without transferable technologies, corresponding to oligopolies in
which players have piecewise linear, convex cost functions. Since limits of con-
vex games are convex as well, we can draw the conclusion that every cooperative
oligopoly game without transferable technologies, corresponding to an oligopoly in
which players have continuous, convex cost functions, is a convex game.
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.7, we conclude that ev-
ery cooperative oligopoly game with transferable technologies, corresponding to an
oligopoly in which players have continuous, convex cost functions, is totally bal-
anced.60 3. Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies
This section is concluded with an example of a non-convex cooperative oligopoly
game without transferable technologies, corresponding to an oligopoly in which the
inverse demand function is concave and every player has linear costs.
Example 3.5 Consider the cooperative oligopoly game without transferable tech-
nologies (N,vnt), corresponding to the oligopoly with N = {1,2,3}, y1 = y3 =
2,y 2 =1 ,c 1 =9 7 ,c 2 = c3 = 98, and inverse demand function given by
p(x)=
(
103 − x if 0 ≤ x ≤ 3
50(5 − x)i f3<x≤ 5.
How to compute vnt(1)? Player 1 faces the proﬁt optimization problem, which is
obtained by letting 2 and 3 produce at maximum capacity. So, if player 1 produces x
units of output (0 ≤ x ≤ 2), then the total amount of output produced is x+y1+y2 =
x +3 , and hence the selling price becomes p(x +3 )=5 0 ( 2− x). Therefore, player
1 has to maximize the function π(x)=5 0 ( 2− x)x − 97x,x ∈ [0,2], which yields





(103 − x)x − 97x if 0 ≤ x ≤ 2
(103 − x)x − 97 · 2 − 98(x − 2) if 2 <x≤ 3
50(5 − x)x − 97 · 2 − 98(x − 2) if 3 <x≤ 5
which yields vnt(123) = π(2.5) = 8.25. Using analogous arguments we get vnt(12) =
3a n dvnt(13) = 6. Since vnt(123) − vnt(12) = 5.25 < 5.955 = vnt(13) − vnt(1) we
conclude that vnt is not convex.
3.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter introduced two special classes of cooperative oligopoly games, which
were proven to have a nonempty core. In addition, oligopoly games without transfer-
able technologies are convex in general, whereas oligopolies with transferable tech-
nologies are totally balanced. Moreover, we note that the main results, which were
obtained in the context of oligopolies with linear cost functions, remain valid for
oligopoly games with convex, continuous cost functions. These observations are
strong arguments for cooperation between all players. The convexity of oligopoly
games without transferable technologies, which states that the marginal contribu-
tion of a player to some coalition increases if the coalition which he joins grows3.6. Concluding remarks 61
larger, is useful particularly for studying stable cartels (for example, see Meinhardt
and Driessen, 2002) and the incentives for achieving agreements. One application
of these games is presented in Chapter 6.62 3. Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologiesChapter 4
The Shapley value for games in
partition function form
4.1 Introduction
The Shapley value, introduced by Shapley (1953), is one of central solution concepts
in cooperative game theory. The idea behind the concept is to evaluate how much
will a player be willing to pay to participate in a give game. In the intervening years,
the Shapley value has been interpreted and reinterpreted since it is considered as
a reasonable way of distributing the gains of cooperation among the players in the
game. In some sence the value captures the expected outcome of the game, and
represents a distinct approach to the problems of complex strategic interactions
that game theory seeks to illuminate (Roth, 1988).
The literature on game theory shows that the Shapley value is the most studied,
and widely used single-valued solution concept for cooperative games with trans-
ferable utility (TU games)1. However, considering an economy with externalities,
one can not easily recommend a division of the joint proﬁts in the same way. For
example, in the context of a symmetric Cournot model with linear cost and demand,
Selten (1973) showed that the connection between the number of competitors and
the tendency to cooperate depends on speciﬁc institutional assumptions about pos-
sibilities of cooperation. If ﬁrms are free to form enforceable quota cartels, then
cartels (coalitions) may or may not include all ﬁrms in the market. The coopera-
1For a nice introduction to the Shapley value and, in particular, its applications, the reader is
referred to Roth (1988).
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tive possibilities of a coalition are derived from equilibrium points of an associated
non-cooperative game. In this situation, one can not employ the usual concept of a
game in characteristic function form (TU game) to predict the outcome (solution),
as the ﬁnal proﬁts depend on the coalition structure that has been formed. This
feature, however, has been captured in the concept of partition function form games
due to Thrall (1962), and Thrall and Lucas (1963): a partition function assigns a
value to each pair consisting of a coalition and a coalition structure which includes
that coalition.
Based on the axioms that characterize the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) for co-
operative TU games, there are apparently many ways to extend the Shapley value to
games in partition function form (see, for example, Myerson (1977), Bolger (1989),
Potter (2000)). Myerson (1977) derived an eﬃcient value which is a natural exten-
sion of the Shapley value based on three simple axioms. Bolger (1989) derived an
eﬃcient value which assigns zero to dummies and nonnegative values to players in
monotonic simple games, whereas Potter (2000) modiﬁed the regular concept of the
dummy player, which allows the dummy player to bring nonnegative worth to the
game. All of these are in some way extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative
TU games.
This chapter2 studies an extension of the Shapley value to the class of games
in partition function form. The eﬃcient value we deﬁne is diﬀerent from the value
from previous authors. The basic idea in this chapter is to construct a value that
is the average of a collection of marginal vectors in order to study the problem
of externalities such as free rider behaviour in resource management (Chapter 7).
We present a simple formula for calculating the Shapley value of partition function
form games, using a decomposition in unanimity games. The next section will recall
the main basic features of partition function form games. The reformulations and
generalizations of the Shapley value and unanimity games will be introduced in
sections 4.3 and 4.4. The properties of this solution concept are studied in section
4.5. Section 4.6 discusses an example demonstrating how the Shapley value can be
applied. Concluding remarks follow in the last section.
2This chapter is based on Pham Do and Norde (2002).4.2. Preliminaries 65
4.2 Preliminaries
This section recalls some deﬁnitions and notations related to games in partition
function form.
Let N = {1,2...,n} be the ﬁnite set of players, and let P(N)b et h es e to fp o s s i b l e
partitions of N.S o ,e a c hκ ∈ P(N) is of the form {S1,...,Sm}, where the nonempty
subsets S1,...,Sm in κ are pairwise disjoint and N = ∪m
j=1Sj. For any subset S ⊆ N,
the set of possible partitions of S is denoted by P(S). A typical element of P(S)i s
denoted by κS.
Let E(N) denote the set of embedded coalitions, i.e.
E(N)={(S,κ) ∈ 2
N × P(N)| S ∈ κ}
Deﬁnition 4.1 Am a p p i n g
w : E(N) −→ R
that assigns a real value, w(S,κ), to each embedded coalition (S,κ) is called a par-
tition function. The ordered pair (N,w) is called a partition function form game.
The set of partition function form games with player set N is denoted by PFFG N.
The value w(S,κ)r e p r e s e n t st h ep a y o ﬀ of coalition S, given that coalition struc-
ture κ forms. For a given partition κ = {S1,S 2,...,S m} and a partition function
w,l e tw(S1,S 2,...,Sm)d e n o t et h em-vector (w(Si,κ))m
i=1. It will be convenient to
economize brackets and suppress the commas between elements of the same coali-
tion. Thus, we will write, for example, w({ijk},{{ijk},{lh}})a s w(ijk,{ijk,lh}),
and w({ikj},{lh})a sw(ijk,lh). For a partition κ ∈ P(N)a n di ∈ N,w ed e n o t e
the coalition in κ to which player i belongs by S(κ,i).
The typical partition which consists of singleton coalitions only, κ = {{1},{2},...,
{n}}, is denoted by [N], whereas the partition, which consists of the grand coalition
only is denoted by {N}. For any subset S ⊆ N, let [S] denote the typical partition
which consists of the singleton elements of S, i.e.[S]={{j}| j ∈ S}.
Deﬁnition 4.2 A solution concept on PFFGN is a function Ψ, which associates
with each game (N,w)i nPFFGN av e c t o rΨ(N,w) of individual payoﬀsi nRN (i.e.
Ψ(N,w)=( Ψi(N,w))i∈N ∈ RN).66 4. The Shapley value for games in partition function form
4.3 The Shapley value
This section will generalize the Shapley value to the class of partition function form
games. First we recall the deﬁnition of the Shapley value for the class of TU games.
A cooperative TU game is a pair (N,v), where N is the ﬁnite set of players and
v(S) ∈ R is the worth of coalition S ⊆ N, with the convention that v(φ)=0 .
Let Π(N)b et h es e to fa l lbijections σ : {1,2,...,n} → N of N.F o r a g i v e n
σ ∈ Π(N)a n di ∈ {1,2,...,n} we deﬁne Sσ
i = {σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(i)}, and Sσ
0 = ∅. We
construct the vector mσ(v), which corresponds to the situation where the players
enter a room one by one in order σ(1),σ(2),...,σ(n)a n dw h e r ee a c hp l a y e ri sg i v e n
the marginal contribution he/she creates by entering. Formally, it is the vector in
RN deﬁned by mσ
σ(i)(v)=v(Sσ
i )−v(Sσ
i−1), for any i ∈ {1,2,...,n}. The Shapley value






In order to introduce the Shapley value for partition function form games we need
some more notation. For a given σ ∈ Π(N)a n di ∈ {1,2,...,n}, we deﬁne the
partition κσ
i associated with σ and i, by κσ
i = {Sσ
i }∪[N\Sσ
i ]. So, in κσ
i the coalition
Sσ
i has already formed, whereas all other players still form singleton coalitions.
Furthermore, we deﬁne κσ
0 =[ N].
For a game in partition function form, the marginal vectors are deﬁned as
follows. The marginal vector mσ(w) of a partition function form game (N,w)
again corresponds to a situation in which the players enter a room one by one




1). If the second player σ(2) joins, then the
two players together can get w(Sσ
2,κσ




























Based on these marginal vectors {mσ(w)}σ∈π(N), the Shapley value Φ of the









just like its counterpart for TU games (c.f. Shapley, 1953).
Example 4.1 Consider the partition function form game (N,w)d e ﬁned by
w(1,2,3) = (0,0,0), w(12,3) = (2,0), w(23,1) = (3,2), w(13,2) = (2,1), w(123) =
10.
The marginal vectors are as follows:
if σ1 =( 1 ,2,3) then m
σ1(w)=( 0 ,2,8)
if σ2 =( 2 ,1,3) then m
σ2(w)=( 2 ,0,8)
if σ3 =( 1 ,3,2) then m
σ3(w)=( 0 ,8,2)
if σ4 =( 2 ,3,1) then m
σ4(w)=( 7 ,0,3)
if σ5 =( 3 ,1,2) then m
σ5(w)=( 2 ,8,0)
if σ6 =( 3 ,2,1) then m
σ6(w)=( 7 ,3,0).
Thus, the Shapley value Φ(w)=( 3 ,3.5,3.5). One can verify that the values, intro-
duced by Potter (2000) and Bolger (1989) yield the vector (3.25,3.5,3.25) for this
game.3 The diﬀerence between our value and Bolger’s value stems from the fact
that Bolger was considering a diﬀerent collection of marginal vectors. The value
introduced by Potter is obtained by considering the sum of an ”average worth” of
coalitions.
4.4 Unanimity games
This section introduces unanimity games for the class of partition function form
games as a generalization of unanimity games for the class of TU games. We estab-
lish a decomposition theorem, which states that every partition function form game
can be written in a unique way as a linear combination of unanimity games. First,
we recall the corresponding concepts for TU games.





if S ⊆ T
otherwise
3For n =3 , the value introduced by Potter coincides with Bolger’s value (Potter, 2000).68 4. The Shapley value for games in partition function form
for all T ⊆ N.
The unanimity games {(N,uS)| S ∈ 2N\{φ}} form a basis for the class of all TU
games with player set N. The unique linear expansion of a characteristic function v
i nt e r m so fu n a n i m i t yg a m e si sg i v e nb y
v =
P
S∈2N\{φ} cSuS, where cS =
P
T:T⊆S(−1)|S|−|T|v(T).
We will now extend the various notions for TU games to partition function form
games.
Let τ =( S,κ)a n dτ0 =( S0,κ0) be two embedded coalitions of N. We say that τ
is a generalized subset of τ0, denoted by τ v τ0, if the two following conditions hold
(i) S ⊆ S0




So, an embedded coalition τ =( S,κ) is a generalized subset of τ0 =( S0,κ0)i f
S ⊆ S0 and if κ0 is the partition that results from partition κ by merging the players
in S0\S with S.
Example 4.2 Let N = {1,2,3,4,5,6},a n dτ =( 1 2 3 ,{123,45,6}) ∈ E(N).
Then τ is a generalized subset of τ0 = (1234,{1234,5,6}), but τ is not a generalized
subset of τ00 = (1234,{1234,56}).
Now we will deﬁne unanimity games for partition function form games.
Deﬁnition 4.3 Let τ =( S,κ) ∈ E(N) be an embedded coalition. The unanimity






if τ v τ0
otherwise
(4.3)
for every τ0 ∈ E(N).
Example 4.3 Let N = {1,2,3}. Let κ1 =[ N],κ2 = {12,3},κ3 = {13,2},
κ4 = {23,1}, κ5 = {N}, and let τ1 =( 1 ,κ1), τ2 =( 2 ,κ1), τ3 =( 3 ,κ1),4.4. Unanimity games 69
τ4 =( 1 2 ,κ2), τ5 =( 3 ,κ2), τ6 =( 1 3 ,κ3), τ7 =( 2 ,κ3), τ8 =( 2 3 ,κ4),
τ9 =( 1 ,κ4), τ10 = (123,κ3).
Table 4.1 gives the values of wτ(τ0) for all embedded coalitions τ and τ0.
τ \ τ0 τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 τ5 τ6 τ7 τ8 τ9 τ10
τ1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
τ2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
τ3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
τ4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
τ5 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
τ6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
τ7 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
τ8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
τ9 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
τ10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 4.1. The values of unanimity games wτ.
We can now prove, similarly to the case of TU games, that the unanimity games
form a basis for the class of partition function form games.
Lemma 4.1 If (N,w) is a partition function form game, then there exist uniquely





T h e s en u m b e r sa r eg i v e nb yµτ =
P
η:ηvτ(−1)|τ|−|η|w(η), where |τ| denotes the car-
dinality of coalition T in an embedded coalition τ =( T,κ).
Proof It suﬃces to show for the µτ, speciﬁed in the lemma, that w =
P
τ∈E(N) µτwτ.























|τ|−|η|)w(η).70 4. The Shapley value for games in partition function form
Now, let η =( S,κ) be such that η v τ0(= (S0,κ0)), and consider the expression
P
τ:ηvτvτ0(−1)|τ|−|η|. Note that for every S00 with S ⊆ S00 ⊆ S0 there is precisely one



















If η = τ0 we clearly have
P
τ:ηvτvτ0(−1)|τ|−|η| =1 .




|τ|−|η| =( 1− 1)
|S0\S| =0 .
Therefore, we can conclude that
P
τ∈E(N) µτwτ(τ0)=w(τ0) for all τ0 ∈ E(N),
which ﬁnishes the proof.
The following example shows the linear expansion of a partition function form
game (N,w) with respect to the unanimity games wτ.
Example 4.4 Consider the partition function form game (N,w) in Example 4.1.
Calculating the numbers µτ, we have µτi =0f o ri =1 ,2,3,4,6, µτj = 1 for j =
5,7,8,9, and µτ10 =6 . So, the decomposition of w is given by
w = wτ5 + wτ7 + wτ8 + wτ9 +6 wτ10.
4.5 Characterization
This section characterizes the Shapley value for partition function form games, which
we introduced in the previous section, by eﬃciency, additivity, symmetry and the
null player property.
For S ⊆ N, i,j / ∈ S and k ∈ S, we denote S+i = S ∪ {i},S +i,j = S ∪ {i,j}, and
S−k = S\{k}.4.5. Characterization 71
Deﬁnition 4.4 Let (N,w) be a partition function form game and i ∈ N. We say
that player i is a null player if for all κN\{i} ∈ P(N\{i})a n dS ∈ κN\{i},
w(S,κN\{i} ∪ {{i}})=w(S+i,(κN\{i}\{S}) ∪ {S+i}).
Deﬁnition 4.5 Given a partition function form game (N,w) ∈ PFFG,we say that
two players i and j are symmetric if for all κN\{i,j} ∈ P(N\{i,j})a n dS ∈ κN\{i,j},
w(S+i,(κN\{i,j}\S) ∪ {{j}} ∪ {S+i})=w(S+j,(κN\{i,j}\S) ∪ {{i}} ∪ {S+j}).
Let Ψ : PFFGN → Rn be a solution for PFFG N. The solution concept Ψ
(i) is called eﬃcient (EFF) if
Pn
i=1 Ψi(w)=w(N,{N}) for all w ∈ PFFGN;
(ii) is called symmetric (SYM) if for all w ∈ PFFGN, and for all symmetric
players i,j in (N,w), we have Ψi(w)=Ψj(w);
(iii)s a t i s ﬁes the null player property (NP) if for all w ∈ PFFG N,a n df o r
all i ∈ N such that player i is a null player in (N,w), we have Ψi(w)=0 ;
(iv)s a t i s ﬁes additivity (ADD) if for any two games (N,w1)a n d( N,w2)i n
PFFG N we have Ψ(w1 + w2)=Ψ(w1)+Ψ(w2). Here, w1 + w2 is deﬁned
by (w1 + w2)(S,κ)=w1(S,κ)+w2(S,κ) for every (S,κ) ∈ E(N).
Theorem 4.1 The Shapley value satisﬁes EFF, SYM, ADD, and NP.





























(ii) SYM:L e tw ∈ PFFG N, and let i,j be symmetric players in (N,w).L e t
σ ∈ Π(N)a n dl e tσij ∈ Π(N) be the permutation that is obtained by interchanging72 4. The Shapley value for games in partition function form




j (w). Since σij ranges over all permutations if σ does, and the Shapley
value is the average of all marginal vectors, we get Φi(w)=Φj(w).
(iii) ADD:O b v i o u s .
(iv) NP: Obtained from the fact that if player k is a null player in (N,w)t h e n
mσ
k(w) = 0 for every σ ∈ Π(N).
Theorem 4.2 There is a unique solution on PFFGN satisfying EFF, ADD, SYM
and NP. This solution is the Shapley value.
Proof (i) From Theorem 4.1, it follows that the Shapley value satisﬁes EFF,
ADD, SYM and NP.
(ii) Conversely, suppose Ψ satisﬁes the four properties. We have to show that Ψ = Φ.

















Thus, it suﬃces to show that for all τ and µτ ∈ R we have Ψ(µτwτ)=Φ(µτwτ).
Let τ =( S,κ) ∈ E(N)a n dµτ ∈ R. For i/ ∈ S ,l e tκN\{i} ∈ P(N\{i})a n dT ∈ κN\{i}.
Let τ0 denote the embedded coalition (T,κN\{i} ∪ {i})a n dτ00denote the embedded
coalition (T+i,(κN\{i}\{T}) ∪ {T+i}). One easily veriﬁes that τ v τ0 if and only if
τ v τ00, so µτwτ(τ0)=µτwτ(τ00). Hence, i is a null player of (N,µτwτ). Therefore,
by the NP property,
Ψi(µτwτ)=Φi(µτwτ) = 0 for all i/ ∈ S. (4.5)
For any two players i,j ∈ S, i 6= j, let κN\{i,j} ∈ P(N\{i,j}), and T ∈ κN\{i,j}.
Denote by τ0 the embedded coalition (T+i,(κN\{i,j}\{T})∪{j}∪{T+i})a n db yτ00 the4.6. An example of oligopoly games 73
embedded coalition (T+j,(κN\{i,j}\{T})∪{i}∪{T+j}) .O n ec a ns e et h a tτ is neither a
generalized subset of τ0 nor a generalized subset of τ00.S o ,µτwτ(τ0)=0=µτwτ(τ00).
Therefore, i and j are symmetric players in (N,µτwτ). Thus, by SYM,
Φi(µτwτ)=Φj(µτwτ) for all i,j ∈ S (4.6)
and similarly
Ψi(µτwτ)=Ψj(µτwτ)f o ra l l i,j ∈ S (4.7)
Therefore, EFF and (4.5)-(4.7) imply that
Φi(µτwτ)=Ψi(µτwτ)=|S|
−1µτ for all i ∈ S.
As a corollary of Theorem 4.2 we get an alternative description of the Shapley
value for partition function form games.






−1µτ for all i ∈ N.
4.6 An example of oligopoly games
This section applies the Shapley value to oligopoly games in partition function form.
Particularly, our attention is focussed on a linear oligopoly market of a homogeneous
good with asymmetric costs, no ﬁxed costs and no capacity constraints. Such an
oligopoly is deﬁned by the vector (b;c) ∈ Rn+1
+ , where b>0 is the intercept of the
inverse demand function, and c =( c1,c 2,...,c n) ≥ 0i st h em a r g i n a lc o s tv e c t o r .
Without loss of generality, assume c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn. We also assume that an





For each supply (input) vector x =( x1,x 2,...,xn), the price is p(x)=b −
Pn
i=1 xi,
whereas player i’s cost and proﬁt( p a y o ﬀ)a r eCi(xi)=cixi and
πi(x)=p(x)xi − Ci(xi)=( b −
n X
i=1
xi)xi − cixi. (4.8)
4This assumption is equivalent to the requirement of positive market shares at the equilibrium
for all players (Zhao, 2001).74 4. The Shapley value for games in partition function form
Player i’s reaction curve is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition:
∂πi(x)
∂xi




A Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a vector such that each player’s action xi is a best re-
sponse to the complementary choice x−i =( x1,...,xi−1,x i+1,...,xn). This equilibrium
is graphically the intersection point of all reaction curves and algebraically the solu-


















[b − (n +1 ) ci +
Pn
j=1 cj]2
(n +1 ) 2 . (4.10)
Now suppose that after suﬃcient communication, some players may agree to cooper-
ate (for example, players intend to adjust negative externalities which are caused by
decreasing returns to inputs). In such a situation a coalition structure might form,
in which, however, the payoﬀ of coalition S depends on the behaviour of the players
outside S. Notice that the payoﬀ for coalition S under one coalition structure is
diﬀerent from that under another coalition structure if the number of coalitions is
diﬀerent. Assume that the marginal cost of coalition S is cS =m i n i∈S ci (that is a
coalition’s most eﬃcient technology can be costlessly adopted by all players in S).
Moreover, if a coalition structure κ = {S1,S 2,...,S k} is formed, then in equilibrium
each coalition S in κ will choose the total (input) quantity levels to maximize the
sum of its members’ proﬁts, given the total inputs of the other coalitions in κ.
Let xSj =
P
i∈Sj xi denote the total input level for a coalition Sj, and πSj(x)d e n o t e
the proﬁt of coalition Sj under structure κ,




Coalition Sj’s reaction curve under coalition structure κ is also implicitly deﬁned
by the ﬁrst order condition:
∂πSj(x)
∂xSj
= p(x) − cSj − xSj =0 , or 2xSj = b − cSj −
X
i6=j
xSi.4.6. An example of oligopoly games 75
The unique equilibrium under the structure κ, (x∗
S1,x ∗
S2,...,x∗
Sk), and the equilibrium












[b − (k +1 ) cSj +
Pk
i=1 cSi]2
(k +1 ) 2 .
The oligopoly game in partition function form (N,w) is determined for every (Sj,κ)
by w(Sj,κ)=πSj(x∗), where x∗ is the equilibrium vector under structure κ.
T og e tf u r t h e ri n s i g h ti n t oh o wt h eS h a p l e yv a l u ec a nb eu s e d ,w es p e c i f yt h e3 -
person oligopoly game in partition function form (N,w). The partition function
form game is given by w(1,2,3) = (α,β,γ), w(12,3) = (a1,b 1), w(13,2) = (a2,b 2),







































Given the ordering of marginal costs, one can easily see that α ≥ β ≥ γ, and






















(a1 − a2 + β − γ) ≥ 0.76 4. The Shapley value for games in partition function form
From (4.12), one can see that if players have identical costs, then α = β = γ,
a1 = a2 = b1 = b2, so g1 = g2 =0 . The Shapley value gives an equal payoﬀ to all
players, i.e. Φi(w)=
g
3. Now, increase the marginal costs of players 2 and 3 by the
same amount, i.e. c1 ≤ c2 = c3.T h e n a1 = a2, β = γ, so g2 =0 . Thus, due to
this increase of costs, the Shapley value reduces the payoﬀ for players 2 and 3 by g1,
whereas the payoﬀ of player 1 is increased by 2g1. A further increase of the marginal
cost of player 3 alone reduces (according to the Shapley value) the payoﬀ of player
3b y2 g2, whereas the payoﬀso fp l a y e r s1a n d2i n c r e a s e db yg2.
Example 4.5 The game in partition function form (N,w)a s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h e
linear oligopoly market (b;c), where b =2 0 ,c=( 1 ,3,4), is given by
w(1,2,3) = (36,16,9), w(12,3) = (53.78,18.78),
w(13,2) = (49,25), w(23,1) = (25,49), w(123) = (90.25).
T h eS h a p l e yv a l u ef o rt h i sg a m ei sΦ(w)=( 4 6 .70,24.71,18.83). This value in-
dicates the diﬀerent payoﬀs due to the diﬀerent costs of players. If players have
identical costs (i.e. c =( 1 ,1,1)), then the Shapley value yields (30.08,30.08,30.08).
If the cost of players 2 and 3 increase by 2 units, i.e. c =( 1 ,3,3), then the Shapley
value yields (40.42,24.92,24.92). A further increase of the marginal cost of player
3 leads to the Shapley value Φ(w)=( 4 6 .70,24.71,18.83). Hereby, g =9 0 .25, g1 =
7.33,g 2 =1 .96.
For n-person oligopoly games in partition function form, the generalization of
the observations above is straightforward.
4.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter aimed to construct a generalization of the Shapley value for the class
of games in partition function form. The partition function is a natural extension of
the characteristic function for situations in which externalities are present. We show
that the Shapley value of games in partition function form has generated various
axiomatizations (such as the original value for characteristic function form games).
The application of the Shapley value for a special class of games in partition function
form is studied in chapter 7 in order to suggest a novel approach to the question of
how cooperation among players might be organized in terms of partial agreement.Chapter 5
Cooperative cost games for a
mountain situation
5.1 Introduction
This chapter1 deals with a special class of connection problems and related cost
sharing games. We consider a group of persons whose houses lie on mountains
which surround a valley or a part of the coast and their houses are not yet connected
to a sewage drainage system. Obviously sewage has to be collected downhill in a
water puriﬁer in the valley or along the coast, where it has to be puriﬁed before
introduction into the environment.
One solution for the houses is to get rid of the wastewater immediately, so each
one wants to connect his house with a drainpipe to the water puriﬁer. However,
althought it is possible for everyone to be connected directly with the water puriﬁer,
it is also suﬃcient to be connected via others. Assuming that pipes are large enough,
one pipe can serve more than one household.
On the other hand, employing pumps to send sewage from houses at lower heights
to houses at upper heights could be unreasonable2 or too expensive. Therefore,
exploiting gravity, only connections from houses to strictly lower ones are allowed
(connections between houses at the same height are not allowed in order to avoid
dangerous stagnation). An example of such a mountain situation is sketched in
1This chapter is based on Moretti, Norde, Pham Do and Tijs (2002).
2Also practical reasons due to the inhomogenous consistency of the waste water could suggest
not to employ pumps.
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Figure 5.1. The network drawn in the picture is a directed weighted graph, whose
vertices are the houses, whose root is the water puriﬁer and whose edges are the












































Figure 5.1: A possible mountain situation
In Figure 5.1 the numbers indicate the cost of building the corresponding pipe.
Sometimes connection from the higher houses to lowers houses is impossible (e.g.
because of a natural reef between two houses), as for example the connection from
house 3 to house 2 in Figure 5.1. However, it is always possible to connect a house
directly with the root. Each house could connect itself to the root, but by cooper-
ating, each might reduce costs. The cost minimization problem for such a mountain
situation leads to constructing a network of minimal cost which provides for every
user in the network a connection with the source, the so-called a minimum cost span-
ning tree (mcst). Bird (1976) treated this problem with game theoretic methods
and proposed a cost-allocation rule that associates with each minimum cost span-
ning tree a cost allocation. As more than one minimum cost spanning tree can exist
for a given problem, Bird’s rule can yield more than one allocation. Generically,
however, only one minimum cost spanning tree exists and then this yield a unique
allocation.3
This chapter focuses on the class of cooperative cost games that arises from min-
imal cost problems for mountain situations. Section 5.2 recalls a few deﬁnitions and
formally presents minimum cost spanning tree problems. We introduce connection
problems corresponding to a mountain situation and describe a simple method to
ﬁnd a spanning tree with minimum costs in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the
cooperative cost game to a mountain situation and shows that the core elements
of this cost game can be obtained by decomposing the cost game into connection
3An overview of the history of minimum cost spanning tree problems can be found in Graham
and Hell (1985).5.2. Preliminaries 79
games. Section 5.5 deals with a subset of the core of the cost game for which each
element is extendable to a population monotonic allocation scheme (cf. Sprumont
(1990), Thomson (1995a)). Section 5.6 shows that each core element of a connection
game is extendable to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme, while Section 5.7 deals with
cost monotonic allocation rules (cf. Kent and Skorin-Kapov (1997)). Concluding
remarks follow in the last section.
5.2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some terminology on graphs and deﬁnitions of minimum
cost spanning tree problems together with the corresponding cooperative cost games.
Further details can be found, for example, in Feltkamp (1995).
A weighted graph is a tuple <N ∗,w>where
(i) N∗ = {0,1,2,...,n} is a set of points (vertices);
(ii) w : A → R+ is a nonnegative function on the set of arcs A, where A = {S :
S ⊆ N∗,|S| =2 }.
Elements of N∗ are called nodes. Node 0 is called the source (or root)a n d
N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of players.E l e m e n t so fA are called arcs (or edges). For
an l ∈ A, the non-negative number w(l) represents the weight or cost of arc l.A
subset T of A is called a network. Then, the cost of network T is w(T)=
P
l∈T w(l).
A path from i to j in T is a sequence of nodes i = i0,i 1,...,ik = j such that
{is,i s+1} ∈ S for every s ∈ {0,...,k − 1}. An e t w o r kT is a spanning network for S
(S ⊆ N) if for every l ∈ T we have l ⊆ S ∪{0} and if for every i ∈ S there is a path
in T from i to 0.
Recall that a cooperative cost game is an ordered pair (N,c), where N =
{1,2,...,n} is the set of players and c :2 N → R is the characteristic function,
which assigns to each coalition S ∈ 2N ar e a ln u m b e rc(S)w i t hc(∅)=0 . Ac o r e
allocation of (N,c) is a vector x ∈ RN satisfying
(c2.6) stability:
P
i∈S xi ≤ c(S)f o re a c hS ∈ 2N,
(c2.7) eﬃciency:
P
xi = c(N).80 5. Cooperative cost games for a mountain situation
The core of (N,c) (cf. Gillies, 1953) is denoted by Core(N,c) and consists of all
core allocations.
For further use we recall bounds for core elements of a cooperative game (N,c):
Mi(N,c) ≤ xi ≤ c({i}) for all x ∈ Core(N,c)a n da l li ∈ N. (5.1)
Here Mi(N,c)=c(N) − c(N\{i}) is the marginal contribution to the costs of
N by player i ∈ N. Note that the second inequality in (5.1) is one of the stability







xk = c(N) −
X
k∈N\{i}
xk ≥ c(N) − c(N\{i})=Mi(N,c),
where the second equality follows from the eﬃciency (c2.7) and the inequality from
(c2.6) with N\{i} i nt h er o l eo fS by the stability of the core elements.
Recall also a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) for a cooperative
cost game (N,c). A pmas, introduced by Sprumont (1990), is a scheme [aS,i]S∈2N\{∅},i ∈S,
where (aS,i)i∈S ∈ Core(S,c)f o re a c hS ∈ 2N\{∅} and where the following mono-
tonicity condition holds:
aS,i ≥ aT,i for all S,T ∈ 2
N and i ∈ N with i ∈ S ⊂ T. (5.2)
In general, the core and the population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) for a
cooperative cost game (N,c) may be empty. However, for the games to be introduced
for mountain situations these sets will be nonempty, as we will show in sections 5.4
and 5.5.
5.3 Connection problems on directed graphs with-
out cycles
This section describes optimal connection problems for mountain situations and
constructs a network of minimum cost which provides for every node in the network
a connection with the source. First, we provide some assumptions to introduce
connection problems for mountain situations. Next, we show the existence of a
unique optimal tree with minimum costs.
Consider a tuple given by <N , 0,A,w >,w h e r eN = {1,2,...,n}, <N∪
{0},w>is a directed weighted graph and <N∪{0},A>is a tree with N ∪{0} as5.3. Connection problems on directed graphs without cycles 81
set of points (vertices), A ⊂ N × (N ∪ {0}) as set of arcs and 0 as the source. We
assume also that the following conditions M.1 and M.2 hold.
M.1 (Direct connection possibility)F o re a c hk ∈ N,( k,0) ∈ A.
M.2 (No cycles)F o re a c hs ∈N and v1,v 2,...,v s ∈ N ∪{0} such that (v1,v 2) ∈ A,
(v2,v 3) ∈ A,...,( vs−1,v s) ∈ A we have (vs,v 1) / ∈ A.
We call such a tuple <N ,{0},A,w>with the properties M.1 and M.2 a moun-
tain situation because of the two following reasons.
(i) Each mountain problem as described in section 5.1 leads to a mountain situ-
ation, where N corresponds to the set of agents (houses) in the mountain, 0
to the puriﬁer, A to the set of allowed connections determined by the gravity
condition
(i,j) ∈ A ⇒ h(i) >h (j)( 5 . 3 )
(where h(i) is the height of house i) and by reefs etc. Further, w(i,j) describes
the cost of connecting i with j via a pipe line. M.1 is demanded and M.2 fol-
lows from (5.3).
(ii) On the other hand, given a mountain situation <N , {0},A,w > with the
properties M.1 and M.2, there exists an intrinsic height function h0 : N∪{0} →
N ∪ {0} such that (i,j) ∈ A implies h0(i) >h 0(j). One deﬁnes h0 as follows:
for i ∈ N ∪{0}, h0(i) is the length of a longest path from i to 0 (if (v1,...,v s)
is a path in A,i . e .( vi,v i+1) ∈ A for every i ∈ {1,...,s− 1}, then the length
of this path equals s − 1).
We address the following problems related to such a mountain situation:
Q.1 How do we ﬁnd a 0-connecting subtree <N∪{0},T >of <N∪{0},A>, i.e.
as u b t r e ec o n n e c t i n ge a c hi ∈ N with 0, with minimum cost?
Q.2 How do we allocate the connection costs in such a tree among the agents?
Q.1 will be solved in this section and the next sections deal with Q.2.
To avoid too many technicalities we will assume that a mountain situation <
N,{0},A,w>satisﬁes not only M.1 and M.2, but also the following property.82 5. Cooperative cost games for a mountain situation
M.3 (Genericity condition) For each k ∈ N and all i,j ∈ N ∪ {0},i6= j:( k,i) ∈
A,(k,j) ∈ A ⇒ w(k,i) 6= w(k,j).
M.3 gives us the possibility to speak of the best connection b(k)o fk ∈ N. Hereby
b(k)= a r g m i n
i∈N∪{0}:(k,i)∈A
w(k,i).
We leave the adjustment of our results for situations where M.3 does not hold
to the readers.
Given a mountain situation <N ,{0},A,w>(with property M.3!), the following
theorem shows that there is a unique optimal tree (with minimum costs), connecting
all players in N with the root 0. This tree corresponds to the situation where each
agent k ∈ N connects himself with his best connection point b(k) ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Theorem 5.1 Let <N ,{0},A,w>be a mountain situation (satisfying beside M.1
a n dM . 2 ,a l s oM . 3 ) .L e tT = {(k,b(k))|k ∈ N}.T h e n
(i) <N∪ {0},T >is a 0-connecting subtree of <N∪ {0},A>.
(ii) The tree <N∪ {0},T > is the unique 0-connecting subtree with minimum
cost.
Proof (i) Since T ⊂ A,c l e a r l yT does not contain cycles. That T is a tree
connecting each point i ∈ N via a path with 0 follows from the claim that for each
s ∈ {1,...,L},w h e r eL =m a x {h0(i)|i ∈ N ∪ {0}}, the next property P(s)h o l d s :
P(s): for each k ∈ N with h0(k)=s there is a t(k) ∈ N and a sequence
v0,v 1,...,v t(k) such that v0 = k, vr+1 = b(vr) for r =0 ,1,...,t(k) − 1, and
vt(k) =0 .
We prove the claim by induction to s. P(1) holds because for each k ∈ N with
h0(k)=1w et a k et(k)=1 ,v0 = k and v1 = 0. Suppose now that P(s)h o l d s
for each s<mwith m ∈ {2,...,L}.L e t k ∈ N be such that h0(k)=m.T h e n
h0(b(k)) <m .I fh0(b(k)) = 0, then b(k)=0a n dw et a k et(k)=1 ,v0 = k, v1 =0 .
Suppose h0(b(k)) 6= 0. Then, by the induction hypothesis, there is a t(b(k)) and a
sequence v0,v 1,...,v t(b(k)) determining a path in A from b(k)t o0w i t hvr+1 = b(vr)
for r ∈ {0,1,...,t(b(k)) − 1}.T h e nw0,w 1,...,w t(k) is a desired path for k,w h e r e
t(k)=t(b(k)) + 1, w0 = k, wi = vi−1 for i ∈ {1,...,t(k)}.S oP(m)h o l d s .5.4. Mountain situations and cooperative cost games 83
(ii) Let <N∪ {0},G>be a 0-connecting tree unequal to <N∪ {0},T >.T h e n
for each point k ∈ N,t h e r ei saπ(k) ∈ N ∪ {0} such that (k,π(k)) ∈ G.M o r e o v e r ,
since G 6= T we can choose π : N → N ∪ {0} such that there is a k∗ ∈ N with










So <N∪ {0},G>is not optimal.
Example 5.1 Figure 5.2 corresponds to a mountain situation <N , {0},A, w >,
where N = {1,2,3}, A = {(1,0),(2,0),(2,1),(3,0),(3,1),(3,2)} and w(i,j)=1 0 i−
5j for each (i,j) ∈ A. Then the intrinsic height function h0 is described by h0(i)=i
for each i ∈ N.S i n c eb(1) = 0, b(2) = 1, b(3) = 2, the tree <N∪ {0},T > with
T = {(1,0),(2,1),(3,2)} is an optimal 0-connecting tree with costs 10 + 15 + 20 =
45. The payoﬀ vector B(N,{0},A,w)=( 1 0 ,15,20) corresponding to the situation
where each player i pays w(i,b(i)) is the Bird allocation. In the next section we will
see that the Bird allocation is a special core element of the cost game corresponding

































Figure 5.2: The mountain situation of Example 5.1.
5.4 Mountain situations and cooperative cost games
Let <N , {0},A,w > be a mountain situation. Then the corresponding cooper-
ative cost game (N,c)i sg i v e nb yc(∅)=0a n df o rT ∈ 2N\{∅} the cost c(T)
of coalition T is the cost of the optimal 0-connecting tree in the mountain prob-
lem <T , {0},A(T),w T >,w h e r eA(T)={(i,j) ∈ A|i ∈ T,j ∈ T ∪ {0}},a n d84 5. Cooperative cost games for a mountain situation
wT : A(T) →R+ is the restriction of w : A →R+ to A(T). For the determination of
c(T) only trees are considered which do not contain nodes outside T ∪ {0}.T h e r e -
fore, (N,c) is the obvious generalization of non-monotonic minimum cost spanning









the cheapest connection point of k in T ∪ {0}. The introduced number b(k)i n
Section 5.2 is equal to bN(k). It is easy to describe one core element of (N,c). Take
the Bird allocation (cf. Bird (1976)) B ∈ RN with Bk = w(k,bN(k)). Then B is a
















for each T ∈ 2N\{∅}. This core element corresponds to the situation where the
player bN(k)t ow h i c hk connects himself does not ask a compensation for this service
to k. But there are interesting other core allocations in general, corresponding to
situations where compensation plays a role. In the description of these core elements







w(k,l)i f bT(k) 6=0
0i f bT(k)=0 ,
plays a role.
Suppose player k wants to connect to bN(k) 6=0a n dp l a y e rbN(k) wants to
ask a price pk ≥ 0f r o mk for connecting k.W h i c h p r i c e c a n bN(k) ask for his
service to k such that k connects with bN(k) and does not go, for example, to
the second best connection point sN(k) for a connection? The price should be an
element of the closed interval [0,w(k,sN(k)) − w(k,bN(k))]. A price pk larger than
w(k,sN(k)) − w(k,bN(k)) can lead to a connection to sN(k)a n di fsN(k) 6= 0 even
to a positive compensation for sN(k), e.g. 1
2(pk − w(k,sN(k)) + w(k,bN(k))); both
players k and sN(k) are then better oﬀ. The allocations (x1,...,x n) corresponding5.4. Mountain situations and cooperative cost games 85
to such competitive prices in the given closed interval turn out to be just the core
allocations of the k-connection game <N ,c k >, which will now be introduced.
The k-connection game (N,ck) is the cooperative cost game with ck(S)=0i fk/ ∈
S and ck(S)=w(k,bS(k)) otherwise. Note that, if bN(k) 6=0 ,t h e nMbN(k)(N,ck)=
ck(N) − ck(N\{bN(k)})=w(k,bN(k)) − w(k,sN(k)).
Theorem 5.2 Let (N,c1),...,(N,cn) be the connection games corresponding to the




(ii) Core(N,c) ⊃ P(N,c) where P(N,c)=
Pn
k=1 Core(N,ck)
(iii) for every T ∈ 2N\{∅} we have Core(T,ck)={0} if k/ ∈ T,
Core(T,ck)=
{w(k,bT(k))ek − p(ebT(k) − ek)|0 ≤ p ≤ w(k,sT(k)) − w(k,bT(k))}
if k ∈ T,bT(k) 6=0 ,and Core(T,ck)={w(k,0)ek} if k ∈ T,bT(k)=0 .[Here
ek ∈RT is the k-th standard basis vector with k-th coordinate 1 and the other
coordinates 0.]
Proof (i) is a direct consequence of the deﬁnitions of c,c1,...,c n.
(ii) follows from (i) because Core(N,·) is a superadditive correspondence.
(iii) Note that if k/ ∈ T then (T,ck) is the zero game and hence Core(T,ck)= {0}.
If k ∈ T and bT(k) 6=0 , then Mi(T,ck)=ck(i)=0i fi ∈ T\{k,bT(k)}.F o r
x ∈ Core(T,ck) we have, by (5.1), xi =0f o re a c hi ∈ T\{k,bT(k)}. Further, by the
eﬃcient property of the core (2.7), xk +xbT(k) = ck(T)=w(k,bT(k)), and, by (5.1),





k)|0 ≤ p ≤ w(k,sT(k)) − w(k,bT(k))}.
For the reverse inclusion, note that for xp = w(k,bT(k))ek − p(ebT(k) − ek)w i t h0≤




i = w(k,bT(k)) = ck(T)a n d86 5. Cooperative cost games for a mountain situation
for S ⊂ T:
xp(S)=w(k,bT(k))
= ck(S)i f {k,bT(k)} ⊂ S
xp(S)=0
= ck(S)i f {k,bT(k)} ∩ S = ∅
xp(S)=w(k,bT(k)) + p
≤ w(k,sT(k))
≤ ck(S)i f k ∈ S,bT(k) / ∈ S, and
xp(S)=−p
≤ 0
= ck(S)i f k/ ∈ S,bT(k) ∈ S.
So xp ∈ Core(T,ck).
If k ∈ T and bT(k) = 0 the statement can be proved in a similar way.
The subset P(N,c)o fCore(N,c) is the set of price supported core elements. In
the next section we will show that elements x of P(N,c) are pmas-extendable (i.e.
there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme [aT,i]T∈2N\{∅},i∈T such that
aN,i = xi for each i ∈ N).
Example 5.2 Consider again the mountain situation of Example 5.1. The cost
game (N,c) corresponding to this situation and the k-connection games are given
in Table 5.1.
S = (1) (2) (3) (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (1,2,3)
c(S)= 10 20 30 25 35 40 45
c1(S)= 10 0 0 10 10 0 10
c2(S)= 02 00 1 5 0 2 0 1 5
c3(S)= 00 3 0 0 2 5 2 0 2 0
Table 5.1. The k-connection games for the game (N,c).
Note that c = c1+c2+c3, Core(N,c1)={(10,0,0)}, Core(N,c2)=c o n v {(0,15,0),
(−5,20,0)},a n dCore(N,c3)=c o n v {(0,0,20),(0,−5,25)}.5.5. Population monotonic cost allocation schemes 87
5.5 Population monotonic cost allocation schemes
In mountain situations the set of agents involved in cooperation can vary. One can
think of unoccupied houses, agents who want to stay alone, etc. Therefore it is in-
teresting to know how to solve for each population T ⊂ N the optimization problem
and to have available a cost distribution vector for each (T,c). The optimization
problems are simple. In problem <T ,{0},A(T),w T > each player i ∈ T connects
to bT(i), the element in T ∪ {0} with the lowest connection cost. This leads to a
cheapest connection of all members of T to the root 0.
For the cost problems, stable allocation schemes A =[ aT,i]T∈2N\{∅},i∈T are in-
teresting, where ‘row’ (aT,i)i∈T ∈ Core(T,c). We are especially interested in pop-
ulation monotonic allocation schemes (pmas); that is, in stable allocation schemes
with the monotonicity condition (5.2). If such a pmas is used, larger coalitions are
more interesting than smaller coalitions for everybody. The Bird allocation scheme
A0 =[ w(i,bT(i))]T∈2N\{∅},i∈T is an example of a pmas. To ﬁnd other pmas-es it is in-
teresting to note that
Pn
k=1 PMAS(N,ck) ⊂ PMAS(N,c); i.e. if Ak ∈ PMAS(N,ck)
for each k ∈ N,t h e n
Pn
k=1 Ak ∈ PMAS(N,c). This motivates us to concentrate on
PMAS(N,ck).
If k/ ∈ T, then (T,ck) is the zero game and hence Core(T,ck)={0}.I fk ∈ T,









k + α(w(k,bT(k)) − w(k,sT(k)))(e
bT(k) − e
k)i fbT(k) 6=0 ,
and xα
T = w(k,0)ek if bT(k) = 0. Note that the core has a unique element if
bT(k) = 0. The next Theorem 5.3 shows that each core element xα
N of (N,ck)c a n
be extended to a pmas, namely Aα.H e r e Aα =[ aα
T,i]T∈2N\{∅},i∈T is the allocation







0 k/ ∈ T;
(xα
N)i∈T k ∈ T, bN(k) ∈ T;
x0
T k ∈ T, bN(k) / ∈ T.
This cost allocation scheme corresponds to the situation where k ∈ T pays his con-
nection cost w(k,bT(k)) and also as compensation α times the marginal contribution88 5. Cooperative cost games for a mountain situation
of bN(k)i nT to bN(k)i fbN(k) ∈ T,a n dn oc o m p e n s a t i o ni fbN(k) / ∈ T.N o t et h a t
‘column’ k of A0 equals ‘column’ k of the Bird allocation scheme. Additionally, in
the rows T with k/ ∈ T we have a core element, since 0 is the unique core element
of (T,ck). Moreover, in the rows T with k ∈ T and bN(k) / ∈ T we also have core
elements.




Proof The only thing to show is that
−α(w(k,bN(k)) − w(k,sN(k))) ∈ [0,w(k,sT(k)) − w(k,bT(k))].
Note that
0 ≤− α(w(k,bN(k)) − w(k,sN(k)))
= α(w(k,sN(k)) − w(k,bN(k)))
≤ w(k,sN(k)) − w(k,bN(k))
= w(k,sN(k)) − w(k,bT(k))
≤ w(k,sT(k)) − w(k,bT(k)).
At the last equality we used the fact that bN(k)=bT(k) and at the last inequality
that
w(k,sT(k)) = min{w(k,i)|i ∈ (N ∪ {0})\{bN(k)},(k,i) ∈ A}
≤ min{w(k,i)|i ∈ (T ∪ {0})\{bT(k)},(k,i) ∈ A}
= w(k,sT(k)).
It follows from the above lemma that the rows with k ∈ T and bN(k) ∈ T contain
core elements. So Aα is a stable monotonic allocation scheme.
Theorem 5.3 For each α ∈ [0,1], Aα is a pmas for (N,ck).5.5. Population monotonic cost allocation schemes 89
Proof We noted above already that Aα is a stable allocation scheme. So, we
only have to prove (5.2). Take i ∈ N, S,T ∈ 2N such that i ∈ S ⊂ T.W ec o n s i d e r
three cases.
(i) Suppose that i ∈ S\{k,bN(k)}.T h e n aα
S,i =0≥ 0=aα
T,i since the column
(aU,i)U∈2N\{∅}:i∈U i saz e r oc o l u m n .










T,bN(k) =0i fk/ ∈ T.





T,bN(k) = α(w(k,bN(k)) − w(k,sN(k))).







N)k if bN(k) ∈ S, and
a
α
S,k = w(k,bS(k)) ≥ w(k,bT(k)) = a
α
T,k if bN(k) / ∈ T.
If bN(k) / ∈ S and bN(k) ∈ T, then
aα




Theorem 5.4 Each core element x ∈ P(N,c) c a nb ee x t e n d e dt oap m a so f(N,c).
Proof Since P(N,c)=
Pn
k=1 Core(N,ck) in view of Theorem 5.2, one can ﬁnd






N ∈ Core(N,ck) for every
k ∈ {1,...,n}.E a c hx
k,αk
N has a pmas extension Ak,αk by Theorem 5.3.
Then A =
Pn
k=1 Ak,αk ∈ PMAS(N,c).
Example 5.3 Reconsider the situation of Example 5.1. Then (10,0,0) is the unique
core element of (N,c1), the core element (−21
2,171
2,0) in (N,c2) is the midpoint of90 5. Cooperative cost games for a mountain situation
t h ec o r eo f( N,c2), and (0,−21
2,221
2) is the midpoint of the core of (N,c3). So
x =( 7 1
2,15,221




2) ∈ P(N,c). Then A1, 1
2 +
A2,1
2 + A3, 1
2 is a pmas extending x. In matrix notation
A1, 1
2 + A2,1
2 + A3, 1
2 =
12 3
N 10 0 0
(12) 10 0 ∗
(13) 10 ∗ 0
(23) ∗ 00
(1) 10 ∗∗












































ap m a se x t e n s i o no f( 7 1
2,15,221
2).
5.6 Bi-monotonic allocation schemes for connec-
tion games
A connection game (N,ck) has the property that k is a veto player because ck(S)=0
for all S not containing k. For such games, bi-monotonic allocation schemes (bi-
mas) are introduced in Brˆ anzei et al. (2001) (see also Voorneveld et al. (2000)).
A bi-mas for such a game with a veto player is a stable allocation scheme with the
property that the veto player is weakly better oﬀ and the other players weakly worse
oﬀ in larger coalitions. In formula, an allocation scheme B =[ bT,i]T∈2N\{∅},i∈T is a
bi-monotonic allocation scheme for (N,ck)i f
each row (bT,i)i∈T ∈ Core(T,ck), (5.4)
and for all S,T ∈ 2N with k ∈ S ⊂ T,
bT,k ≤ bS,k, (5.5)
bT,i ≥ bS,i for all i ∈ S\{k}. (5.6)
It turns out that for connection games bi-monotonic allocation schemes exist. More-
over, each core element of (N,ck) can be extended to a bi-mas, as Theorem 5.1 shows.5.6. Bi-monotonic allocation schemes for connection games 91
For α ∈ [0,1], let Bα =[ bα






T if k ∈ T,
0i f k/ ∈ T.
Theorem 5.5 For every α ∈ [0,1], Bα is a bi-mas extending xα
N.
Proof (i) In view of Theorem 5.2, row T in Bα is a core element for each T ⊂ N
and row N equals xα
N. So (5.4) holds.
(ii) To prove (5.5), note that for S ⊂ T and k ∈ S we have
w(k,bS(k)) ≥ w(k,bT(k)), (5.7)
w(k,sS(k)) ≥ w(k,sT(k)). (5.8)
Using (5.7) and (5.8), we obtain (5.5) as follows:
bα
T,k =( 1 − α)w(k,bT(k)) + αw(k,sT(k))
≤ (1 − α)w(k,bS(k)) + αw(k,sS(k))
= bα
S,k.
(iii) To prove (5.6) for S,T with i,k ∈ S ⊂ T, i 6= k, we consider three cases:
i 6= bS(k); i = bT(k); i = bS(k)a n di 6= bT(k).
Case 1: If i 6= bS(k), then i 6= bT(k), so bα
S,i = bα
T,i =0 .
Case 2: If i = bT(k), then i = bS(k)a n dt h e n
bα
T,i = α(w(k,i) − w(k,sT(k)))
≥ α(w(k,i) − w(k,sS(k)))
= bα
S,i,
where the inequality follows from (5.8).
Case 3: If i = bS(k)a n di 6= bT(k), then
b
α
S,i = α(w(k,bS(k)) − w(k,sS(k))) ≤ 0=b
α
T,i.92 5. Cooperative cost games for a mountain situation
Example 5.4 Take the game of Example 5.2. Then for k = 3 the bi-mas, corre-
sponding to α = 1









(23) ∗− 52 5
(1) 0 ∗∗
(2) ∗ 0 ∗
(3) ∗∗ 30
5.7 Cost monotonicity
The Bird rule, which assigns to each mountain situation the corresponding Bird
allocation, has an interesting monotonicity property, called cost monotonicity (cf.
Kent and Skorin-Kapov (1997)). Here a cost allocation rule is called cost monotonic
if the decrease (or increase) in the cost of any arc does not increase (or decrease)
the cost of any player. Suppose a mountain situation <N ,{0},A,w>changes to
<N ,{0},A,w 0 >,w h e r ew0(i,j)=w(i,j)f o ra l l( i,j) ∈ A\{(k,l)} and w0(k,l) >
w(k,l). Suppose that B and B0 are the corresponding Bird allocations. Then,
obviously, Bi = B0
i for all i ∈ N\{k},a n dBk = w(k,b(k)) = B0
k if b(k) 6= l,
while B0
k >B k if b(k)=l. So the Bird rule is cost monotonic. Allocation rules,
where compensations for connections play a role, do not have this cost monotonicity
property. The reason is that if an arc increases so much in costs that there is a change
of best connection points, the new connection point proﬁts from the compensation
and is better oﬀ.
Example 5.5 Consider again the mountain situation of Example 5.1. Consider the
Bird rule B and the rule E, where compensations of half of the marginal contribution
take place. The Bird rule assigns to the mountain situation (10,15,20) and E assigns
the allocation (71
2,15,221
2). If we change the mountain situation such that the cost of
(3,2) raises to 40, then we obtain as allocations for B and E respectively (10,15,25)
and (5,171
2,271
2). In the rule E, player 1 is better oﬀ in the second situation because
of compensations from two players.5.8. Concluding remarks 93
5.8 Concluding remarks
We studied optimal connection problems and related cost sharing problems for
mountain situations with the properties M.1, M.2 and M.3. Interesting results were
that ﬁnding optimal connections was easy as well as giving one core element, the
Bird allocation. Insight in core elements with compensations was obtained and also
stable allocation schemes were given for situations where the involved houses vary.
If we drop M.3, then it is still easy to ﬁnd an optimal 0-connecting tree, but
in these situations there may be more. Again, population monotonic allocations
exist. If we consider mountain situations with more puriﬁers, then we get special
minimum cost 0-connecting forest problems, where all houses are connected with at
least one puriﬁer, with properties M’.1, M.2, and M.3. Here M’.1 tells us that each
house can be connected directly with at least one puriﬁer. Roughly speaking, the
obtained results can be extended to the forest situation.
Finally, we want to note that for general directed connection problems we cannot
expect that a pmas exists. Norde et al. (2003) provide for both the non-monotonic
version and the Steiner tree version of directed connection problems a 6-person ex-
ample without a pmas. So we were lucky to ﬁnd a class of directed connection
problems for which pmas-es exist. For the Steiner tree version of undirected connec-
tion problems, Megiddo (1978) already noted that such games need not be totally
balanced, and hence need not have a pmas. For the non-monotonic version of undi-
rected connection problems, Kent and Skorin-Kapov (1997) and Norde et al. (2003)
independently proved the existence of a pmas. In fact, the authors of the ﬁrst paper
prove the existence of a monotonic allocation scheme that provides a core element
of the Steiner tree game and all Steiner tree subgames, whereas the second paper
shows that a pmas can be found by means of Kruskal’s algorithm.94 5. Cooperative cost games for a mountain situationChapter 6
Regional Fisheries Management
Organization: how to reduce eﬀort
and select new members
6.1 Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas of 10 December 1982 granted
coastal states the right to extend their jurisdiction over ﬁshery resources out to 200
nautical miles by establishing exclusive economic zones (EEZ). The rationale for the
EEZ regime was to mitigate the ﬁsheries common property problem by transforming
the status of the bulk of the world’s marine ﬁshery resources from international
common property to coastal state property (Bjørndal and Munro, 1998). Straddling
and highly migratory ﬁsh stocks, however, cross the borders of EEZs and are found
in the adjacent high seas areas, where, in principal, there is free entry for nations
to harvesting1.T h i s h a s l e d t o ﬁshing disputes and even ﬁshing wars (e.g. the
Spain-Canada dispute in 1995).
The escalation of high seas ﬁsheries and resulting ﬁshing disputes were addressed
by the U.N. intergovernmental conference from 1992 to 1995. The conference re-
sulted in the 1995 U.N. Transboundary Fishery Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks Agreement which sets out principles for the conservation and management
1See Kaitala and Munro (1993, 1995, 1997), Kaitala and Lindroos (1998), and Bjørndal and
Munro (2003) for analyses of straddling and highly migratory ﬁsh stocks. For a survey of the
economics of ﬁshery management, see Bjørndal and Munro (1998).
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of those ﬁsh stocks. The Agreement declares that states should cooperate to ensure
conservation and optimal utilization of ﬁsheries resources both within and beyond
the EEZs. It grants the rights of all states to utilize the ﬁshery resource in the
high seas and speciﬁes that harvesting should be coordinated by a coalition of the
traditional harvesting states, acting through a regional or sub-regional organization,
i.e. a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO)2. The Agreement calls
for those nations who wish to participate in the harvesting of the ﬁsh resource in
the high seas, but are not currently members of the RFMO, to declare a willingness
to join and to enter into negotiations over mutually acceptable terms of entry. The
Agreement entered into force on 11 December 2001 (UN, 2002).
The Agreement, however, provides to the RFMO “no coercive enforcement pow-
ers to exclude non-member harvest or set the terms of entry into membership”
(McKelvey et al., 2002). There are, among others, two problems casting doubt on
the eﬀectiveness of RFMOs (Kaitala and Munro, 1993). Both problems arise as
major issues in ﬁnding a resolution of a “just and reasonable” share of the Total
Allowable Catch (TAC) under RFMO management (Kaitala and Munro, 1997).
First is the “interloper problem”, which concerns the diﬃculty of controlling
harvesting by non-member vessels, including individually operated vessels, but also
coordinated multi-vessel “distant water ﬂeets”. Both seek targets-of-opportunity,
and skim oﬀ bountiful harvests wherever they occur, but with little interest in the
long term conservation of the stocks3.
Second is the “new member problem”, which concerns the inherent diﬃculties
of negotiating in a timely manner, mutually acceptable terms of entry that specify
the petitioning nation’s membership rights and obligations (Kaitala and Munro,
1995)4. Indeed, the interests of current members and of applicants are often strongly
opposed: the current members face the likelihood of having to give up a portion of
their present quotas to the newcomer, and the applicant believes that it may be
better oﬀ by staying outside of the coalition and continuing to harvest while facing
fewer constraints.
According to Kaitala and Munro (1995), the resolution of the new member prob-
2A given RFMO is expected to have all relevant coastal states and distant water ﬁshing nations
as members (OECD, 1997).
3The interloper problem is not deal with in this chapter.
4We refer to Pintassilgo and Duarte (2000) who discuss the problem of new entrants in a
dynamic setting for the Northern Atlantic BlueﬁnT u n a .6.1. Introduction 97
lem may call for the creation of de facto property rights for the “charter members”
(also called incumbent ﬂeets or nations) of a RFMO. They raise the question whether
a possible solution might be one in which new members are required to “buy their
way in” through the purchase of quota shares. The quotas allocated to “char-
ter member” states would take the form of individual transferable quota (Munro,
2000a). Thus, the charter members would become the sole beneﬁciaries of the ﬁsh-
ery resource. Moreover, a potential new entrant could only access the ﬁsh stock in
question by buying the ﬁshing rights and quotas of an incumbent ﬂeet. However,
it is not evident that such a system based on assumptions of economic eﬃciency
and resource sustainability is viable. It would vest substantial interests with the
incumbent ﬂeets, which is likely to be strongly opposed by potential entrants.
As an alternative to the transferable quota system, we suggest enlargement of the
RFMO by admitting new members. A basic problem in this regard is the allocation
of the payoﬀs with the enlarged organization such that non-members have incentive
to join and incumbent members to adjust to the enlargement rather than leaving
the coalition and starting to exploit the resource in an unsustainable manner.
In this chapter5, we shall describe a set of management rules that make both
charter members and potential entrants better of compared with a situation of un-
regulated exploitation (i.e. the competitive or Nash-Cournot equilibrium). In this
context, we consider two typical cases. First, how to induce independent countries
to reduce their eﬀorts from the competitive equilbirum so as to prevent the ﬁsh
stock from extinction or to increase proﬁts. Secondly, the expansion of a coalition of
countries that operatives collectively to achieve sustainable and eﬃcient harvesting.
The approach taken in this chapter is cooperative rather than noncooperative
game theory which is common in environmental and resource economics (see among
others, Folmer et al. (1998), Batabyal (2000), and the references therein). Whereas
in noncooperative game theory the emphasis is on how players choose their strategies
to achieve their goals, cooperative game theory focuses strongly on the possibilities
of cooperation and the division of the joint beneﬁts from cooperation among the
players. Given the objectives of this chapter, cooperative game theory is a more ap-
propriate approach than noncooperative game theory (see also chapter 2, however).
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 6.2, the ﬁshery resource manage-
ment problem is set up and deﬁned as a noncooperative game. Section 6.3 introduces
notations and deﬁnitions of the cooperative ﬁshery game. Moreover, it presents some
5This chapter is based on Pham Do, Folmer and Norde (2001).98
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results that are applied in section 6.4, which focuses on various allocation schemes
for the cases distinguished above. Conclusions follow the last section.
6.2 The ﬁshery game
In the Gordon-Schaefer model of ﬁshery (Clark, 1990, McKelvey et al., 2002) the
biological response of the ﬁsh stock to harvesting is characterized by the following
steady state yield-to-eﬀort relationship:
·
x = F(x) − H(e,x)( 6 . 1 )
where x is a non-negative state variable representing the ﬁshery resource or biomass;
F(x)i sagrowth function of biomass satisfying F(0) = F(b)=0 , and F
00(x) 6 0
for x ∈ (0,b). Here b denotes the carrying capacity of the resource (i.e.n a t u -
ral capacity); e is total ﬁshing eﬀort and H(e,x)i st h eharvesting or production
function6.
Although equation (6.1) is dynamic, we will proceed in a static setting7.T h i s
can be justiﬁed on the basis of common practice in transboundary ﬁshery manage-
ment, where production conditions are set periodically based on the status of the
ﬁsh stock. For example, the Individual Transferable Quota systems (ITQs) repre-
sent harvesting rights designed for a one-year period (Bjørndal and Munro, 1998).
Hence, the presumed environment is one in which only the current decision variable
(ﬁshing eﬀort) and stock variable directly aﬀect the management decision. The ap-
proach we adopt here comes down to choosing across diﬀerent steady states, ignoring
transitional dynamics8.
6The harvesting function is often assumed to be bilinear in the stock, x,a n dt h eﬁshing eﬀort,
e, such that H(x,e)=qex ,w h e r eq is the catchability coeﬃcient (see, for example, Clark, 1990
and 1999).
7The static model comes down to periodic adjustment of current exploitation of the ﬁsh stock
(Bjørndal and Munro, 1998).
8McKelvey et al. (2002) argues that distant-water ﬂeets will have substantial ﬁxed costs for
seasonal entry so that under a competitive regime their optimal harvesting pattern will be a
periodic pulsing. Consequently, no harvest steady state will develop. Hence, a dynamic instead of
a static analysis would be required. We observe that this situation is more typical for the interloper
problem than the new member problem we are dealing with in this paper. In the present context
we are dealing with new members who either join the coalition and adopt their eﬀorts accordingly
or stay out of it and harvest the stock in a competitive setting. In such a setting the periodic
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The above assumptions imply that for a given e, the stock evolves towards the
natural equilibrium x = xb(e)d e ﬁned by
F(xb(e)) − H(e,xb(e)) = 0, i.e.
·
x =0 .
It is convenient to assume that F(x)a n dH(e,x) are in the forms: F(x)=x(b−x)
and H(e,x)=ex. In that case, the natural equilibrium is xb(e)=b − e, if e 6 b. If
e>bthe stock decays rapidly (Clark, 1990). Therefore, to avoid depletion of a ﬁsh
resource, e should be less than b. Under these circumstances, the ﬁsh stock remains
in equilibrium, xb(e). The corresponding level of harvesting at this equilibrium is
determined by
H(e,xb(e)) = e(b − e), for 0 6 e 6 b. (6.2)
To simplify the analysis, we normalize the unit price of harvest landed so that the
payoﬀ (or economic rent)i s
π(e)=e(b − e) − ce (6.3)
where c i st h eu n i tc o s to fe ﬀort9. The harvest is thus proﬁtable only when 0 <e<
b − c
p.
To develop the noncooperative ﬁshery game, we consider a set of N coun-
tries (N = {1,2,...,n})h a r v e s t i n gt h eﬁsh stock independently and simultane-
ously. Furthermore, we assume that each country’s set of eﬀort levels (or ﬁsh-
ing ﬂeet) is Ei, where Ei =[ 0 ,l i], and li ∈ [0,∞)i st h em a x i m u me ﬀort level
of country i. Let ei be a given eﬀort level of country i, ei ∈ Ei. In addition, let
e =( e1,e 2,...,en) ∈ E1×E2×...×En denote the vector of ﬁshing eﬀort of n countries
(for the remainder of this paper e denotes a vector of eﬀort levels). The structure of
the yield-to-eﬀort equation (6.1) does not change (given b), but the total eﬀort now
is the sum e(N)=
Pn
i=1 ei, and the equilibrium ﬁsh stock is xb(e(N)) = b−
Pn
i=1 ei.
Since this equilibrium depends upon both the capacity b and the total (competi-
tive) eﬀort
Pn
i=1 ei, we can consider it as the linear inverted supply curve p(e) (i.e.,
xb(e)) in a Cournot situation with n producers. If the individual country payoﬀs
are proportional to the corresponding ﬁshing eﬀort levels, and if each country has
9I nt h ec a s eo fal a r g eh i g hs e a sﬁshery, costs may not be constant, as assumed here. However,
for convex cost functions (rather than linear cost functions) the results obtained below would not
basically change (for details, see Chapter 3, Section 3.5)100
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its own cost function (i.e. each country has its own technology), then country k’s
payoﬀ can be written as




Equation (6.4) shows that each country’s payoﬀ depends on the aggregate eﬀort
a n do nt h ec o u n t r y ’ so w ne ﬀort. Particularly, for a country to maximize its payoﬀ,i t
will calculate its optimal eﬀort level taking into account the anticipated eﬀort level
of its opponents.
We now present a formal deﬁnition of a noncooperative ﬁshery game:
Deﬁnition 6.1 A noncooperative ﬁshery game (NFG) is an n-person game
Γ =<E 1,...,En;π1,...,πn >, where
(i) Ek =[ 0 ,l k]i st h estrategy set of player k,a n d0 <l k < ∞ .
(ii) πk(e)=p(e)ek − ckek is the payoﬀ function of player k ,w h e r eck > 0a n d
p(e)=m a x {b −
Pn
j=1 ej,0}.
6.3 Competitive and cooperative strategies: some
deﬁnitions and results
Before going into detail, we recall some notations and concepts.
For each k ∈ N, N = {1,2,...,n}, and for every non-empty subset S ⊆ N, we deﬁne
E = Π
n
k=1Ek,E S = Πj∈SEj, and E−S = EN\S = Πj/ ∈SEj.
Furthermore, notations like (ei,e −i)o r( eS,e N\S) are used if the strategy of player
i or coalition S needs stressing, where, as usual, e−i denotes the vector e with the
ith component deleted. The sum
P
i∈S ei is occasionally denoted by e(S) for every
S ⊆ N.
Deﬁnition 6.2 Av e c t o re∗ =( e∗
k)k∈N ∈ E is a Nash-Cournot equilibrium if
for every k ∈ N and ek ∈ Ek, πk(e∗) ≥ πk(ek,e ∗
−k); i.e. player k has no incentive to
deviate from e∗
k when all other players play e∗
−k.6.3. Competitive and cooperative strategies: some deﬁnitions and
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Theorem 6.1 Every noncooperative ﬁshery game Γ has a unique Nash-Cournot




Proof A noncooperative ﬁshery game can be considered as an oligopoly game
with linear inverse supply function p(e)=m a x {b −
Pn
k=1 ek,0}.E k is a closed,
bounded interval [0,l k], where lk ∈ [0,∞), for all k, and the inverse supply function is
ad i ﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing function of total eﬀorts. The ﬁr s tp a r to fT h e o r e m
3.1 now follows from Theorem 3.3.3 in Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (1999).
















m < 0, and the best response of player m to e∗
m is em =0 . This
contradicts the assumption that e∗ is an equilibrium point.
We observe that the choice of the competitive outcome as benchmark case cor-
responds to a worst case scenario. This is because distant water ﬂeets belonging to
countries that have not previously participated in a given ﬁshery usually announce
an intention to begin harvesting and at the same time petition to join the RFMO
(Kaitala and Munro, 1997). Meanwhile, the traditional harvesting countries have
restrained their collective harvests to build up the stock. So, under these circum-
stances the stock is larger than the one in the competitive outcome. The situation
characterized by Theorem 6.1 might prevail in the case of independent countries
that have not restrained their competitive eﬀorts (section 6.4.1) or when negotia-
tions between new members and incumbent nations break down, and the latter give
up conservation to turn to competitive eﬀorts.
Remark 6.1 The outcome of the non-cooperative game is virtually identical to
that of the unregulated open access ﬁshery, particularly when the combined har-
vesting eﬀort in the Nash equilibrium is larger than b/2 (further details, see Clark,
1980)10.
We now turn to cooperative ﬁshery game. Consider an n-player ﬁshery game
and a coalition S ⊆ N. The aggregate payoﬀ function of coalition S equals the sum
10This is due to the fact that at b/2 the yield of the ﬁsh resource is maximally sustainable and
p(e)=b −
Pn
i=1 ei is the Cournot price.102
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[p(eS,e −S)ej − cjej]. (6.5)
For each ﬁshery game, we deﬁne two related cooperative games by means of the α-
and β- conversions (cf. Aumann, 1959), as introduced in Chapter 3.
The α-characteristic function of a ﬁshery game Γ is the function vα deﬁned by
vα(S)=MaxeS∈ESMine−S∈E−SπS(eS,e −S), (6.6)
whereas the β-characteristic function of the ﬁshery game Γ is the function vβ deﬁned
by
vβ(S)=Mine−S∈E−SMaxeS∈ESπS(eS,e −S)( 6 . 7 )
The α−characteristic function represents a prudent perception by the members
of the coalition S about their capability to guarantee themselves the payoﬀ vα(S)
if they choose the joint strategy eS when the opposition N\S acts to minimize its
payoﬀ (i.e. coalition S can ensure to its members the maximum (total) payoﬀ while
choosing the strategy combination eS, regardless of what the opposition N\S does).
The β−characteristic function represents an optimistic perception by the mem-
bers of the coalition S in the sense that the opposition N\S can prevent the players
in S from getting more than vβ(S). It is the payoﬀ to which the opposition can hold
the coalition. Therefore, in the α- framework, a coalition S obtains the payoﬀ it can
guarantee itself, irrespective of the strategy choice of the players in N\S,w h e r e a s
in the β- framework, the coalition S obtains the maximum payoﬀ from which it can
n o tb ep r e v e n t e db yt h ep l a y e r si nN\S.
It is easy to see that
vα(S) 6 vβ(S)f o ra l lS ⊆ N and vα(N)=vβ(N).
The α− and β−characteristic functions coincide for ﬁshery games, as the follow-
ing proposition states.
Proposition 6.1 The payoﬀsd e ﬁned by (6.6) and (6.7) coincide for each ﬁshery
game, i.e. vα(S)=vβ(S) for all S ⊆ N.6.3. Competitive and cooperative strategies: some deﬁnitions and
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Proof A cooperative ﬁshery game can be considered as an oligopoly game
without transferable technologies that was introduced in chapter 3. The result then
follows from Proposition 3.3 therein.
Proposition 6.1 states that for every coalition S the amount vα(S) which this coali-
tion can guarantee itself, and the maximum amount vβ(S)f r o mw h i c hi tc a nn o tb e
prevented by the opposition are the same. The game (N,v)w h e r ev = vα = vβ as
mentioned above will be called a cooperative ﬁshery game (CFG).
We now turn to some important characteristics of cooperative ﬁshery games.
First of all, the convexity of a cooperative ﬁshery game follows directly from Theorem
3.1 in Chapter 3.
Proposition 6.2 Every cooperative ﬁshery game is a convex game.
The following corollary follows from Proposition 6.2.
Corollary 6.1 Ac o o p e r a t i v eﬁshery game has a non empty core. Moreover, for
every S,T such that S ⊆ T, v(S) −
P
k∈S v({k}) 6 v(T) −
P
k∈T v({k}).
Corollary 6.1 implies that for a cooperative ﬁshery game expansion of the coali-
tion can be rewarding to its players.
Deﬁnition 6.3 Let (N,v) be a cooperative ﬁshery game. An agreement for all
relevant nations can be achieved if there exists an allocation w such that w is indi-
vidually rational and eﬃcient (i.e. wi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N and
PN
i=1 wi = v(N)).
Theorem 6.2 The Shapley value of a cooperative ﬁshery game is a solution that
is both individually rational and eﬃcient. Moreover, the Shapley value is in the
midpoint of the core of the CFG.
Proof Since a CFG(N,v) is convex, the results follows from Shapley’s theorem
(see Chapter 2).104
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6.4 RFMO management rules
A management problem frequently encountered in practice is the allocation of har-
vest quotas for a set of countries that have agreed upon the reduction of the ﬁshing
eﬀort in the competitive equilibrium so as to prevent the stock from extinction or
to increase proﬁts. Although in this case, the ﬁshing nations de facto have accepted
some coordination, they are not fully cooperating in the sense that they have formed
a coalition that operates colletively to achieve sustainable and eﬃcient harvesting.
In section 6.4.1 we propose the proportional rule to distribute harvest quotas, and
show that under this rule, the countries are better oﬀ than in the competitive equi-
librium. The second problem, discussed in section 6.4.2, concerns the expansion
of coalitions. We propose the population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) for
this problem. Before going into details, we observe that a RFMO can be considered
as a coalition S of incumbent members, whereas the set of outsiders of S (i.e. N\S)
consists of all potential entrants.
6.4.1 Independent players: The proportional rule
As described in section 6.2, a ﬁsh stock will be depleted if total eﬀort exceeds the
carrying capacity of the stock b. In a similar vein, if total eﬀort exceeds b/2, then
total proﬁt is below the maximum sustainable yield. For both cases the management
problem comes down to a reduction of eﬀort levels (i.e. quota shares). To develop a
reduction policy for the RFMO we make use of a bankruptcy analysis. Particularly,
the proportional rule which is frequently used in the context of bankruptcy problem
(see among others, Thomson, 1995b)11.
Under the proportional rule (PROP), each country would reduce its eﬀort in
proportion to its original eﬀort. Consider, for instance, the management objective
to reduce eﬀort from the total competitive eﬀort level e∗(N)=
Pn
i=1 e∗
i to the eﬀort
level corresponding to the maximum sustainable yield eM = b
2, where eM <e ∗(N)
and e∗
i is country i’s eﬀort in the competitive outcome. Under PROP country i’s









11A bankruptcy problem is a triple (N,E;d), where N is the ﬁnite set of players, E ∈ (0,∞)
is the state which has to be divided and d =( d1,...,dN) is the vector of player claims such that
d(N)=
PN
i=1 di ≥ E.6.4. RFMO management rules 105
Proposition 6.3 If, in the competitive equilibrium e∗, the total eﬀorts exceed halfof




2, then for every player the payoﬀ
under the proportional rule corresponding to the maximum sustainable yield is larger
than the competitive payoﬀ.12
Proof Let e∗ =( e∗
i)i∈N be the eﬀort vector in the competitive equilibrium (i.e.
the NE, for which b
2 6 e∗(N) 6 b). Furthermore, let ePROP =( ePROP
i )i∈N be the





i, and πi(e∗)a n dπi(ePROP)
the corresponding payoﬀs for player i, respectively). Deﬁne Ωi = πi(e∗)−πi(ePROP).
It is suﬃcient to prove that Ωi 6 0.
If e∗
i =0t h e nePROP
i = 0 and clearly Ωi =0 .
Now assume that e∗
i > 0. We have































































































i ) 6 0.
The following example illustrates Proposition 6.3.
Example 6.113 Consider a 2-person NFG in which b =3 0 ,l1 =1 8 ,l 2 =1 6 ,c 1 =4 ,
and c2 =5 .




13For an application of bankruptcy analysis to the Northern European Anglerﬁsh ﬁshery problem,
see Gallestegui et al. (2003).106
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The competitive equilibrium e∗ =( 9 ,8) which is the intersection of the two solid
lines in Figure 6.1. Since
Pn
i=1 e∗
i =1 7> b
2 =1 5w eh a v eas u b o p t i m a lp r o ﬁt
π(e∗)=( 8 1 ,64). Adjustment according to the propotional rule leads to eA =( 9 ,8)∗
15
17 =( 7 .94,7.06), which is the intersection of the two dotted lines in this Figure 6.1.












2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Player 2 
Figure 6.1. Best replies (solid lines) and adjusted eﬀort levels (dotted lines).
6.4.2 Expansion of coalitions
If a coalition S is stable, i.e. each player gains from joining the coalition S relative
to the situation where there is no cooperation (see, Moulin, 1995, and Botteon and
Carraro, 1997), and if its members are committed to cooperation, the additional
beneﬁto fp l a y e rj when country k enters S is wj,S∪{k} − wj,S. A new entrant k
can be accepted to join the coalition S if it does not harm any member of S,t h a t
is, wj,S∪{k} − wj,S ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S. Moreover, the new entrant should be better
oﬀ by joining the coalition rather than staying out of it. This feature forms the
so-called monotonicity property. In other words, an allocation scheme satisfying the
monotonicity property is acceptable for every player. This section proposes two
allocation schemes that can be used for expansion of coalitions.
The population monotonic allocation scheme
Sprumont (1990) introduced the notion of population monotonic allocation scheme
(PMAS), which exhibits the monotonicity property. It guarantees that once a coali-
tion is formed, no player in this coalition has an incentive to form a smaller coalition,
since the payoﬀ of every player belonging to the coalition increases when it grows
larger. Sprumont also shows that convex games have a PMAS. In fact, he proves6.4. RFMO management rules 107
that the Shapley value for the game that includes all players and for each subgame
provides a PMAS14. The following theorem is a direct consequence of Sprumont’s
result and Proposition 6.2 which states that every ﬁshery game is a convex game.
Theorem 6.3 Every cooperative ﬁshery games have a PMAS. Furthermore, the
Shapley values calculated for all subgames give the PMAS.
Example 6.2 We numerically illustrate the calculation of the PMAS for a simple
example. Consider the 3-person ﬁshery game, where N = {1,2,3}, l1 =1 4 ,l2 =8 ,
l3 = 12, c1 =2 ,c2 =4 ,c3 = 16, and b =6 0 . T h eﬁr s ts t e pi nt h ec o m p u t a t i o no f
the PMAS is the calculation of the characteristic function for all possible coalitions
of this game. Norde et al. (2002) provides a formula for calculation of the value
vα(S)( =vβ(S)). Applying this formula (see also chapter 3), we obtain
v(123) = 776; v(12) = 512; v(13) = 520; v(23) = 321;
v(1) = 336; v(2) = 176; v(3) = 121.
The next step in the computation of the PMAS is the calculation of the Shapley
value for all players in a given coalition. For a given player it can be obtained as the
average over the marginal contributions for all possible orders of the players joining
the coalition. Finally, the Shapley value for all possible subgames gives the PMAS.
able 6.1 illustrates the calculation of the Shapley value for the 3-person CFG.
The ﬁrst column of Table 6.1 shows the possible orders of joining the grand coalition,
whereas columns 2, 3, 4 show the marginal contributions of players 1,2, and 3
joining the grand coalition for a given order, respectively. Consider for instance
the order 1-2-3, where player 1 is the ﬁrst to enter the grand coalition, followed
by player 2 and player 3. Player 1’s marginal contribution is his stand alone value
v({1})=3 3 6 .15 Player 2 is given his marginal contribution to coalition {1,2}, i.e.
14Kaitala and Lindroos (1998) and Li (1999) also consider the Shapley value as sharing rule for
the surplus beneﬁts from cooperation. However, these papers only compare the grand coalition
to the competitive outcome. The present paper considers the PMAS which relates to all possible
subgames. Furthermore, Kaitala and Lindroos, and Li do not consider the equal division of the net
gain value for the expansion of coalition. The present paper also diﬀers in other respect. Notably,
convexity of CFG is proven here rather than assumed.
15Note that the stand-alone values in the cooperative game indicate the payoﬀs of single coali-
tions. For example, in this game v({1})i st h em a x i m u mp a y o ﬀ of single coalition {1} when player 1
considers players 2 and 3 as the coalition {2,3}. Therefore, these values diﬀer from the competitive
payoﬀs in the Nash equilibrium, where countries behave as described in Deﬁnition 6.1.108
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v({1,2}) − v({1}) = 176, and player 3 is given his marginal contribution to the
coalition {1,2,3}, i.e. v({1,2,3}) − v({1,2}) = 264.
order
marginal contri-
bution of player 1
marginal contri-
bution of player 2
marginal contri-
bution of player 3
1-2-3 336 176 264
1-3-2 336 256 184
2-1-3 336 176 264
2-3-1 455 176 145
3-2-1 455 200 121





Table 6.1. Marginal contributions from joining the grand coalition
and the Shapley value for the 3-country CFG.
For each of the six orders of joining we can compute a marginal contribution for
each player; the average of these contributions is the Shapley value. Computing the










23 ∗ 188 133
1 336 ∗ ∗
2 ∗ 176 ∗
3 ∗ ∗ 121
Table 6.2. PMAS for the 3-country CFG.
From Table 6.2 we conclude ﬁrst of all that for each player the payoﬀs rise with
increasing coalition. This illustrates the monotonicity property referred to above.
Secondly, player 1’s ﬁshing capacity l1 is largest, his cost is lowest, and his payoﬀ is
the largest in every coalition. In other words, capacity and eﬃciency are “rewarded”
under PMAS in this example.6.4. RFMO management rules 109
Equal division of the net gain value
If two coalitions, say S and K, merge, then under the equal division of the net gain
value of S and K, ngv(S,K)=v(S ∪ K) − (v(S)+v(K)), every player in S ∪ K
receives
ngv(S,K)
|K|+|S| extra, and every player outside the coalition receives nothing extra.
A merger is stable if for the disjoint coalitions S and K, ngv(S,K) ≥ 0( i . e .i ft h e
game (N,v)i ssuperadditive). Since convexity implies superadditivity, we conclude
that a merger is stable. Hence, Proposition 6.4 is obtained.
Proposition 6.4 Under the equal division of the net gain value allocation scheme,
each player is better oﬀ than in the original coalition.
Example 6.4 Consider example 6.2. Initially, every country i receives its stand
alone value v({i}). If, for instance, countries 1 and 3 decide to merge, then they
should divide ngv({1},{3})=v({1,3})−v({1})−v({3})=6 3 . Equal division gives
ap a y o ﬀ of 336 + 31.5 = 367.5 for country 1 and 121 + 31.5=1 5 2 .5 for country 3.
Country 2 receives its stand alone payoﬀ. If in the second step country 2 decides
to join the coalition {1,3}, the net gain ngv({1,3},{2})=v({1,2,3})−v({1,3})−
v({2})=8 0 . Equal division gives 3941
6 for country 1, 2022
3 for country 2 and 1791
6
for country 3. Table 6.3 presents the payoﬀ vectors under equal division of the net
gain value for various coalition sizes.
1 2 3 Sum Gain1)
Single country4) 336 176 121 633
Expansion I 2)


















Table 6.3. Payoﬀ vectors under the equal division of the net gain value.
1) Concerns the sum of payoﬀs relative to the sum of the previous situation (single110
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country coalition in the case of Expansion I and two-country coalition in the case of
Expansion II, respectively).
2) Expansion from single country coalitions to two-country coalitions.
3) Expansion from two-country coalitions to grand coalition.
4) It is straightforward to see that the Shapley value and the equal gain payoﬀ coincide
for the single country and two-country coalitions. However, this does not hold for
more country coalitions.
The table 6.3 allows us to draw the following conclusion. First, expansion leads
to an improvement of individual country payoﬀsa sw e l la so ft h es u mo ft h ep a y o ﬀs
relative to no expansion. However, individual country payoﬀs are dependent on the
order of expansion, as is shown by comparing diﬀerent rows under Expansion II in
Table 3. Secondly, rejection of a country may lead to a loss for each country. For
instance, if coalition S = {1,3} does not accept country 2 to become a member, all
three countries will be worse oﬀ. However, for more-country coalitions this does not
hold.
6.5 Concluding remarks
A basic issue in transboundary ﬁshery management is the new entrant prob-
lem. It concerns the diﬃculty of negotiating mutually acceptable terms of entry
that specify the petitioning and incumbent nations’ rights and obligations. The in-
cumbent members face the likelihood of having to give up a portion of their present
quotas to the newcomer. The applicant, on the other hand, may believe that it may
be better oﬀ by staying outside of the coalition.
In this chapter we examined how a Regional Fishery Management Organization
(RFMO) might achieve eﬀective control of a high seas ﬁshery. We showed that
the outcome of the non-cooperative solution is virtually identical to that of the
unregulated open access ﬁshery. When the combined harvesting eﬀorts in the Nash
equilibrium are larger than the carrying capacity the stock will be depleted. Next
we considered management rules to achieve adjustment from the Nash equilibrium
to a state of cooperation. We proposed the proportional rule for situations where
the ﬁshing nations have accepted some coordination but are not fully cooperating
in the sense that they have formed a coalition that operates collectively to achieve
sustainable and eﬃcient harvesting. The next management problem considered is6.5. Concluding remarks 111
the expansion of coalitions. In this regard we made use of the basic result that a
ﬁshery game has a unique competitive equilibrium in a competitive setting, and that
it is convex game in a cooperative setting. We proposed the population monotonic
allocation scheme and the equal division of the net gain value as management rules
for coalitions of various sizes. Under these management rules, each player’s payoﬀ
increases when the coalition is expanded. Moreover, a player’s capacity and eﬃciency
are rewarded.
The above mentioned solutions are individually rational and eﬃcient, which are
prerequisites for an agreement. This implies that application of the above mentioned
management rules may lead to an arrangement that can be achieved without waiting
time and transferable membership. However, application of the monotonic allocation
scheme critically depends on the convexity of the cooperative ﬁshery game. If this
condition is not met, alternative mechanisms need to be developed. Particularly,
obstacles to cooperation (i.e. net welfare losses) need to be overcome.112
6. Regional Fisheries Management Organization: how to reduce eﬀort
and select new membersChapter 7
Regional Fisheries Agreements:
the feasibility and impacts of
partial cooperation
7.1 Introduction
The oceans’ ﬁsh stocks have been exploited as never before. Most of the world’s
marine ﬁshing areas have already reached their maximum potential for ﬁsh captures
(UN, 2002). FAO (2000) shows that about 47 to 50 percent of marine ﬁsh stocks are
fully exploited and are, therefore, producing catches that have either reached or are
very close to their maximum limits, with no room for further expansion. Another
15 to 18 percent are overexploited and there is an increasing likelihood that catches
from these stocks will decrease, if remedial action is not taken to reduce or revert
overﬁshing conditions.
The world catch of marine ﬁsh has continued to rise in spite of extensions of
ﬁsheries jurisdictions (Exclusive Economic Zone or EEZ) in the mid-1970s to 200
miles, though at a slower rate. To regulate the exploitation of the ocean’s ﬁsh
stocks further, several international agreements have been concluded. The relevant
international law was codiﬁed, developed and enhanced through, inter-alia, the entry
into force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1994, the adoption of the
Convention on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 1995
(abbreviated as 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement), and the adoption of the FAO Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in the same year. Moreover, an international
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jurisprudence on ﬁsheries related issues is slowly emerging through the work of the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (for details see Green Paper, 2001).
The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement calls for those nations who wish to partic-
ipate in the harvesting of the ﬁsh resources in the high seas, but are not currently
members of the relevant Regional Fisheries Organization (RFO), to declare a willing-
ness to join and to enter into negotiations over mutually acceptable terms of entry.
Under the term of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is of direct rele-
vance to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, coastal states (CSs) and distant water
ﬁshing nations (DWFNs) shall apply the precautionary approach to conservation,
management and exploitation of straddling and highly migratory ﬁsh stocks in order
to protect the living resources and preserve the marine environment. In addition,
all states are obliged to take conservation and management measures necessary for
the conservation of the living resources of the high seas (Article 117). Moreover,
international cooperation and negotiations are required for all states involved in the
exploitation of such resources (Article 118).
Although the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement entered into force on 11 December
2001 (UN, 2002), the precise meaning of the provisions describing these obligations
is not clear nor the manner in which they will be applied. For example, Article 63
expresses that the states concerned should seek to agree on conservation measures
applicable beyond the EEZs, either directly or through appropriate Regional Fish-
ery Organizations (RFOs). Article 64 requires that coastal and other states whose
nationals ﬁsh in the region “shall cooperate” directly or through appropriate interna-
tional organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and optimum utilization.
Furthermore, Article 118 on high seas stocks, referring to the need to establish
RFOs, provides that states exploiting such stocks or diﬀerent ones in the same area
“shall enter into negotiations” with a view to taking the measures necessary for the
conservation of the living resources concerned.
Due to inter alia its ambiguities, the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides
little or no guidance as to how cooperation, through a RFMO, is to be eﬀected
(Munro, 2000b). The lack of cooperation has resulted in conﬂicts between coastal
states and distant water ﬁshing states (Bjφrndal and Munro, 2003)1.M o r e o v e r ,
overexploitation has continued and the need for a cooperative management regime
1According to these authors, the inadequacies of Part VII, section 2 (Articles 116-120), of the
UN Convention pertaining to the management of high seas ﬁsheries are the source of the lack of
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is evident.2
The literature on the economic analysis of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement
notes that the new member or participant problem is one of the most important
problems in the high seas ﬁshery management (Kaitala and Munro, 1993 and 1995;
Bjφrndal and Munro, 2003), since the interests of current members of the RFO
and of the applicants are often strongly opposed: the current members face the
likelihood of having to give up a portion of their present quotas to the newcomer,
and the applicant believes that it may be better oﬀ by staying outside of the coalition
and continuing harvesting while facing fewer constraints. According to Kaitala and
Munro (1997), the likelihood of achieving stable cooperation will be very low if the
new member problem is mishandled. In addition, Datta and Miraman (1999) show
that with an increasing number of countries, the ineﬃciency of the noncooperative
equilibrium generated by the common access feature of high seas dominates and
overharvesting increases. Although the nations involved in a regional ﬁshery resource
often recognize an advantage in cooperative management of the resource, on-going
negotiations over harvest allotments often have proven to be arduous and frustrating,
and interrupted by brief but astonishingly violent ’ﬁsh wars’.
This chapter3 examines how a RFO might successfully achieve eﬀective control
o fah i g hs e a sﬁshery. As in the previous chapter, we consider the high seas ﬁshery
stock as common property and assume that all nations are allowed to exploit it.
We view concluding a feasible Regional Fishery Agreement (RFA) as a game, where
countries freely decide whether or not to join a coalition (i.e. a RFA)4.T h a ti s ,
we consider a management situation in which a coalition S of countries cooperate,
whereas one or several groups of countries stay outside S. The coalition member of
S will coordinate their inputs so as to maximize their incomes. However, coalition
S’s income will be aﬀected by a negative externality due to the input of those who
do not belong to S.
The question deals with in this chapter is the feasibility of partial cooperation and
its impacts on ﬁshing eﬀorts. Moreover, we analyze how to allocate property rights
among ﬁshing nations that have expressed an interest in sustainable exploitation of
2For a review of the history of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement as well as its implementation,
the reader is referred to Bjφrndal and Munro (2003).
3This chapter is based on Pham Do and Folmer (2003).
4For the general framework and reviews of international environmental agreements, see Tulkens
(1998), Jeppensen and Andersen (1998), and Barrett (1992, 1994, 1997, 2000); whereas see Bloch
(1996, 1997) and Yi (1997) for another approaches to coalition formations.116
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a ﬁsh stock in a partial cooperative setting. Particulary, we examine the feasible
allocations of property rights among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of
potential entrants.
In this chapter, the feasibility and impacts of partial cooperation are analyzed by
means of games in partition function form (see Chapter 4). The partition function
form game allows the complements to split into coalitions in an arbitrary manner,
while the classical characteristic function form game is deﬁned in terms of a coalition
and its complement only. We apply the modiﬁed Shapley value, introduced in
Chapter 4, as a device for the division of the gains from partial cooperation. We
observe that the emphasis in this chapter is on the cost function rather than on the
production function.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic model
and introduces notations and deﬁnitions. Section 7.3 analyses the eﬀects of partial
cooperation in terms of ﬁshing eﬀorts. Section 7.4 demonstrates that the modiﬁed
Shapley value is a feasible solution concept for RFOs. Concluding remarks follow in
the last section 7.5.
7.2 The model and deﬁnitions
We begin by specifying a static model5 o fac o m m o nﬁshery resource as a n-person
game (c.f. Funaki and Yamato, 1999; and Cornes and Hartley, 2000). Let N =
{1,2,...,n} be the set of n ﬁshing nations, with generic element j ∈ N.L e t e =
(e1,e 2,...,en) be a vector of ﬁshing eﬀorts, where ej ≥ 0 is country j’s ﬁshing eﬀort,
and let eN =
Pn
j=1 ej be the aggregate ﬁshing eﬀort of all countries.
We introduce the production function f(eN)t h a ts p e c i ﬁes the amount of ﬁsh
caught for each value of the total eﬀort eN. We assume that eﬀo r ta si n p u ti s
homogenous and that all countries are equally likely to catch a ﬁs hp e ru n i to f
eﬀort. This implies that the share of the total harvest obtained by country j is
directly proportional to the share of country j’s eﬀort in total eﬀort eN. In other
words, the harvest of country j is given by
ej
eNf(eN) for a given ﬁsh stock6.
Diﬀerent levels of technology eﬃciency among countries are represented by the
5That is, we assume a situation, where the ﬁshing nations choose across diﬀerent possible steady
states, ignoring the transitional dynamics.
6Note that the distribution of ﬁsh is not a result of negotiations among ﬁshing countries; it is
simply a reﬂection of the dependence of harvesting on its eﬀort level ei and eN.7.2. The model and deﬁnitions 117
cost functions cj(ej), ∀ j ∈ N. Normalizing the price of the resource to unity, the




f(eN) − cj(ej), (7.1)
where πj(0,0,...,0) = 0.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption A1: f(.) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, f00(.) < 0 (i.e. strictly
concave for eN > 0)7, and f(0) = 0.
Assumption A2: cj(.) is continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing and convex for
every j.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that cj(ej)=cjej, where cj > 0 for every
j ∈ N.
Assumption A3: 0 <c j <f 0(0), for every j ∈ N
This assumption guarantees the existence of an interior solution.
For every e =( e1,e 2,...,en), and i ∈ N we deﬁne e−i =( e1,...,ei−1,e i+1,...,en).
In a similar vein, a vector e =( e1,e 2,...,en) is written as e =( ei,e −i).
The above assumptions imply that the beneﬁt function (7.1) is continuously
diﬀerentiable and strictly concave on ej. Particularly, the biological constraints that
the beneﬁt function is decreasing for eN large enough is met.
• Av e c t o ro fe ﬀort e∗ =( e∗
1,e ∗
2,...,e∗
n)i ss a i dt ob eacompetitive equilibrium or









i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N.
The assumptions A1-A3 guarantee that the existence of a competitive equilib-
rium. Moreover, this equilibrium is unique (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 in Watt,
1996).
7This assumption implies that the additional catch from an extra unit of eﬀort will clearly
decrease as the total eﬀort expended increseases, i.e. there are decreasing returns to ﬁshing eﬀort.118
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Additional, we make the following behavioural assumptions for analyzing re-
gional ﬁsheries agreements.
Assumption A4: a country is free to enter or leave a coalition. When a country
defects from a coalition defectors either play as singletons or form a new coalition.
Assumption A5: when countries coordinate to form a coalition, their objective
is to maximize the aggregate beneﬁt, given the strategies of the others.
We recall some notations and deﬁn i t i o n s( C h a p t e r4 )t h a tw i l lb eu s e dt oa n a l y s e
partial cooperation. Let N be the set of players and P(N) be the set of all partitions
of N. So, a coalition structure κ ∈ P(N)m e a n st h a tκ = {S1,...,Sm},N⊇ Sj 6= ∅,
Sj ∩ Sk = ∅, for all j,k =1 ,...,m, j 6= k and ∪m
j=1Sj = N. The class of games in
partition function form is denoted by PFFGN.
For a given κ ∈ P(N),let |κ| denote the cardinality of κ (i.e. if κ = {S1,...,Sm},
then |κ| = m). The partition which consists of singleton coalitions only, κ =
{{1},{2},...,{n}}, is denoted by [N] whereas the partition which consists of the
grand coalition only is denoted by {N}.
Let E(N) denote the set of embedded coalitions, i.e.
E(N)={(S,κ) ∈ 2
N × P(N)| S ∈ κ}.
Let PFFGN denote the set of partition function form games (N,w), where N is
a set of players and w : E(N) −→ R is a partition function.
Note that the value w(S,κ)r e p r e s e n t st h ep a y o ﬀ of coalition S, given that coalition
structure κ forms. For a given partition κ = {S1,S 2,...,Sm} and a partition function
w,l e tw(S1,S 2,...,Sm)d e n o t et h em-vector (w(Si,κ))m
i=1.
It will be convenient to economize brackets and suppress the commas between ele-
ments of the same coalition. Thus, we will write, for example, w({ijk},{{ijk},{lh}})
as w(ijk,{ijk,lh}), and w({ikj},{lh})a sw(ijk,lh). The set of partition function
form games with player set N is denoted by PFFG N.
Deﬁnition 7.1 Let (N,w) be a partition function form game and κ ∈ P(N).
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(ii) a coalition structure κ ∈ P(N)i saf e a s i b l es t r u c t u r eif all coalitions are




w(i,[N]), for all S ∈ κ
A feasible coalition implies that the worth of its members is at least as much as
their worth under the stand-alone structure. In a similar vein, a coalition structure
is feasible if the worth of each coalition in the coalition structure is at least as much
as its stand-alone worth. A feasible coalition structure for a given game (N,w)i s
called a partial cooperation.
Example 7.1 Consider the game (N,w), where N = {1,2,3,4}, the players are
identical and w is given as follows.
w(i,[N]) = 3,w (i,{i,j,N\{ij}} =2 ,w (i,{i,jkl})=3 ,
w(ij,{ij,k,l})=4 ,w (ij,{ij,kl})=5 ,w (ijk,{ijk,l})=1 0 ,w ({N}) = 11.
In this example, every coalition formed by 3 players such as {i,j,k}, has
w(ijk,{ijk,l}) ≥ w(i,[N]) + w(j,[N]) + w(k,[N]), while the value for a
singleton in this coalition structure is
w(l,{ijk,l})=3=w(l,[N]).
For every coalition consisting of 2 players, we have two cases:
(i)i f κ = {ij,kl} then w({ij},κ) <w ({i},[N]) + w({j},[N]),
(ii)i fκ = {ij,k,l}} then w({ij},κ) <w ({i},[N]) + w({j},[N]) and
w(i,{i,j,N\{ij}} =2<w (i,[N]).
In addition, w({N}) <
P4
i=1 w(i,[N]).
Hence, feasible coalition structure are: {i,jkl}.
We now turn to the case that some countries agree to form a coalition S (S ⊆ N).
Note that assumption A5 states that when countries coordinate to form a coalition,
their objective is to maximize the aggregate beneﬁt, given the strategies of the
others. Since countries have diﬀerent technologies, and each country is free to enter
or leave a coalition, we consider the case in which cooperation among countries is
possible in term of transferable technologies8 (see Chapter 3). This implies that the
cost function of coalition S, cS(.), is the cheapest cost function which is available
among members in their coalition, i.e.
cS(eS)=m i n {
j∈S
cj(eS)}, (7.3)
8For example, cooperation may lead to an exchange of vessels or labor among coalition partners.120




j∈S ej is the total eﬀort of S.
Suppose that a coalition structure κ = {S1,S 2,...,Sm} is formed. Total eﬀort
for an admissible coalition structure Si in κ is denoted by eSi. The beneﬁt function




f(eN) − cSi(eSi), (7.4)
where e−Si =( eS1,...,eSi−1,e Si+1,...,eSm)
• A non-negative vector e∗ =( e∗
S1,e ∗
S2,...e∗
Sm) associated with coalition struc-
ture κ = {S1,S 2,...,Sm}, is called a competitive equilibrium under coalition








Note that if m = n,t h e n( 7 . 5 )i st h ed e ﬁnition of Nash equilibrium, and if m =1
then it presents Pareto eﬃciency.
The existence of a unique competitive equilibrium under a given coalition struc-
ture is straightforward since the strategy sets are 1-dimensional and the m−person
game with payoﬀ functions (7.4) is obtained9 from the n−person game with payoﬀ
functions (7.1).
We are now in a position to deﬁne the ﬁshery game in partition function form.
Deﬁnition 7.2. A ﬁshery game in partition function form (FGPFF) is an ordered
pair (N,π), where N is the set of players and π is the partition (beneﬁt) function





−Si)f o ra l l( S,κ) ∈ E(N), (7.6)
with πSi(e)d e ﬁned by (7.4).
The set of ﬁshery games in partition function form with player set N is denoted
by FGPFF N.
Let κ(Si) denote a coalition structure κ, where Si belongs to. Note that π(Si,κ)
may diﬀer from π(Si,κ0) since there exist many coalition structures which a coalition
Si may belong to while the equilibria under coalition structures κ and κ0 are diﬀerent.
9The assumptions A1-A3 still hold for this game.7.3. Implications of partial cooperation 121
In the remainder of this paper, we use the notations π(i,[N]) and π(Si,κ)t o
denote the payoﬀ of a single coalition {i} in the Nash equilibrium and the payoﬀ of
ac o a l i t i o nSi under coalition structure κ, respectively.
7.3 Implications of partial cooperation
In this section we analyze various impacts of coalitions and coalition structures.
For each coalition structure κ = {S1,S 2,...,Sk}, let e∗(κ)b et o t a le ﬀort associated
with κ, i.e. e∗(κ)=
Pk
j=1 e∗
Sj,w h e r e{e∗
S1,e ∗
S2,...,e∗
Sk} is the unique competitive
equilibrium under κ. Let π(e∗(κ)) =
Pk
j=1 π(Sj,κ)b et o t a ln e tr e n t so rb e n e ﬁts
associated with κ at equilibrium e∗(κ), where π(Sj,κ), deﬁned by (7.6), is the net
rent of coalition Sj under κ.
Without loss of generality, we assume that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn. Thus, condition A.2
implies: 0 ≤ cn <f 0(0).
For each coalition structure κ, a straightforward result is that in the competitive
equilibrium a coalition with lower cSi has a higher ﬁshing eﬀort level eSi.
Proposition 7.1 For every coalition structure κ, the lower the marginal cost cSi,
the higher the eﬀort level in the coalition structure equilibrium. That is, for every
Si,S j ∈ κ, if cSi ≥ cSj then e∗
Sj ≥ e∗
Si in the equilibrium.




















From (7.7), it follows that









Moreover, assumption A1 implies that10
f0(e∗(κ))e∗(κ) − f(e∗(κ)) < 0
10Since f(0) = 0, and f0(x)x − f(x) is decreasing and non-positive.122
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in the equilibrium under κ.
Therefore, if cSi − cSj ≥ 0w eh a v ee∗
Si ≤ e∗
Sj.




















































If the share of eﬀorts of coalition Sj in the competitive equilibrium under struc-
ture κ is deﬁned by sh(Sj)=
e∗
Sj










The above equations (7.8) and (7.9) form an alternative to the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.1 and show how to calculate total eﬀort and each coalition eﬀort in coalition
structures. Hence, total eﬀort can be predicted by the aggregate marginal cost and
the number of coalitions k. In the following example we will demonstrate how to cal-
culate total eﬀort and the eﬀort of each coalition, under a given coalition structure
in the competitive equilibrium.7.3. Implications of partial cooperation 123
Example 7.2 Consider four countries, indexed by i =1 ,2,3,4, with the production
function f(eN)=( 6 0− eN)eN and marginal costs c1 =2 ,c 2 =3 ,c 3 =6 ,c 4 =9 .
Aggregate marginal costs, total eﬀort and total beneﬁts as calculated by means of
(7.8) and (7.9) are presented in Table 7.1. Consider, for example, the case k =3w i t h
κ = {12,3,4}. Aggregate marginal cost of this coalition structure is 2+6+9 = 17.11
Since f0(e∗(κ)) = 60 − 2e∗(κ)a n d
f(e∗(κ))
e∗(κ) =6 0− e∗(κ), equation (7.8) implies that
60 − 2e
∗(κ)+2 [ 6 0− e
∗(κ)] = 17.
Solving the above equation, the total eﬀort in the competitive equilibrium is obtained
by e∗(κ)=180−17
4 =4 0 .75.
Substituting e∗(κ)i n t o( 7 . 9 )w eh a v e
e∗












=1 3 .25, and
e∗








m=1 cSm e∗(κ) π(e∗(κ))
k =4 1 − 2 − 3 − 4 20 44 514
k =3 12 − 3 − 4 17 40.75 548.18
k =3 13 − 2 − 4 14 41.50 602.75
k =3 1 − 23 − 4 14 41.50 602.75
k =3 14 − 2 − 3 11 42.25 603.68
k =3 1 − 24 − 3 11 42.25 603.68
k =3 1 − 2 − 34 11 42.25 603.68
k =2 123 − 4 11 36.33 684.51
k =2 12 − 34 8 37.33 704.81
k =2 124 − 3 8 37.33 704.81
k =2 14 − 23 5 38.33 735.71
k =2 13 − 24 5 38.33 735.71
k =2 134 − 2 5 38.33 735.71
k =2 1 − 234 5 38.33 735.71
k =1 1234 2 29 841
Table 7.1. The possible coalition structures for the four countries.
11Observe that transferable technology within a coalition is assumed.124
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Similarly for all other coalition structures.
Corollary 7.1 For every coalition structure κ, the lower the marginal cost cSi,t h e
higher the net beneﬁts in the coalition structure equilibrium.
Proof Let e∗ =( e∗
S1,e ∗
S2,...,e∗
Sm) be a coalition structure equilibrium. By Propo-
sition 7.1 above, if cSi ≥ cSj, then e∗
Si ≤ e∗
Sj. Moreover, at this equilibrium, the





Sj) − cSi · e∗

































Since in the competitive equilibrium
f(e∗(κ))
e∗(κ) ≥ cSi, it follows that
π(Si,κ) − π(Sj,κ) ≤ 0.
The following Proposition shows that total ﬁshing eﬀort for a coalition structure
depends on the number of coalitions and aggregate marginal cost in the competitive
equilibrium.
Proposition 7.2 Let κ and κ0 be two coalition structures of a game (N,w) ∈



















j and (7.8), it follows that
f
0(e














e∗(κ0) ]+( k − m)
f(e∗(κ))
e∗(κ) ≤ 0. (?)
Assume to the contrary that e∗(κ) <e ∗(κ0). Since
f(x)
x and f0(x)a r ed e c r e a s i n g
functions, it follows that7.3. Implications of partial cooperation 125





Moreover, k − m ≥ 0. Therefore the left hand side of inequation (?) is positive
which is a contradiction.
This Proposition shows that for a given coalition structure, the forming of coali-
tions with lower total cost need not reduce the total eﬀort, while for a given to-
tal cost, the total eﬀort increases if the number of coalitions increases (i.e. if
P
S∈κ cS = c(κ)=c(κ0), and |κ| > |κ0|,t h e ne∗(κ) >e ∗(κ0)).12. These results
are illuminated in Table 7.1:
(i) coalition structures {14,2,3} and {123,4} have the same aggregate marginal
cost, i.e. 11, but e∗(3,{14,2,3}) >e ∗(2,{123,4}).
(ii) coalition structures {123,4} and {124,3} h a v et h es a m en u m b e ro fc o a l i -
tions, i.e. k = 2, but aggregate marginal cost is 11 for {123,4} which is larger
than aggregate marginal cost 8 for {124,3}. Then the total eﬀort e∗(2,{123,4}) <
e∗(2,{124,3}).
Applying (7.6), the partition function form game (N,w) is obtained as follows
π(1,2,3,4) = (196,169,100,49);
π(12,3,4) = (297.56,175.56,105.06);
π(13,2,4) = π(1,23,4) = (272.25,240.25,90.25);
π(14,2,3) = π(1,24,3) = π(1,2,34) = (248.06,217.56,138.06); (Γ7.1)
π(123,4) = (469.59,214.92);
π(124,3) = π(12,34) = (427.25,277.56);
π(1,234) = π(13,24) = π(14,23) = π(134,2) = (386.91,348.20);
12These results imply that the forming of coalitions will determine the situation of a ﬁsh stock.
Moreover, aggregate eﬀort under a given coalition structure depends strongly upon how coalitions
are formed by the marginal costs. For a given number of coalitions, the coalition structure with
lower aggregate marginal cost has higher total eﬀort.126
7. Regional Fisheries Agreements: the feasibility and impacts of partial
cooperation
π(1234) = 841.
From this partition function it follows that for the case of k = 3 coalition struc-
ture {14,2,3} is the only feasible13, while every coalition structure consisting of two
coalitions is feasible.
Observe that if countries are identical, i.e. ci = cj for all i 6= j, the equations
(7.8) and (7.9) in the unique equilibrium e∗ =( e∗
Si,e ∗
S2,...e∗
Sm) under κ satisfy:
f0(e∗(κ)) + (k − 1)
f(e∗(κ))








This implies that the eﬀort of each coalition only depends on the number k of
coalitions. Furthermore, for any coalition structure κ = {S1,S 2,...Sk}, total ﬁshing
eﬀort is an increasing function of the number of coalitions k, whereas total net rents
and the net rent of each coalition are decreasing functions of k (Theorem 2 in Funaki
and Yamato, 1999).
Corollary 7.2 For the case of identical countries, it follows that







(ii) a coalition structure κ is feasible if the size of the largest coalition is feasible
under the equal sharing rule.





π(S,κ) for all coalition struc-
tures κ
0 6= κ. Moreover, from Proposition 7.2, i.e. that ﬁshing eﬀort is an increasing
function of the number of coalitions, it follows that for any two coalition structures
κ = {S1,S 2,...Sk} and κ0 = {S0
1,S0
2,...S0





13This is because π(14,{14,2,3}) = 248.06 > π(1,[N]) + π(4,[N]) = 245,














Si. Thus, result (i) is obtained.












Then, if countries have prudent perceptions (pessimistic expectations), a vector







We observe that for a given coalition structure κ with k coalitions, a vector z






n for all j ∈ S, where
e(k,κ) is the total eﬀort in an equilibrium under κ, and e∗
N is the Nash equilibrium.
Since π(S,κ)=
f(e∗(κ))−c·e∗(κ)

















n for all Sj ∈ κ.
Example 7.3 Consider four identical countries, i =1 ,2,3,4, with marginal cost
c = 9 and production function f(e)=( 6 0 −e)e. Since all countries are identical, there
are only ﬁve types of coalition structures: κ1 = {|1|,|1|,|1|,|1|}, κ2 = {|1|,|1|,|2|},
κ3 = {|2|,|2|}, κ4 = {|1|,|3|}, and κ5 = {|4|},w h e r e|i| denotes the number of
countries. T h eg a m e( N,π) ∈ FGPFFN is given by
π(|1|,|1|,|1|,|1|) = (100.40,100.40,100.40,100.40);
π(|1|,|1|,|2|) = (162.56,162.56,162.56);
π(|2|,|2|)=π(|1|,|3|) = (289,289); π(|4|) = 650.25.
The coalition structures κ3 is feasible since π(|2|,κ3)=2 8 9> 2 · π(|1|,κ1)=
200.80, under the equal sharing rule. However, a coalition with 2 players for a
coalition structure consisting of 3 coalitions is not feasible since π(|2|,κ2)=1 6 2 .56 <
2 · π(|1|,κ1) = 200.80.128
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7.4 Distribution of payoﬀs
This section considers the distribution of payoﬀs of partial cooperation that countries
can agree upon. To simplify the analyses, suppose the production function takes
the quadratic form f(e)=( b − e)e. The parameter b c a nb ec o n s i d e r e dac r i t i c a l
(maximum) eﬀort level where production cannot recover the total cost, i.e. f(eN) ≤
c · eN if eN ≥ b, and c ∈ [mini∈N ci,maxi∈N ci].
Recall that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn. To ensure that all countries have the possibility
to catch, i.e. e∗




n+1 >c n.14 The net beneﬁt
function of coalition Si under coalition structure κ is:
πSi(eSi,e −Si)=( b − eN)eSi − cSi · eSi. (7.11)
For each coalition structure κ, the value πSi(e∗
Si,e ∗
−Si) of the coalition Si (under κ)
is deﬁned by (7.11) at competitive equilibrium e∗. Denote the share of eﬀorts of











l.M o r e o v e r ,l e tπ(e∗(κ)) =
P
S∈κ πS(e∗)
be the total net beneﬁt.
Proposition 7.3 For every coalition structure κ, the following results hold for
every competitive equilibrium
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14This assumption is equivalent to the requirement of positive shares at the equilibrium for all
players (for details, see Zhao, 2001).7.4. Distribution of payoﬀs 129
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leading to (iii).
(iv) Since π(e∗(κ)) =
Pk
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⇔ sh(Sj) < 1/(k +1 ) ,
which implies (iv).
Proposition 7.3 shows the relationship between marginal costs, ﬁshing eﬀorts and
net beneﬁts for coalitions in the competitive equilibrium15. To illuminate Proposi-
tion 7.3 consider a coalition structure κ consisting of k coalitions (|κ| = k)a n dt h e
case where one member i leaves its coalition Sκ(i) (∈ κ) and joins another coalition,
say Sκ(j) ∈ κ.I ft h em a r g i n a lc o s tci of this member is larger than the marginal cost
cSκ(i) of its former coalition Sκ(i) but smaller than the cost cSκ(j) of its new coalition
Sκ(j), then the joining of this member will lead to the cost reduction of coalition
Sκ(j). Moreover, the marginal cost of the coalition to which i used to belong does
not change. Therefore, although the number of a new coalition structure κ0 doesn’t
change, i.e. |κ0| = k (since only i changes coalitions), the cost structure does change.
In similar vein, (ii) and (ii) describe the impacts on coalition eﬀorts and coalition
net beneﬁts. If owmn marginal costs of another coalition increase, own eﬀorts and
net beneﬁts increase. According to (iv), the forming of a new coalition structure
may cause a reduction of total net beneﬁti fa tl e a s to n eo ft h ee ﬀort shares is larger
than 1
k+1.
The above Propositions 7.1- 7.3 imply that although an outcome depends on
both the marginal cost cSj and cardinality of κ, countries with high costs have an
15Coalitions mean both individuals and groups of individuals in a given coalition structure.130
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incentive to cooperate since they will take advantage by reducing costs when joining
a coalition with lower costs. The following example illuminates this.
Example 7.4 Consider again Example 7.2. The beneﬁts of free-riding are presented
in Table 7.2. The number of coalitions is presented in the ﬁrst column and the beneﬁt
of each free-rider follows in the next columns.
In Table 7.2 the second row represents noncooperative net beneﬁts. The third
and fourth rows represent free riding beneﬁts for countries i, j, i 6= j when countries
k and l form a coalition {kl}, k,l ∈ N\{i,j}. For example, for k = 3, 272.25
and 248.06 are the payoﬀs of country 1 in the coalition structures κ = {1,4,23}
with aggregate marginal cost 14 and κ = {1,3,24} with aggregate marginal cost 11,
respectively (see Table 7.1). The last row represents free riding beneﬁts for country
i when N\{i} forms a coalition.
|κ| π({1},κ) π({2},κ) π({3},κ) π({4},κ)
k =4 196 169 100 49
k =3(free-riders with high costs ) 272.25 240.25 175.56 105.06
k =3(free-riders with low costs) 248.06 217.56 138.06 90.25
k =2 386.91 348.20 277.56 214.92
Table 7.2 The beneﬁts of free-riding.
If only two countries form a coalition, i.e. k = 3, then relative to the noncooper-
ative situation a free-rider country, for example, country 4, gains 90.25−49 = 41.25
(84%) in the low cost cases, i.e. coalition structures {13,2,4} or {1,23,4}, and
105.06 − 49 = 56.06 (114%) in the high cost case, i.e. coalition structure {12,3,4}.
In a similar vein, country 1 gains 248.06− 196 = 52.06 (27%) in coalition structure
{1,24,3} and 272.25 − 196 = 76.25 (39%) in coalition structure {1,23,4}.
In Example 7.4, although country 4 with the highest marginal cost has the
smallest net beneﬁt in the noncooperative situation (Corollary 7.1), it will gain
relatively more from free-riding than the other countries. For example, consider
the case of only one free-rider, i.e. k = 2. In this situation, if countries 1,2 and
3 form a coalition {123}, then in the coalition structure {123,4} country 4 gains
214.92−49 = 165.92 (337%). The gains are 177.56 (177%) in {124,3} for country 3,
179.20 (106%) in {134,2} for country 2 and 190.91 (97%) for country 1 in {234,1}.
Moreover, in coalition structure {123,4} country 4 gains more than in coalitions with7.4. Distribution of payoﬀs 131
two free-riders (c.f. {1,4,23} or {13,2,4} with gains 56.06 (114%) and {12,3,4} with
gains 41.25 (84%) for country 4.
Observe that although all coalition structures with two coalitions in Example
7.4 are feasible under the equal sharing rule (see section 7.3), the total beneﬁts of
coalition structures with two coalitions will increase if country 4 forms a coalition
such that the lowest cost coalition materializes (because it reduces the total cost
of the coalition structure). For example, consider κ1 = {12,34}, κ2 = {14,23},
κ3 = {13,24}, κ4 = {123,4}, κ5 = {124,3}, κ6 = {134,2} and κ7 = {234,1}. From
the last column in Table 7.1, it follows that16:
π(e∗(2,κ2)) = 735.71 > 704.81 = π(e∗(2,κ1)), and
π(e∗(2,κ7)) = 735.71 > 704.81 = π(e∗(2,κ5)) > 648.51 = π(e∗(2,κ4)).
In coalition structures κ4, κ5, κ6 and κ7 there is free-riding by countries 4,3,2a n d
1, respectively17. The total eﬀort and total net beneﬁta r ea ﬀected by the marginal
cost of the free-rider. For example, Table 7.1 shows that if country 1 or 2 free-rides,
then total eﬀort is 38.33 and the total net beneﬁt is 735.71. If country 3 free-rides,
then the total eﬀort is 37.33 and the total net beneﬁti s7 0 4 . 8 1 ,w h e r e a st h et o t a l
eﬀort reduces to 36.33 and total net beneﬁt is 684.51 if country 4 free-rides.
The smallest eﬀort (29) and highest net beneﬁt (841) materialize for the grand
coalition only. Therefore, although there exist some feasible partial coalition struc-
tures, the grand coalition is optimal eﬃciency.
The question arises what sharing rule of the net beneﬁts should be adopted to
stimulate the ﬁshing nations to join the grand coalition. We propose the modiﬁed
Shapley value, developed by Pham Do and Norde (2002)18. The reason to consider
the modiﬁed Shapley value rather than the original value developed by Shapley19
(1953) is that, the latter cannot be applied to games in partition function form such
as the present game (N,w) ∈ PFFG N, since in this class of games the contributions
of each player to the grand coalition diﬀer among coalition structures, due to the
presence of externalities among coalitions.
16Note that π(e∗(2,κ2)) = π(e∗(2,κ3)) and π(e∗(2,κ7)) = π(e∗(2,κ6)) since the total cost of
κ2 and κ3 as well as κ7 and κ6 are equal.
17It is a reason why the full cooperation may not stable if a distribution of beneﬁts can not be
accepted by several countries.
18An alternative is the equal sharing rule. However, this rule does not take into account the
contributions of each player to the grand cooperation, whereas the Shapley value does.
19For the introduction to the Shapley value, its extensions and applications, see, for example,
chapters 53-58 in Aumann and Hart (2002).132
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Pham Do and Norde (2002) showed that the modiﬁed Shapley value is a unique
and eﬃcient solution for a PFFGN (see also Chapter 4). Moreover, section 4.6
pointed out that for a special class of oligopoly games in partition function form
such as a (N,w) ∈ FGPFFN, where w is deﬁned by the net beneﬁt function (7.11)
in a competitive equilibrium of coalition structures, the modiﬁed Shapley value keeps
the same ordering for every player in the Nash situation. Applying this result to a
ﬁshery game in partition function form, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 7.4 Let ψ be the modiﬁed Shapley value for a (N,π) ∈ FGPFFN,
where the net beneﬁt function (7.11) is determined in a competitive equilibrium under
coalition structures. It follows that if c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ... ≤ cn then
(i) π(1,[N]) ≥ π(2,[N]) ≥ ... ≥ π(n,[N]),




Proof See section 4.6 in Chapter 4
It is obvious that a stable cooperation results if ψi(π) ≥ π(i,[N]) for all i ∈ N.
Example 7.5 Consider the ﬁshery game in partition function form (N,π)i nE x -
ample 7.2, where π is deﬁned as w of (Γ7.1). In this game, we have
π(1,[N]) = 196 > π(2,[N]) = 169 > π(3,[N]) = 100 > π(4,[N]) = 49.




i=1 ψi(π) = 841.
The modiﬁed Shapley value allocates the payoﬀs such that the contributions of each
country in the grand coalition as determined by its marginal cost are rewarded. The
surplus gained from full cooperation is (75.18,69.86,84.94,97.02). Each country has
thus a diﬀerent gain in the grand cooperation, due to its contribution. We observe
that this distribution diﬀers from the values that are obtained by applying other
division rules such as the equal sharing rule. For example, the transition from the
noncooperative to the cooperative situation yields the surplus 327 (= 841 − 514).7.5. Concluding remarks 133
The equal sharing rule gives the outcomes (277.75,250.75,181.75,130.75), where
each player gains 81.75.
This example indicates that although the equal sharing rule can be applied for
any feasible coalition structure, the modiﬁed Shapley value has more potential to
induce full cooperation.
Finally, we observe that although each country is better oﬀ in the grand coalition
than in the competitive outcome, individual countries can do even better by free
riding under certain circumstances, as illustrated in the last row of Table 7.2. This
implies that application of the modiﬁed Shapley value is not suﬃcient to discourage
free riding. Therefore, additional measures are needed to deter free riding; e.g.
linking a ﬁshery problem to another problem in which the players are involved (see
Folmer et al., 1993 and Kroeze-Gil, 2003 and the references therein).
7.5 Concluding remarks
The objective of regional ﬁshery agreements is to develop rules for joint decision
making to use common ﬁshery resources eﬃciently, particularly to avoid ineﬃcient
outcomes and the collapse of ﬁsh stocks resulting from noncooperative behaviour.
Furthermore, a better balance must be reached between ﬁshing eﬀort and the quan-
tities of ﬁsh that can be removed from the sea without endangering the future of
the ﬁsh stocks or ecosystems.
This chapter addressed the formation of coalitions smaller than the grand coali-
tion. Particularly, attention has been paid to the feasibility of coalition structures
and their impacts on reducing harvest levels. We showed that for every coalition
structure in a competitive equilibrium a coalition with lower marginal cost has a
higher eﬀort level, and total ﬁshing eﬀort is an increasing function of the number
of coalitions. Moreover, the lower the marginal costs, the higher the net beneﬁts in
the coalition structures.
In order to induce countries to cooperate the modiﬁed Shapley value adopted to
games in partition function form has been considered. This is a unique and eﬃcient
division rule of gains from cooperation that preserves the ordering of players in the
Nash outcome. This device can be applied to develop a proﬁta l l o c a t i o ns c h e m e
such as a reasonable compromise and compensation for both the potential entrants
and the charter members. However, allocation of the gains from cooperation on the
basic of the modiﬁed Shapley value is not suﬃcient to discourage free-riding since134
7. Regional Fisheries Agreements: the feasibility and impacts of partial
cooperation
under certain coalition structures the latter option may result in a higher payoﬀ
than is attainable on the basic of the modiﬁed Shapley value.Bibliography
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Speltheorie is een verzameling analytische middelen ontworpen om ons te helpen
situaties te begrijpen waarin het gedrag van een besluitvormer niet alleen zijn of haar
eigen opbrengsten en verliezen be¨ ınvloedt, maar ook die van andere besluitvormers.
Speltheorie wordt onderverdeeld in co¨ operatieve en niet-co¨ operatieve speltheorie.
Co¨ operatieve speltheorie beschouwt situaties waarin de spelers bindende afspraken
kunnen maken. Samenwerking tussen de spelers kan dan leiden tot gezamenlijke
winst. Een uitbetalingsvector is een mogelijke verdeling van deze gezamenlijke
winst voor een speciﬁeke situatie. Een verdeelregel geeft een uitbetalingsvector voor
elk co¨ operatief spel in een speciﬁeke klasse. Veel aandacht binnen de co¨ operatieve
speltheorie gaat uit naar aansprekende eigenschappen van verdeelregels.
De niet-co¨ operatieve speltheorie beschouwt voornamelijk conﬂictsituaties. Een
conﬂict kan het gevolg zijn van besluitvorming door verschillende individuen met
tegengestelde belangen. Indien ieder individu een beslissing neemt die puur en alleen
in zijn eigen belang is, kan dit leiden tot een uitkomst die voor iedereen slechter
is dan een geco¨ ordineerde beslissing. Een strategieproﬁel in een niet-co¨ operatief
spel beschrijft een mogelijke beslissing van iedere beslisser. In niet-co¨ operatieve
speltheorie wordt veel aandacht besteed aan Nash-evenwichten, strategieproﬁelen
waarin geen enkele speler een reden heeft om eenzijdig zijn beslissing te herzien.
Onlangs is de speltheorie een onontbeerlijk hulpmiddel voor milieu en natuurli-
jke hulpbronneneconomie geworden omdat veel van de typische eigenschappen van
milieuproblemen het best door middel van speltheoretische begrippen en modellen
kunnen worden behandeld. Speltheorie verschaft krachtige hulpmiddelen om exter-
n a l i t e i t e nt ea n a l y s e r e nd i eo p t r e d e ni nd ec o n t e x tv a nh e tb e h e e rv a nh e tm i l i e ue n
natuurlijke hulpbronneneconomie.
Dit proefschrift is een verzameling van essays in speltheorie en toepassingen van
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speltheorie om het gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronproblemen te analyseren. In
het proefschrift verwijzen hulpbronproblemen naar situaties gekenmerkt door inef-
ﬁci¨ ent gebruik, terwijl hulpbronbeheer als het ontwerpen van mechanismen wordt
gedeﬁnieerd, dat tot eﬃci¨ ente gebruik leidt. De essays over speltheorie (hoofd-
stukken 3, 4 en 5) hebben betrekking op coalitievorming, terwijl het hoofdthema
van de toepassingen (hoofdstukken 6 en 7) gericht is op internationaal visserijbe-
heer in de context van het VN Verdrag van 1995 over de implementatie van Zeerecht.
Deze vijf essays worden verbonden door het begrip van een “eerlijke” oplossing om
eﬃci¨ ent gebruik van hulpbronnen te bereiken.
De eerste twee hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift zijn inleidend. Hoofdstuk 1
motiveert de doelstellingen van het proefschrift. Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een overzicht van
de begrippen en de oplossingsconcepten van speltheorie. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt eerst
een informele beschrijving van de speltheorie gegeven. De formele beschrijvingen
van de belangrijkste concepten van de in dit proefschrift gebruikte speltheorie volgen
daarop.
De volgende drie hoofdstukken, hoofdstukken 3 t/m 5, behandelen verscheidene
klassen van spelen en hun oplossingen. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt standaardoligopolie
ge¨ ınterpreteerd op twee manieren: oligopolie met overdraagbare technologie¨ en en
oligopolie zonder overdraagbare technologie¨ en. Het eerste type wordt gekenmerkt
door het feit dat een groep samenwerkende ﬁrma’s volgens de goedkoopste technolo-
gie in deze groep mag produceren, terwijl een dergelijke overdracht van technologie¨ en
niet mogelijk is voor het tweede type oligopolie. Vanuit een co¨ operatief standpunt
leidt dit tot twee verschillende klassen van co¨ operatieve oligopoliespelen. Er wordt
aangetoond dat de corresponderende oligopoliespelen zonder overdraagbare tech-
nologie¨ en convexe spelen zijn en die met overdraagbare technologie¨ en totaal gebal-
anceerd, maar niet noodzakelijk convex zijn. Deze eigenschappen worden toegepast
om de regels in regionale visserijorganisaties in hoofdstuk 6 te analyseren.
De Shapley waarde is´ e´ en van de belangrijkste oplossingsconcepten in de co¨ operat-
ieve speltheorie. Verschillende axiomatische benaderingen van de Shapley waarde
kunnen in de literatuur worden gevonden. Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt een generalisatie
van de Shapley waarde naar de klasse van spelen in partitie functie vorm. Dit
hoofdstuk breidt concepten en axioma’s met betrekking tot de Shapley waarde uit,
en bestudeert een karakterisering voor deze waarde in spelen in partitie functie vorm.
Tot slot wordt een toepassing van de Shapley waarde gegeven voor een klasse van
partitie functie vorm oligopoliespelen.151
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt verscheidene problemen van co¨ operatieve kostenverdeel-
spelen voor een bergsituatie. Ik bekijk een groep personen wiens huizen op bergen
worden gebouwd, die een vallei of een deel van de kust omringen. Hun huizen zijn
nog niet aangesloten op een rioleringssysteem. Het afvalwater moet bergaf in een
waterzuiveringsinstallatie in de vallei of langs de kust worden verzameld, waar het
moet worden gezuiverd voordat het weer in het milieu kan worden geloosd. Dit
hoofdstuk bestudeert het probleem om huizen in bergen op een zuiveringsinstallatie
aan te sluiten. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een eenvoudige methode voorgesteld om een
opspannende boom met minimale kosten te vinden. Deze methode wordt gebruikt
om aan te tonen hoe regelingen kunnen worden geconstrueerd voor het toewijzen
van de kosten onder zijn leden, die populatie monotoon zijn.
Hoofdstukken 6 en 7 passen speltheorie toe op internationaal visserijbeheer. Het
centrale thema in deze hoofdstukken is de analyse van de opbrengsten verbonden aan
regionale samenwerking. In het bijzonder wordt er aandacht besteed aan het ”nieuw
lid” probleem van landen die interesse hebben getoond om lid van een regionale
visserijorganisatie te worden. Er wordt aangetoond dat er een netto opbrengst is
bij samenwerking, en dat de Shapley waarde het aangewezen mechanisme is om de
voordelen van samenwerking te verdelen.
Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt het probleem om de winsten in een visserijorganisatie
tussen de bestaande en nieuwe leden te verdelen. Er wordt aangetoond dat in
het geval van onafhankelijke landen de proportionele regel kan worden gebruikt om
v a n u i th e tN a s he v e n w i c h tt ek o m e nt o te e ne v e n w i c h tg e k e n m e r k td o o rm a x i m a l e
duurzame opbrengsten. Voorts stellen wij de populatie monotone toewijzingsregel
voor als beheersregel voor verdeling van winsten binnen een coalitie.
Hoofdstuk 7 behandelt gedeeltelijke samenwerking onder landen betrokken bij de
benutting van grensoverschrijdende en migrerende visvoorraden. De haalbaarheid
van coalitiestructuren en hun eﬀecten op visserij-inspanningen wordt geanalyseerd
door middel van spelen in partitie functie vorm. Voorts wordt aangetoond dat de
aangepaste Shapley waarde een aangewezen mechanisme is voor de verdeling van de
opbrengsten van samenwerking.